Supranational Law and Compliance by Reynolds, Evangeline Mae
SUPRANATIONAL LAW AND COMPLIANCE
BY
EVANGELINE MAE REYNOLDS
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Xinyuan Dai, Chair
Professor Paul Diehl
Professor Brian Gaines
Associate Professor Matthew Winters
Abstract
This dissertation sheds light on the reputational theory of international law, a theory used to
explain state behavior in relation to international law. Due to concerns for their reputation, it
is argued, countries will fulfill their commitments, not wanting to be excluded from cooperative
opportunities that come out of commitment-making in the future. Existing studies of international
law struggle to identify the effect of international law due to endogeneity resulting from the fact
that international law is by-and-large consent based.
The dissertation uses non-consent based international law to address the selection problem.
Specifically, the dissertation focuses on international legal obligations coming out of the Security
Council. Some Security Council resolutions are binding for all UN member states, even though
just a handful of UN members participate in creating the resolutions. Such law has the advantage
of yielding clear groups for comparison — law makers versus law receivers — in members of the
Security Council versus non-members. Also, participation or not is argued to be orthogonal to
issues voted on at the Security Council.
Consistent with reputational theory, I find that states that have a participatory role in creating
a resolution are more likely to comply with procedural aspects of the resolution. However, they
do not differ in substantive compliance compared to their non-participatory counterparts. In a
survey of elites, participants are more likely to worry about future participation with a country
that participates on the Council but does not comply, than with a country that does not participate,
and does not comply, which is consistent with reputational theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Israel guessed—correctly, as it proved—that the costs of [international law] viola-
tion would not be high and would be forgotten in the drama of the trial [of Adolf
Eichman].
– Louis Henkin
Breaking the rules comes with a cost, and Argentina could turn itself into an
international pariah.
– In˜igo Mendez de Vigo
A persistent question in International Relations has been: Why do states comply with interna-
tional law at all, given that they don’t face punishments as meted out in domestic contexts such
as imprisonments and fines? One of the most persuasive arguments as to how international law
affects state behavior is the rationalist theory of reputation, which argues that reputation plays a
significant role.1 Reputational theory asserts that states are motivated to comply because changes
in reputation might affect possibilities for future cooperative agreements.
The two quotations above refer to cases in which state actors opted to violate international
law. The first citation is from law scholar Louis Henkin’s analysis of the Israeli decision to kidnap
1Reputation for compliance should be distinguished from other types, such as reputation for toughness as discussed
in Alt, Calvert and Humes (1988); and reputation for following through with threats. See “Unpacking the State’s
Reputation” (Brewster, 2009) for a discussion of different types of state reputations.
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Nazi SS lieutenant colonel Adolf Eichmann upon learning in 1960 that he was alive and well in
Argentina. The second is from Spain’s Secretary of State for European Affairs In˜igo Mendez de Vigo
on Argentina’s 2012 threat to nationalize a Spanish company’s majority stake in the Argentine-
based Yacimientos Petrolferos Fiscales (YPF). In the first case, the Israelis decided to kidnap
Eichmann and in the second Argentina followed through with the nationalization of the petroleum
industry. Given these and other examples of non-compliance, the question bears examination: Do
reputational concerns motivate compliance with international law?
Given shortcomings in research on this topic, which I will later detail, the question of whether
reputation really plays a role in motivating compliance remains open. This dissertation seeks to
provide empirical evidence through an innovative approach using international mandates. Specifi-
cally, I offer conclusions based on new research comparing reactions to international law that some
countries experience as consent based and others experience as non-consent based.
Each country determines whether or not it will adhere to the obligations of consent based
international law. In this framework, states give their consent to be bound by international law,
tying their reputations to compliance. Traditionally, consent-based regulations are the only pathway
for creating new international law, and scholars typically assume its consensual nature.
Yet there are instances of non-consent based international law in which countries do not sign
onto it but nevertheless are bound. It stands to reason that comparing compliance with consent-
based and comparable non-consent based obligations will provide insight regarding the reputational
mechanism of compliance. According to the reputational theory, when a state signs onto an obli-
gation, it suffers reputational harm for non-adherence. In contrast, a state which does not sign
onto the same obligation, but faces the obligations, should suffer reputationally less for lack of
compliance.
My dissertation offers a new perspective using features of recent United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) resolutions. Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the fifteen Security Council
members to issue legally binding resolutions to the entire corpus of UN members. My research
divides the members into two study groups: Security Council members are the mandate issuers
and the UN members are mandate receivers. The responses of countries with different relationships
to the particular legal obligation can be leveraged to evaluate reputational theory.
In addition, my dissertation uses an original survey to gather evidence regarding the proposed
2
reputational mechanism. It explores the trustworthiness of two types of states–countries that par-
ticipate in international legal obligation creation that subsequently do not comply, versus countries
that do not participate in obligation creation, but face it and subsequently do not comply.
Is reputation damaged to different extents as extension of the theory predicts? Are governing
elites more concerned about compliance of states that participate in the creation of a resolution?
The goals of the next chapters are to answer these questions.
3
Chapter 2
Reputation and International Law
2.1 Theory
Scholars consider reputation to have a prominent role in explaining how international law mat-
ters. Beth Simmons explains compliance by invoking the reputational logic: “The acceptance of
treaty obligations raises expectations about behavior that, once made, are reputationally costly
for governments to violate” (2000, 819).1 Michael Tomz echoes, “By embedding agreements in
international law, countries ‘ante up a greater reputational stake’ . . . ” Tomz (2008, 5). Similarly,
Mitchell and Hensel (2007, 723) assert that agreeing to legally binding international settlements can
“raise reputational costs for treaty violation.” Douglas Gibler sums up the attitude of the discipline
simply, “Reputations are supposed to matter”2 (2008, 426).
Legal scholars employ a similar line of reasoning. Henkin (1979, 52) writes, “Every nation’s
foreign policy depends substantially . . . on maintaining the expectation that it will live up to in-
ternational mores and obligations.” Andrew Guzman3 explains, ”Among the reasons that states
comply with international law in the absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a concern for
1See this logic reiterated in Simmons and Hopkins (2005, 623) as well: “Treaties are the most formal ‘language’
governments have to focus the expectations of individuals, firms, and other states that they seriously intend to
keep their word in a particular policy area. Treaties enhance the reputational effects that may inhere in general
policy declarations, precisely because they link performance to a broader principle that underlies the entire edifice of
international law: pacta sunt servanda treaties are to be observed. By choosing to become a treaty party, governments
ante up a greater reputational stake than would otherwise be the case.”
2Gibler is also commenting both about reputation for resolve in military conflicts.
3A primary focus of Guzman’s research involves reputation as a mechanism for compliance with international law.
See Guzman 2002, Guzman 2005, Guzman 2008.
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their reputation for compliance with international legal rules” (Guzman, 2005, 383).4 Law scholar
Laurence Helfer also asserts that when “government leaders . . . signal their solemn commitment to
other nations, [they pledge] their reputations as collateral” (2008, 73).
While the reputational mechanism is popular among scholars, empirical studies of this mecha-
nism suffers shortcomings. In brief, the study of international law tends towards causal inference.
In this research frame, international laws are taken as treatments, the effect of which is measured.
The discipline struggles to account for selection and endogeneity. To consider international law as
a treatment in analyses, scholars effectively need to make selection mechanisms ignorable. This can
be a perilous task, and some argue that it has not been achieved in the case of international law.5
What is more, to the extent that scholars successfully make international law look like a treatment,
they move away from the analysis of reputation, which holds self-selection into international laws
as a theoretical tenet of how international law matters.6 My dissertation aims to take a new ap-
proach designed to address these pitfalls, advancing empirical study of the reputational theory of
international law.
2.1.1 Mechanism
Reputation purports that past actions shape expectations of future actions in repeated inter-
actions. These constructed expectations will also have an effect on actors’ willingness to interact
with each other in the future. Scholars note that even when state preferences over policy options
do not support short-run cooperation (Axelrod, 1981), cooperation may be sustainable when states
face off again and again.7 Cooperation with other countries allows for mutual gains. Reputational
theory argues that states have an incentive to comply with international law so as to be viewed as
4In another piece he describes a “simple model.” He critiques this basic model noting that reputation should not
be affected in cases where compliance may be the default action, i.e. where compliance is easy. This idea is also
emphasized in Tomz (2007) in his distinction between fair-weather versus stalwarts in loan repayment, information
is revealed only in difficult financial circumstances. Thinking about the reputation in contexts which can be modeled
as the prisoner’s dilemma. These are situations where the short-run best strategy is to not cooperate, i.e. the
non-compliant action.
5See Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2011).
6See Gaines and Kuklinski for more on how an emphasis on purely exogenous treatments may hamper the asking
of interesting social science question (2011).
7For example, actors in the prisoners’ dilemma game may play more cooperatively in a long-run rather than in
the short-run game. When one player consistently plays a cooperative strategy, the player may gain a reputation
for its consistency. In a prisoner’s dilemma action set, if the players are sufficiently patient by placing importance
upon future as well as current pay-offs, then repeated cooperative behavior can become a Nash equilibrium strategy
for both players.
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future partners. If states do not follow through with commitments, they may be considered less
likely to follow through with new commitments and therefore will be presented with fewer cooper-
ative opportunities. The reputational argument applied to the interaction between two countries is
detailed in the decision tree in Figure 2.1. Country 1 proposes and Country 2 chooses or declines
to enter into agreement. If Country 2 enters into agreement, it then subsequently decides whether
to comply or not. Later, Country 1 may decide whether or not to propose another cooperative
agreement. (In reality both states could propose new agreements and the compliance of both states
would be observed. For simplicity here, only the first state proposes, and the second state’s com-
pliance is observed.) Country 1’s decision to propose can be affected by observing the compliance
behavior of its partner. Country 2’s decision to comply or not may also be affected by the knowl-
edge that compliance or noncompliance will be observed by the other country. The reputational
theory of compliance with international law predicts a propensity toward the action set [Propose,
Sign, Comply, (Repeating) Propose...]. Also, the action set [Propose, Not Sign] is consistent with
the reputation theory of compliance. Consideration for reputation may dissuade a country from
signing on to a commitment it is unlikely to keep.
A pathway of non-compliance is not expected, but, in the event that non-compliance is observed,
we would expect the proposing state to follow with the [Not Propose] action. Given the anticipated
response of Country 1 to non-compliance, Country 2 is motivated to comply with international
law that it has taken on. Concern about another country’s history in following through with
its commitments makes states less willing to enter into an agreement with a country that has a
history of non-compliance. As is reflected in the schematic, the reputational theory of compliance
with international law assumes that international law is consent-based. While modeled here as a
two player interaction, compliance or noncompliance may be observed by third parties and effects
assessments of the actors.
Groups of states may also have control to either invite or deny state’s membership in exclusive
conventions and organizations.8 Reputational logic holds, too, when multiple states are involved.
8Consider China’s bid for the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership finally granted in 2001.
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Figure 2.1: The Reputational Mechanism of Compliance with International Law
2.1.2 Refinements
There is some debate about whether reputation travels between issue areas. The most basic theory
would imply that actions in one issue area, such as trade, would have an impact on reputation for
following through with commitment in another issue area, such as human rights. However, Downs
and Jones (2002) question whether compliance or noncompliance in one area affects reputation for
compliance in another issue area. Guzman (2008) argues that the effects of noncompliance do not
spill over into other issue areas when noncompliance is very costly for a state.
International relation scholarship also invokes reputation to explain behavior in international
conflict — following through not with legal commitment but rather with not backing down in
conflict.9 Classic writings such as Schelling (1960) and Jervis (1976) posit that reputation for
resolve plays a role in determining winners and losers in conflict, while skeptics, notably Mercer
(1996), argue that psychology of actors affects how they interpret other states’ behaviors. Kertzer’s
(2014) recent work adds nuance by considering dispositional characteristics of actors to the analysis.
In theory, the psychology of reputation for resolve is affected by preexisting dispositions of actors.
2.2 The State of the Field: Existing Empirical Studies
There is a growing effort to measure the causal effect of international law on state behavi r. Using
empirical evidence, scholars have tried to assess whether the reputational mechanism is really
9Also, some work on reputation in conflict is about following through with alliance promises instead of reputation
for steadfastness within a conflict. See Gibler (2008).
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at work in state compliance with international law. A popular strategy has been to control for
selection into international agreements in an attempt to estimate the causal effect of international
law. However, current statistical strategies for selection may not be adequate to accomplish this
task. What’s more, by trying to control for selection, studies, even as they invoke reputation as
primary motivation for states’ compliance, distance themselves from evaluating the reputational
theory. Because selection into international agreements is key to the mechanism for why reputation
motivates compliance, if we successfully remove selection, then reputation is not the focus of the
estimation. Both these problems are discussed below.
2.2.1 Comparisons for Causal Inference
A principle goal of social science is to describe and to provide theories that explain relationships, and
in turn assert causality. It follows that causal inference is required to provide evidence for causal
theories.10 Consensus is emerging that while description of patterns is important, establishing
causality is critical.11
The study of international relations does not lend itself to experimentation with random as-
signment of treatments — the “gold standard” for causal inference.12 Still, studying international
law as a cause, on its face, appears to have advantages over trying to establish causal relationships
using other “causes” in international relations. Unlike gradually changing variables in international
relations, (e.g. country wealth, trade openness, CINC score), international law can be considered
an intervention, and therefore more naturally regarded as a treatment. In practice, researchers do
tend to think of international laws as treatments — before ratification, countries are considered
untreated, and after ratifying they are considered treated.13
Having an intervention is only a starting point for making causal inferences. Considering an
international law as a treatment, the researcher then has to make the data resemble the “gold
10Scholars assert, “Causal inference is considered the gold standard in social science research” (Sen and Wasow,
2012).
11This trend is also apparent in the study of international law (Shaffer and Ginsburg, 2012).
12Randomized experiments are often called the gold standard of causal inference. This second usage is more typical,
i.e. the phrase “gold standard” is in reference to “random assignment” as the gold standard for causal inference.
Statistician Andrew Gelman writes on his blog, “I have always been taught that the randomized experiment is the
gold standard for causal inference....” Within he discusses a competing (though arguably minority) view. The website
http://andrewgelman.com/2006/07/07/the_randomized/ accessed June 12, 2013.
13This thinking is reflected in the ubiquitous “zero-one coding” of legal adherence to conventions, treaties, and
alliances.
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Figure 2.2: Hypothetical, idealized research design for causal inference with International Law as
“Treatment”
standard” of a randomized experiment via statistical corrections. The ideal situation, shown in
Figure 2.2, is where chance determines the treatment assignment. The aim is to isolate the effect of
international law (how much states change their behavior in the presence of international law versus
in the absence of international law). The difference between the control and treatment group which
is not explained by other factors is attributed to the international law intervention. To make a
causal inference the researcher must effectively strip the analysis to the core components of “. . . (1)
a unit of analysis, (2) a manipulable treatment, and (3) a specific outcome” (Sen and Wasow, 2012,
4).
Because there are no random experiments in international law, researchers use statistical tools
to make the comparisons between treatment and control units appropriate. The typical first cut
at this is a regressi n framework employing control variables. This approach acknowledges that
the treatment is not randomly assigned, and other causes may lead to variation in the response
variable. By accounting for variation in the response variable du to other causes, we will be in a
better position to attribute the remaining difference to the treatment of interest.
Beth Simmons (2000) illustrates this approach , by comparing the behavior on capital controls
of countries bound by Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to those that are not.
Attempting to hold everything else equal with control variables, Simmons contends that countries
that ascribe to Article VIII obligations are more likely to exhibit behavior that looks compliant.
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The form that her data and that of similar studies takes is shown in Figure 2.3, in which the
researcher tries to make ignorable — in the strict statistical sense — the pretreatment attributes
of the treatment and control groups.
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Figure 2.3: Usual source of data for international law studies and research strategy. The aim is
making treatment as-if random, the imagined situation in Figure 2.2.
Yet using control variables is probably n t sufficient to make the treatment assignment ignor-
able. The data generating process for international law treatment is self-selection into treatment. It
has been shown that failure to account for selection may result in biased estimates (Heckman, 1979).
Simmons research may not go far enough to make the treatment and control groups compar ble.
Failing to consider selection may represent a failure to make the distinction between compliance
and effectiveness.14 The units (countries) that select into the treatment (a sp cific international
law) may have greater pre-treatment propensity toward the outcome of interest. Perhaps only the
countries that find it easy select into the Article VIII obligation. Jana Von Stein (2005) argues this
point, and advocates for the use of a Heckman selection model.15
14The idea of distinguishing effectiveness from simple compliance is closely linked to causal inference.
15Before these quantitative statistical studies, scholars grappled with these issues. An oft used quotation by
Louis Henkin described nations’ compliance behavior with international law: “Almost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all their obligations almost all of the time” (Henkin, 1979, 47). The
quotation points to the fact that much of compliance with international law that is observed may be incidental.
One expects nations to comply with international law; they make agreements with the intent to fulfill their obliga-
tions (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Chayes and Chayes explain in arguing their position, “The most basic principle of
international law is that states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent. So . . . the state need not enter
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Von Stein (2005) does not believe that Simmons’ (2000) data cannot be used to address the
question of effectiveness but rather that a different statistical strategy must be used. Using the se-
lection model with Simmons’ data suggests that most of the economic behavioral difference between
countries that face an international obligation versus those that do not likely due to preexisting
economic propensities. Von Stein argues that Simmons should not reject the null of no difference in
response of treatment and control groups. Yet, notably, Simmons and Hopkins’ (2005) subsequent
matching approach leaves intact Simmon’s original finding that behavior consistent with Article
VIII is more likely for states that have signed onto it.16
While acknowledging the role selection plays in the data generating process, using selection
models and other statistical fixes will not always be a sufficient identification strategy in the in-
ternational law context. While selection models seem to offer much promise, there sometimes may
be no exogenous determinant of selection. In other words, if state preference for all intents and
purposes determines treatment17 can we really make causal inferences? Can statistical fixes achieve
into a treaty that does not conform to its interests.” Chayes and Chayes’ managerial school position, assign roughly
equal weight on the mechanisms of law and selection which lead to high levels of compliance. First, they assume that
there is a background propensity to comply with international law. Second, they treat selection as a positive aspect
of international agreements because it leads to self-enforcement (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Oran Young (Young,
1979) and Ronald Mitchell (Mitchell, 1994) have also argued for the “managerial schools interpretation of wide-spread
compliance.
The other side of the debate argues that if states enter into the agreements because the obligations are in-line with
states’ preferences, then international law does not change behavior (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). Downs et
al., take a skeptical view of the selection mechanism. For these authors international agreements are an expression
of what states intend to do anyway, and compliance should not be taken as much more than epiphenomenal —
international law does not change states’ behavior.
16After the Simmons-von Stein exchange, selection became a central methodological concern for international
law compliance studies. Consideration of selection effects is now commonplace in research designs. Sara McLaughlin
Mitchell and Paul Hensel (2007) invoke the reputational theory of compliance and ask whether legally binding dispute
settlements lead to greater compliance with settlements than do ad-hoc, non-binding settlements. Selection takes a
central role in their empirical strategy, and in this they follow von Stein. They explain, “a selection model is useful for
studying phenomena that are only observed for cases that meet some selection criteria, particularly when the selection
process might be systematically related to the primary phenomenon of interest.” However, they are susceptible to
the same critique as that made of von Stein’s approach. Additionally, it might be argued that the selection step
chosen for their model is not the correct step, given their hypothesis to be tested. Even though their phenomenon
of interest is exploring the effect of “bindingness” on compliance, their selection model is of “reaching agreement”
and not selection into the binding-type agreement. Their outcome of interest is compliance. I would be interested
in using their data to model selection into a binding agreement as the selection phase, conditional on “reaching
agreement”. This model would be much more consistent with the logic of the paper. As the paper stands, a strong
case could be made that the model for selection does not, in fact, model selection into the “treatment” of interest.)
The matching approach employed in Simmons and Hopkins (2005) has also been followed in Hill’s assessment of the
effect of adherence to human rights treaties (2010).
17Consider the contrast between the causal question in international law versus domestic law. Sen and Wasow
consider this question: “Is a worker training program effective in helping people go back to work?” In domestic
law, a state might pass a law which provides resources for such a program. The units treated are people within
a state. It is true that the unemployed may be part of the state, which introduces endogeneity, but the state and
these individuals do have distinct identities. Their treatment is exogenous – by the state. However, in this regard,
studies of international law are unlike the case of most of the studies on domestic law. In studies of the effectiveness
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as-if random treatment assignment of international laws?
When a unit of analysis self-selects into the treatment group, it is hard to imagine treatments
having been “assigned” differently. One might imagine that a few countries on-the-fence about
signing onto an international law or not, shocks could have flipped their decision from the counter-
factual by exogenous shocks.18 But for most of the countries observed, would this be the case? If
we could narrow down the countries to ones that are “on the fence” would there be enough of these
cases to make statistical inferences? What would be the source of exogenous variation (the cause of
flipping the on-the-fence countries) to provide a strong instrument for treatment? An element that
looks like chance as shown in Figure 2.2 - i.e. an orthogonal treatment mechanism – should play a
strong role in treatment assignment to assert causality between treatment and response variables.
The use of selection models to identify causation in international law studies has critics (Dunning,
2008; Sovey and Green, 2011). Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2011) argue that it is not clear
that von Stein’s implementation of the selection model solves the identification problem,19 noting
that von Stein makes “. . . no argument for a valid instrument” in her attempt at controlling for
selection bias.20 Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita argue that the required research design should
have “an instrument which provides exogenous variation in being bound by the rules.”21
Without a strong exogenous treatment mechanism, the questions remain: Does the treatment
of legal adherence to international law drive states to comply when it is not in their interest?
Are states just signing onto agreements which align with their preferences? Acknowledging the
likelihood for selection bias is a step in the right direction. Yet a better solution is a research
of international law the unit of the analysis, the state, is also the treatment giver. The state is usually both the
lawmaker and the subject.
18This is the logic of regression discontinuity design. However, seems unlikely to be able to identify countries that
were on-the-fence versus others.
19Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2011 EITM presentation “Research Design and Research Method”,
accessed January 20, 2013, http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Blogs/EITM/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
eitm-identification1.pdf. Simmons and Hopkin’s (Simmons and Hopkins, 2005) response to von Stein, using
matching, also does not address the problem to the satisfaction of Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita.
20There should be a variable that predicts signing onto international law treatment and does not violate the
exclusion restriction; i.e. a variable that only predicts the outcome through the intervening variable of international
law.
21An additional concern raised by Douglas Gibler (2008) is that different modeling choices will result in differing
inferential conclusions. Gibler’s tone is pessimistic about modeling selection: “In the end, selection bias makes it
exceedingly difficult to grasp the effects of intangibles such as reputation in a particular international crisis. Even
the most sophisticated models, which take selection bias seriously, are still heavily influenced by initial modeling
assumptions . . . which makes it difficult for examinations of crisis behavior to give a definitive assessment of the
influence of past actions” (Gibler, 2008, 5). Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita also assert that, even if von Stein “had
an instrument, [it] would not provide consistent estimates.”
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designs that makes use of strong instruments providing exogenous variation.
Yet, researchers may be resigned to the idea that they will never find such exogenous variation
when it comes to international law. The foremost scholars opine that international law is consent-
based and therefore is fundamentally an endogenous process (Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Henkin,
1979; Aust, 2010; Tomz, 2008).22 Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita argue that a strong instrument
is required, but do not offer examples. Circumvention of the selection problem amounts to con-
sidering international law as not fully consent-based — unimaginable to those considering consent
a fundamental tenet of international law. Tomz represents this viewpoint succinctly, “At root,
international law is what each state chooses for itself.” A research design with a strong instrument
may will be regarded as wishful thinking and/or unfamiliarity with the consent principle.
2.2.2 Causal inference approaches distance empirics from theory
There also exists a problem for an international law research design with exogenous treatments —
that the research would be distanced from the reputational theory of international law. Evaluating
the role of reputation in compliance differs from evaluating causal effects in purely physical systems.
In the case of smoking, trying to remove selection from the analysis is appropriate. The theory was
that smoking itself was linked to lung cancer – not that choosing to smoke caused cancer. However,
selection is essential in the reputational theory about states’ motivation to comply with international
law. According to the theory, states face reputational consequences for non-compliance precisely
because they make the commitment to a specific international law. Reputational theory is not
22The principle has been called the “most basic” principle of international law (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). They
write “The most basic principle of international law is that states cannot be legally bound except with their own
consent.” Louis Henkin emphasizes the consent principle in How Nations Behave, writing, “The society of nations
has no effective lawmaking body or process. General law depends on consent: in principle, new law, at least, cannot
be imposed on any state” (Henkin, 1979, 23). Anthony Aust is more concise: “[international law] is based on the
consent (express or implied) of states.” (Aust, 2010) Tomz Tomz (2008, 4) reflects:
... each nation in world affairs is its own lawgiver. Today as in the past, international law arises
almost entirely from treaties and other interstate agreements. Under the principle of sovereignty, no state
can be bound by an international agreement without consenting to its terms. Moreover, states always
have the option of withdrawing consent, thereby reversing legal commitments they took aboard at earlier
times. Some scholars maintain that international obligations stem not only from explicit agreements,
but also from consistent patterns of state practice that give rise to ‘customary law.’ Such customary
law does not bind states that ‘persistently object’ to the custom, however. At root, international law is
what each state chooses for itself.
Andrew Guzman, (Guzman also directly cites Aust) characterizes a traditional perspective: “The importance of
consent is built into the DNA of international law scholars. Many of the most important international law scholars
of the last 60 years have gone so far as to assert that a state cannot be bound without its consent” Guzman (2012,
60).
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about an exogenous process.
In fact, it might be argued that the extent to which the international law treatment is exogenous,
is related to how much a state’s reputation stands to suffer from non-compliance. In pursuit of causal
inference framework, researchers may have felt it necessary to sideline reputational theory. The
logic of reputational theory and the causal inference research paradigm, which requires exogenous
treatments, have co-existed uncomfortably with each other.
The endogenous nature of the reputational theory means that looking for exogenous treatment
for causal inference could result in a theory–empirics mismatch. In pursuit of causal inference
framework, researchers may have sidelined the reputational theory.
2.2.3 Conclusions on the state of the field
Behavioral patterns in many studies of international law are consistent with reputational theory.23
It does appear that international law, may change state behavior through reputation by motivating
compliance. However, it may be that states sign onto an international statute because they would
have chosen a behavior the consistent with compliance anyway. Other states may decide not
to become adherents to an international law, knowing that they would not be able to or would
not wish to comply. Causal-inference-based evidence is lacking in most studies of compliance
with international law because studies have not been able to make as-if random comparisons —
comparisons between countries that have equal probability of being assigned to a treatment or
control group. Instead in the typical data that researchers analyze, states either face international
law they have chosen to sign onto, or do not face an international law having chosen not to sign
onto it. Scholars have conceived of international law itself as a treatment. But this has been shown
to be problematic as self-selection is determinative in treatment assignment – and because taking
international laws as treatments results in a disconnect from reputational theory.
What researchers lack is data that provide a strong identification strategy for causal inference,
(i.e. an exogenous treatment mechanism) and that comments on the reputational theory – i.e.
a treatment in which international law reputation is in play versus a control treatment where
international law reputation is not in play. Given such circumstances researchers could confidently
23A notable exception is Oona Hathaway’s oft cited finding that authoritarian human rights records worsen after
signing the Convention Against Torture.
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attribute behavioral changes to reputation. Heretofore, researchers have not identified such a
circumstance. Sometimes statisticians warn that in spite of the importance of determining causal
relationships in a research area, some problems simply do not lend themselves to causal inference
(Berk, 2003). However, given my proposed research design, these challenges are surmountable; we
are able to study compliance with international law in the causal inference framework.
15
Chapter 3
Research Strategy
3.1 Non-consent Based International Law
Until now, international law by consent and the resulting concern for endogeneity in empirical
studies, have presented a quandary because scholars have not observed ideally informative points
of comparison. If it were the case that states faced international legal obligations only via an
endogenous process, the problem of evaluating the reputational theory could seem insurmountable.
But the view that international law is exclusively consent-based is not correct. Non-consent based
international law does exist, and it can be leveraged to effectively examine the reputational question.
3.1.1 Scholarship on Non-Consent Based International Law
In the field of international law many scholars have commented extensively on non-consent based
international law, though not yet in terms of evaluating reputational theory. Szasz (2002) puts forth
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 as groundbreaking in that it legislates to all UN members and
not just in relation to a specific conflict or isolated geographic location. In Stephen Talmon’s piece,
“The Security Council as World Legislature”, Talmon considers recent Security Council resolutions
that require action by all UN member states to deny resources to terrorist organizations and their
affiliates (Talmon, 2005).
An other well-known source of non-consent based international law is that of the European
Union Parliament and Council. Many scholars have written about compliance with EU directives,
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which are not consensus-based. All countries do have representatives participating in the EU
Parliament and Council, but universal consent is not required for EU directives to become binding
for all states (Toshkov, 2008; Falkner et al., 2004; Falkner, Treib and Holzleithner, 2008).
Perhaps the most complete review of non-consent based international law is Helfer (2008).
He defines nonconsensual law as that which results from “the creation of a legal obligation that
binds a member state of a treaty or an international organization (IO) even where that country
has not ratified, acceded to, or otherwise affirmatively accepted that obligation.” Helfer discusses
examples of international legislatures that scholars may be less aware of, such as the IMF and the
World Bank which do not require consensus for legally binding rule changes. Helfer reflects on the
tradeoff between the “participation deficit” — the idea that states which might be most important
in participating in specific international laws might be the most resistant to participating — which
makes mandated international law attractive and the “compliance deficit” — the idea that consent
leads to higher compliance — which is good for international law legitimacy.
Concerned with the so-called participation deficit, Guzman’s legal article “Against Consent”
(2012), argues that international law under a consent based system is not equipped to deal with
global challenges and that organizations non-consensual international law should not be discour-
aged. Interestingly, despite of his earlier focus on reputation, for example in Guzman 2008, he does
not discuss the reputational implications of non-consent based international law.
Meyer (2014), by contrast, argues that the reach of non-consent international law may be exag-
gerated. While international legislatures may bind states without their consent, these legislatures’
features allow a state or a minority of states to obstruct new legal proposals, as in many national
legislatures, which favors the status quo.
3.1.2 Evaluating the Causal Role of Reputation in International Law
While the above literature has broken new ground, it does not use non-consent based international
law to shed light on the reputational question. Yet this vein of international law has testable
implications for the reputational theory of international law. The reputational theory implies a
state that participates in creating an obligation would be at greater reputaional risk compared to a
state that receives the obligation as a mandate. Observing non-compliance by the state that faces an
international obligation after signing onto it provides much more information to other states about
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compliance levels; the non-complier has violated its commitment. Where a commitment has not
been made – when a country receives an obligation as a mandate — there is less information about
the likelihood of non-compliance with commitments in future rounds and in turn its reputation
should not be as affected.1
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Figure 3.1: The data for studying international law usually compares country’s behavior where one set of
countries faces international law with a set of countries that does not face international law. Above, we see
the comparison I make, between two groups of countries that both face international law, but which differ
in whether or not they participated in the creation of that international law.
Figure 3.1 depicts this situation that non-consent based international law, in conjunction with a
good instrument, could offer: observing the difference in compliance between an as-if random assign-
ment of law makers and law receivers.2 This design contrasts with the traditional approach which
considers facing an international law obligation or not as the comparison of interest. Instead, the
1The countries that face an obligation without signing on are usually just the product of a thought experiment,
i.e. they exist only in the researcher’s imagination. Most commonly, there are no observations in this category which
makes empirical study of the reputational mechanism of compliance problematic. For example, in all of the empirical
studies that I covered, the cases studied are ones where states choose to sign onto a law for themselves. Also, note tha
this contrasts with Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita’s imagined exogenous treatment: “exogenous variation in being
bound by the rules.” Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita’s imagined treatment, discussed above, considers compliance
in an atheoretical way, asking the age old question does international law matter, but not, how does international
law matter. In fact, if one cares not about the question “Does international law matter?” but “Does international
law matter through the mechanism of reputation?”, then the exogenous variation imagined by Ashworth and Bueno
de Mesquita is the wrong treatment. Through consent, states put their own reputation on the line so the exogenous
variation would need to be on consent or not to being bound the rules.
2It might be argued that this situation is still not what we would like to study to get a grip on the reputational
question. Perhaps countries that are on the Security Council but do not follow through with their obligations will not
be judged so harshly. Maybe this does not speak poorly of a countries ability to follow through with commitments
that it truly decides to take on, not which it participates in because it happens to be on the Council. This point
has some merit - we might expect the effect of reputation to be dampened in this situation. However, the logic of
reputation is still at play, and there is a distinction to be made between the country that participates and does not
in the resolution creation (this is tested in the survey as well). What’s more, it is hard to imagine a research design
that would further satisfy the reputational scholar’s wish list, beyond the design I present.
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difference in relationship to the international obligations is the treatment. The law maker/receiver
comparison is a key comparison that has not as of yet been leveraged. This comparison allows us
to focuses squarely on the question of the effect of reputation.
Specifically, I look at countries’ responses to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res-
olutions. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may legally bind all UN
member states via resolutions — an avenue for the creation of new international obligations for all
UN member countries in which countries’ relationship to a given resolution varies. Some participate
in the resolution’s creation as members of the Security Council, but countries that are not on the
Security Council when the resolution was issued see it as a mandate.
Comparing such groups — countries where the obligation is a mandate, versus countries sign-
ing onto international obligations themselves — is of interest.3 The empirical implication of the
reputational theory of international law is that participants in the creation of a Security Council
resolution should exhibit better compliance, since they are faced with greater reputational costs for
non-compliance than countries that did not participate in the creation of the resolution.
3.2 Security Council Resolutions Research Design Advantages
Legally binding Security Council resolutions are well suited for the study of reputation for several
reasons. First, UNSC resolutions are a source of non-consent based international law providing a
new vantage point that contrasts to the modal approach of studying consent-based international
law. Second, while resolutions are mandated law for some countries, they are at the same time
consent based for members of the Security Council. Thus we are able to make the key comparison
between law makers and law receivers. Third, the treatment assignment mechanism - rotation on
and off the Council assists in research design. Because of the Council rotation, other potential
treatments are clear. We can as easily imagine a different set of states participating in the passing
of a resolution: other sets of countries that plausibly could have been seated on the Council. Thus
the appropriate contrast space is clear. Fourth, this data generating process for treatment, rotation
3Sometimes, countries will not vote in favor of a resolution which passes. This presents a deviation from the game
form I describe in Figure 3.1. However, I do not consider resolutions where there are abstentions or votes against a
passing resolution among my empirical cases. If a country were to vote against a resolution which eventually passes,
we can imagine that there would be less reputational loss for noncompliance when compared to the country that
votes for the resolution.
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onto the Security Council, is arguably independent of the content of specific issues raised to the
Security Council. Orthogonality to resolutions’ issue content allows for causal identification.
3.2.1 Legislative Resolutions
In my view only legislative Security Council resolution are useful for the proposed study which
means that there are relatively few resolutions that will meet these criteria; ultimately I only
examine three Resolutions. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, precipitated those that
I examine. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to resolutions with far
reaching effect, which has been described as a legislative shift (Szasz, 2002; Talmon, 2005). Szasz
(2002) characterizes the shift,
With its recent resolution to counter the threat of terrorism [Resolution 1373], the
United Nations Security Council broke new ground by using, for the first time, its
Chapter VII powers under the Charter to order all states to take or to refrain from
specified actions in a context not limited to disciplining a particular country. (Szasz,
2002)
This new type of resolution has been aimed broadly at securing assets, materials, and privileges
from use by terrorist organizations.4
There are only a handful of Security Council resolutions enacted since 2001 which meet the
qualifications of being described as “legislative” (Szasz, 2002; Talmon, 2005), requiring substantive
action by all UN member states. The specific ones that I will examine in the following chapters
are UNSC Resolution 1373, “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”;
UNSC Resolution 1540, “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”; and UNSCR 1624,
“Threats to international peace and security (Security Council Summit 2005)”.
Chapter VI, Military Action, Peacekeeping and Sanctions Resolutions
Other types of Security Council Resolution are less useful for my study. Resolutions passed under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, as opposed to Chapter VII, are not legally binding,5 so given our
4Notably, UN Security Council also changed substantially after the end of the Cold War. The sheer quantity of
resolutions has increased dramatically in the post-cold war period.
5Chapter VI resolutions have political value — condemning actions, making exhortations and recommendations
— but do not have legally binding content.
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concern with binding international law, such resolutions are not useful. Also some Chapter VII res-
olutions are not useful for my study including military action and peacekeeping resolutions.6 Such
resolutions are limited geographically in scope and do not impose an obligation on UN members;
for states that are not involved in supplying troops or resources we would expect no behavioral
change. The resolutions used for the research design require action by all states. Sanctions resolu-
tions, also passed under Chapter VII, are not so useful. These resolutions have specific geographic
targets. Some countries may have no or almost no trade with the target country to begin with, so
such a resolution would have little impact on them. Also, failure to comply may be hidden when a
resolution constitutes a prohibition.7 For these reasons, only a handful of “legislative” resolutions
provide the best research opportunities. These resolutions are binding, and require action by all
UN member countries.
3.2.2 Asserting Orthogonality
As I mention above, rotation of the Security Council non-permanent membership, especially given
the fact that it is arguably independent from issues arising on the Council, is an important feature
to my analytical framework. The treatment mechanism is the rotation of non-permanent members
on the Security Council, while the treatment of interest itself is being on the Council or not when a
resolution is passed. There are ten non-permanent members of the Council, and new members rotate
onto the Council for two-year membership terms. This is an exogenous instrument for treatment
(participation) assignment if compositions do not change in anticipation of specific global security
issues that arise.
I argue that assignment to the different treatments (being on the Security Council or not,
6Erik Voeten estimates that between its inception in 1946 and 1998, the UNSC authorized 46 peacekeeping missions
and adopted 167 resolutions under Chapter VII (Voeten, 2001). “Security Council enforcement powers have been
employed with dramatically increased frequency-more than two hundred Chapter VII resolutions were passed between
1990 and 2004, compared to only seven during the Cold War-and its practice of authorizing coalitions of states to
conduct coercive actions is well established and increasingly common. Most invocations of Chapter VII have come
in the context of peacekeeping missions and do not qualify as coercive interventions. However, these operations are
often complex and evolve toward a mixture of consent and coercion, sometimes with extensive authority to use force”
(Thompson, 2006, 2).
7Consider the case of Argentina’s arms shipments to Croatia in violation of UNSC Resolution 713, imposing an
arms embargo on Yugoslavia. It is alleged that “In late 1991 [Argentine] President Menem authorized the transfer
of 6500 tonnes of weapons to Panama. The consignment was diverted and shipped to Croatia. In 1992, Menem
authorized the sale of $51 million worth of weapons to Bolivia. This transfer was also diverted to Croatia” (Bromley,
2007, 13). The SPIRI report also other sources of arms during the arms embargo were China, Central and Eastern
European Countries (Bromley, 2007).
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and therefore participation in resolution creation) is orthogonal to the presentation of a specific
resolution. If this is the case, the treatment assignment is exogenous and is therefore may be used
in causal identification.
Stated more formally, assignment of countries to the Security Council or not varies from year to
year independently of the specific issues that will be voted upon in the Security Council. Expressed
in ex ante probabilities, P (Ai|t) = P (Ai), where A is the outcome that country i is observed on
the Security Council, and t is the year.8 That is, Ai is independent of t. Also, P (Rt|t) > 0 and
P (Rt|¬t) = 0 where Rt is a specific resolution passed on the Security Council in year t because of
the timing of events that arise in the international system. The probability that the resolution is
presented and passed in year not t is zero, that is the probability of its occurrence is determined
by t. It follows that P (A|R) = P (A) and P (R|A) = P (R).
Arguments for the Independence Assumption
There is good reason to believe that this is indeed the case for a few reasons, even though mem-
bership on the Council is by election. First, typically countries run campaigns for election with a
general interest in influencing global politics, and not to vote on a specific issue. In fact, countries
usually will not be able to guess precisely what issues will be voted on once on the Security Council
because many countries use a “calling dibs” strategy to secure their seat on the Council. In other
words, many countries make know and begin campaigning for a particular Security Council mem-
bership tenure years in advance of the target tenure. For example, the campaign for Australia’s
2013-2014 seat on the Security Council began five years prior in 2008. Upon winning the seat,
Australian Prime Minister Julie Gillard expressed interest in addressing specific issues, but many
of these issues, like the crisis in Syria, arose since the bid for a seat was initiated back in 2008.
The motivation for membership seems to have been enhanced global political voice in general given
8Note that, once a country’s presence on the Security Council has been defined, P (Ai|t0) = 1, then there is
temporal dependence. Countries serve on the Council two years at a time - half of the members changing each year.
Thus the chance of being on the Council in year t+ 1 is about half if it is known that it was on the Council in year t.
Also, the probability of being on the Council approaches zero for a country in year t if it is known that that country
was on the Council in both year t − 1 and t − 2. There is no precedent for non-permanent members being on the
Council in back to back terms. This is not something that I am greatly concerned about, because the I analyze the
resolutions independently. Also, later in the paper I discuss the creation of synthetic Security Councils. The temporal
dependence between the time a country is on the Council and the next time it is on the Council is not a problem, as
I only am trying to create a set of plausible Councils, I do not worry about when they could occur relative to each
other.
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Australia’s long absence from Council membership—its last tenure being 1985-1986—rather than
to be able to vote on any specific issue.9
Many other cases fall into this pattern of early seat claiming. Back in 2012, New Zealand
had already declared its bid for Security Council Membership in 2015-2016.10 Italy declared its
bid for the 2016 election in 2009,11 Japan and Ukraine had declared their bids for membership
for 2015-2016 in 2013, Belgium for the 2018 election in 2013,12 Norway for the 2020 election in
2013,13 Afghanistan for the 2020 election,14 Albania for the 2021 election,15 Bahrain for the 2021
election,16 Switzerland for the 2022 election,17 and Greece for the 2024 election.18 These countries
cannot hope to guess the precise issues that the Council will be voting on in the year of their future
membership, should they eventually win the seat.
This dynamic often leads to little contestation when it comes time for the election to the Security
Council and, frequently, even closed slate elections. For the 2012 October election for the 2013-
2014 open seats, for example, commentators as early as May 2012 were already saying the race was
locked-in, confident that Chad, Chile, Lithuania, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia would win the election
for 2013.
There are critics of closed slates for the Security Council’s non-permanent membership; they
are concerned that the Assembly’s vote does not depend on the positions and preferences of the
9“Australia wins seat on UN Security Council” http://www.news.com.au/national-news/
australia-wins-seat-on-united-nations-security-Council/story-fncynjr2-1226498925124
“The former prime minister [Kevin Rudd] and foreign minister kicked off Australia’s bid for a non-permanent
Council seat in 2008, before being replaced by Julia Gillard as prime minister and Labor leader two years later.”
10See article above, on Australia.
11The article, “Italy a candidate for a non-permanent member of the Security Council for 2017-2018,” was
published on May 12, 2009 http://www.italyun.esteri.it/Rappresentanza_ONU/Menu/Comunicazione/Archivio_
News/2009_05_12+Candidatura+CdS+2017_18.htm and was accessed June 27, 2013
12The website indicating this,http://countries.diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newyorkun/, was accessed June 27,
2013.
13The website indicating this, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/
reports-to-the-storting/2011-2012/meld-st-33-20112012-2/3/2.html?id=717920, was accessed Sept 27, 2014
14The article “Choosing Between Allies and UNSC Seat: India’s Catch 22 Situation”, http://capsindia.org/
files/documents/CAPS_Infocus_AK2.pdf, is from 2013.
15The statement was accessed from the website “Permanent Mission of Albania to the United
Nations”, http://web.archive.org/web/20120322191401/http://www.albania-un.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=57:welcome&catid=37:statements&Itemid=41.
16“Security Council Elections: Options after Saudi Arabia Rejects its Seat” http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/
10/security-council-elections-options-after-saudi-arabia-rejects-its-seat.php
17“Swiss aim for UN Security Council in 2023-24.” January 12, 2011 http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/
Swiss_aim_for_UN_Security_Council_in_2023-24.html?cid=29225198 Accessed June 27, 2013
18“Candidature of Greece as a non-permanent member for 2025-2026.” This article, found at http://www.mfa.
gr/missionsabroad/en/un-en/about-us/candidatures.html, was updated Wednesday, 05 December 2012, and ac-
cessed June 27, 2013.
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candidates on specific issues, but rather in larger part on the happenstance of candidates’ self-
slating and coordinated election logrolling. One commentator argues, “Closed slates deny the world
community an opportunity to seat states with demonstrated positions on current or anticipated
threats to international peace.”19 He also comments that the practice of closed slates “encourages
vote trading for states who agree to stand aside one year in exchange for unchallenged support in
the future.”
From a normative perspective, his concerns may be valid, but this feature of membership is
beneficial for the current study. It is advantageous for the study that countries’ specific preferences
and what is on the world security agenda not be linked to get at causal identification.
Challenges to the Orthogonality Assertion
Some might challenge the assertion of orthogonality between timing of membership and issues voted
upon at the Council. From time to time there are contested elections, such as the 2010 Canada,
Portugal and Germany race, for the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) 2011-2012 seat,
in which Canada lost the bid for a seat.20 Also, Azerbaijan and Slovenia vied in 2011 for the
2012-2013 open Eastern European seat on the Security Council.21 However, analysis of such races
does not find that countries are vying for membership to vote on some specific issue but rather for
enhanced global influence or prestige or very general platforms.22
Also, when there is just one contested seat (which is usually the case if there is any contestation
at all), it is hard to imagine that the two different possible Security Council compositions that
might have resulted would have a dramatic impact on the outcome for the draft resolutions that
I study. Only nine affirmative votes are needed to pass a Resolution, but the cases that I study
garner unanimous support.23
An additional potential reason for concern it that issues and members could be linked is if the
timing of the tabling of resolutions is delayed or hastened due to the changing composition of the
Council. It is true that there is substantial endogeneity in terms of what reaches the Security
19http://globalmemo.org/2013/05/29/2013-security-Council-race-no-contest/
20Canada loses bid for UN Security Council seat” http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/10/12/
15662311.html
21http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/24/world/europe/un-security-Council
22Consider Canada in 1998 (Malone, 2000).
23Article 27 of the UN Charter stipulates “Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members.”
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Council for a vote. One reason for this situation is what is termed the “virtual veto”. The rarity
of seeing an actual veto by one of the P5 is due to the fact that “the draft resolution is either
modified to make it acceptable to the permanent member(s) which might otherwise veto it, or is
just not put to a vote” (Aust, 2010). Moreover, the endogeneity induced by veto power of the
P5 does not translate into dependence between resolution issues and Security Council membership
composition. Security Council compositions and a specific resolution’s content may be independent
even given this “virtual veto” because the P5 membership is constant from year to year. However,
Resolution 1373 was passed almost immediately in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. Resolution 1540 was passed in the wake of growing revelations in 2004 on the Pakistani
government official A.Q. Khan’s illegal supplying of nuclear materials to countries of concern like
Libya and Iran. It is more likely, in these cases, that world events precipitated action on the
Security Council at the moment when action was most urgent, and little consideration was given
to which members happened to be on the Security Council. In fact, Pakistan was on the Security
Council in 2004. Pakistan was difficult to persuade to support Resolution 1540 on the control of
sensitive materials, but leadership in the Council proceeded.
Another problematic issue would be endogeneity resulting from decisions on the timing or
content of a resolution being related to the non-permanent members of the Security Council. Aust
(2010, 193) notes, “five to seven members (usually) belong ... to the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM)”, which could vote as a block especially if their organization exercises influence to coordinate
on a vote. He further notes, “abstention by any seven members will prevent any decision being
adopted (15-7=8), and is known as the “collective veto”. Endogeneity resulting from a potential
“collective veto” is of greater concern than the issue of the “virtual veto”, and can be considered
on a case by case basis. First, I need to evaluate if there is evidence of manipulating the timing
of tabling of a resolution. Second, I can see to what extent changes were made on drafts of a
Resolution. Third, the margin of victory might tell to what extent the collective veto may have
come into play, and how popular the resolution would have been generally, had a different Council
been seated. I will examine these issues in greater detail in future research.24
Additionally, the recent unprecedented and unanticipated move of Saudi Arabia rejecting its
24For the three Security Council Resolutions that are a part of my study, all fifteen members of the Security Council
voted in favor of the resolutions for each resolution.
25
2014-2015 seat on the Security Council, citing current events in the Middle East and especially in
Syria and Iran as its motivation, might be cause for concern. Jordan took its seat. This represent
a case where the Security Council composition has changed due to the temporally immediate
preferences of would be members. Fortunately for my analysis, this is a new phenomenon and
does not affect the empirical cases I evaluate. Replication of the analysis presented here, with
resolutions passed in 2014 or later should take the Security Council “boycott” option into careful
consideration, especially if other states to follow suit.25
3.2.3 Potential Outcomes Analytical approach
I have made the case that treatment is orthogonal to state preference. Given this condition, I can
assess the question in a potential outcomes framework: Is compliance better for countries that were
treated (did participate) than those might have been treated (might have participated). One way
to attempt to approximate this comparison is by using a regression model approach, to try to the
effect of other country features that might explain variance in the compliance outcome. However,
regression estimation can suffer from bias due to omitted variables and an error structure which is
not independently and identically distributed (IID). I do use a regression approach, however my
preferred approach is to use the natural point of comparison — other Security Council member
compositions.
First, I look at the responses of realized Security Councils to the resolution in question. The best
comparison for the behavior of the true treatment group is with other observed Security Council
compositions because these compositions might have been in place, but happened not to be, when
the resolution in question is passed. I compare treated countries behaviors with those of countries
that might have been on the Security Council. Collecting the aggregate compliance behavior of
many observed Security Councils, we can construct a meaningful reference distribution for the
treated Council.
25What’s more, it has been asserted that Jordan may be taking its cues on the Security Council from Saudi Arabia
which stepped aside for Jordan to be on the Council. This raises the question: to what extent do countries act on
behalf of another country or the region? If it is true that country missions to the UN Security Council see themselves
as delegates or trustees for the region, and do not representatives primarily of their country, then my logic could break
down. In that case, countries would not feel the reputational pressure to follow through with a resolution that they
helped to create. Rather they voted for the resolution on behalf of the region. However, this thinking is probably
incorrect. Diplomats representing their country at the Security Council have their home governments as their bosses
and benefactors, and not some regional body.
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Secondly, I amplify these comparisons by creating other plausible treatment groups — synthetic
Security Council compositions, mimicking Security Council formation by drawing ten countries
from the 193 UN member countries that are not permanent members.26 Included in Appendix A
is the script in the statistical software package R, written to make the draw look plausibly like a
true composition; they meet the regional requirements and the probability of countries appearance
comes from the observed frequency of non-permanent members.
3.3 Existing Studies Exploiting Security Council Rotation
Other scholars have exploited features of the Security Council rotation for causal identification.
Most have considered the aid outcomes as a function of Security Council membership. Scholars
have found that when countries are on the Council, they are more likely to enjoy larger sums of
US foreign aid (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), grants awards from the World Bank (Dreher, Sturm
and Vreeland, 2009a), the loan awards from the IMF (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009b), and aid
from the Asian Development Bank (Lim and Vreeland, 2013). Also a study by Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2010) posits being on the Security Council, because of the aid flows, leads to negative
political outcomes, like decreased economic growth and fall in level of democracy.
All of these studies, like mine, posits that Security Council membership is a good instrument for
a treatment - that treatment is a “quasi-natural experiment.” Dreher et al. (2014), analyzing the
determinants of non-permanent Security Council membership, assert that election to the Security
Council is independent of political or economic development.
Given this research, I am content that my assertions about the SC as an instrument are rea-
sonable. At the same time, I will take extra care to consider aid flows to non-permanent SC
members.27
26Non-parametric methods could be used, of course; for example, the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon ranks test could
help determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the treated and untreated cases. However, while
this is a valid pathway for statistical inference, it would not be valid for causal inference unless the treatment had
been randomly assigned. We know that this is not the case. While there is good reason to believe that assignment
is exogenous and orthogonal, but each country does not have an equal probability of being on the Security Council
in any given year.
27The work of Dreher et al. (2014), “The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council”, will be
a further challenge to my analysis. Most of their findings are not at all problematic to my analysis because they are
time insensitive. They summarize their findings: “UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the
demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn.” The one
confounder that they uncover not addressed by my analytical strategy is that involvement in warfare lowers election
probability. This information can be included in future analysis. Specifically, synthetic Security Council compositions
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3.4 Dissertation Overview
In the next three chapters of my dissertation, I explore the empirical support for reputation. In
the first empirical chapter, I examine the responses of UN member countries to three resolutions
issued by three different Security Councils throughout time — the fulfillment reporting requirements
for Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1624. These resolutions were a reaction to September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and imposed legal obligations on all UN member states without targeting one
country or entity. All three resolutions required states to respond by returning one or more reports
to the Security Council. Compliance by countries which participated in their creation is compared
to that of countries that did not participate.
In the second empirical chapter, I examine Resolution 1540 in more depth, created by the
2004 Security Council Resolution 1540. This resolution, like Resolutions 1373 and 1624, targeted
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction required states to report to the Security Council
regarding compliance. Subsequently, the 1540 Committee, dedicated to the implementation of
Resolution 1540, created matrices charting each state’s level of fulfillment of almost 400 items. This
chapter’s response variable is based on these matrices, which represent substantive compliance. To
reiterate, comparisons are between countries that participated in the creation of this resolution,
and countries not on the Security Council in 2004 - which received the obligation that Resolution
1540 presents as a mandate.
The third empirical chapter examines survey data collected in September 2011 and August 2012
from 50 deputies the Brazilian House of Deputies. The survey questions were designed to compare
the drive to comply with a resolution that Brazil helped create, versus a resolution that arose when
Brazil was not involved. Because Brazil frequently sits on the Security Council, second only to
Japan, Brazilian officials should have found either situation realistic. As a regular member of the
Security Council, Brazil creates international law for which it is responsible; when a non-member,
it is a recipient of Security Council mandates. Additionally, the survey also asked the deputies
to judge the trustworthiness of other countries — those do not comply with a resolution and are
not on the Security Council versus those that do not comply with the resolution and are on the
Security Council.
can be created that have a lower probability of including a country at war or embroiled in civil war.
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Chapter 4
Procedural Compliance with Non Con-
sent Based International Law
Within a month of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security Council passed Res-
olution 1373, targeted at withholding financial resources from actors linked to terrorism. This
resolution was the first among several that had a fundamentally different quality from previous
Security Council resolutions. For the first time the Security Council could be described as a “world
legislature” (Szasz, 2002; Talmon, 2005). For the first time the Security Council — under the
power vested to it by Chapter VII of the UN Charter — issued a broad mandate to all UN member
countries to have in place national measures to respond to a general global security threat and not
just a specific crisis in a narrow geographic context.
Resolution 1373 and subsequent, related resolutions 1540 and 1624 have been recognized as
milestones for the evolution of international law.1 Given their legislative character, these resolu-
tions provide a unique opportunity to assess the reputational theory of international law. In the
introductory chapter of the dissertation, I theorized about how reputation would have a different
effect on states’ compliance with mandated international law; if countries receive international law
as a mandate, they stand to lose less reputationally than they would if they had consented to it.
I have argued in the previous chapter of the dissertation that direct tests for the reputational
1Resolutions 1540 and 1624 also aimed at denying resources to terrorists. By title these are: “Threats to inter-
national peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, UNSC Resolution 1373; “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction”, UNSC Resolution 1540; and “Threats to international peace and security (Security Council Summit
2005)”, UNSCR 1624.
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mechanism are lacking. Thus, my dissertation represents a shift to use of non-consent based in-
ternational law to provide new leverage to evaluate the persistent questions, “Is the reputational
mechanism in fact at work?” and “How can the reputational theory of international law be sup-
ported empirically?” Specifically, I compare the effect of international law that some countries see as
consent based and other countries see as non-consent based — a novel and important comparison.
To reiterate from the previous chapter, consent based means that states decide their interna-
tional legal obligations for themselves, and traditionally consent is the sole means for creating
new international law. States put their reputations on the line when they sign onto international
law, giving consent to be bound by it. Yet increasingly, non-consent based international law is
arising. Comparing the more common circumstance of a consent based international obligation to
non-consent based obligation, could provide the clearest evidence heretofore for the reputational
mechanism of compliance with international law.
The implication of the reputational theory is straightforward. In one situation, a state takes on
an obligation itself. This type of state should suffer reputational harm if it does not follow through
with the commitments it has made. By contrast, a state that faces the same obligation, but did not
take on the obligation itself—seeing it instead as a mandate—should suffer less reputationally if it
does not follow through with the obligation. In turn we would expect to observe worse compliance
records for countries facing the obligation as a mandate. In the next section, I argue that these
comparisons can be made by looking at the Security Council Resolutions which are both consent
based for Security Council members and non-consent based for non-members.
4.1 Constrained Randomization Analysis
In Chapter II, I’ve made the case that treatment is orthogonal to state preference on the response
variable. At this point, there are many statistical tools that could be used to compare the treatment
and control groups. I propose using a constrained randomization test to make the causal inference
for this comparison. Many researchers might simply use the data in a cross sectional regression
framework to predict responsiveness to a particular resolution given treatment by participation in
the creation of a Security Council resolution. However, regression analysis can suffer from omitted
variable bias and problems if data violates modeling assumptions - such as independently and
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identically distributed (IID) errors. A randomization test is an attractive way to move past these
concerns.
While a generic randomization test would be valid for statistical inference such a test would not
be helpful for causal inference unless the treatment had been randomly assigned. Assignment to
serve on the Security Council obviously does result from a random process, though the assignment
is argued to be exogenous and orthogonal. Each country does not have an equal probability
in any given year of being in the treatment group (countries that are on the Security Council
when the resolution in question is passed) versus control (countries not on the Security Council).2
Obviously, the likelihood of assignment to the non-permanent membership group is not equal among
all countries, considering that 71 modern countries have never been on the Security Council and
might have low chances of being on the Council in general, compared with, for example Brazil or
Japan, on the Security Council 20 years each. More populous countries tend to be on the Council
more frequently as well. (Dreher et al., 2014) Also, the regional representation requirement — that
fixes the number of non-permanent member seats for each region — means that there is variation
in the baseline probability of two countries from different regions being on the Council.
Consider that one potential point of comparison, if these probabilities were ignored, would be
a set of ten countries in which none had ever been members of the Security Council, or a set of ten
non-permanent member countries all from the same region. These should not be allowable points of
comparison because such a treatment assignment implausible. Thus, a constrained randomization
approach is more appropriate for making our set of comparisons.3
4.1.1 Rationale
The analytical solution proposed — a modified randomization test — constrains the set of ran-
domizations of treatment and control that may be used as comparisons. A set of constrained
comparisons, in contrast to a generic exact test, allows the researcher to look at a set of potential
outcomes that could have plausibly been generated had treatment assignment been different.
A convincing justification for this approach is made by Bailey in “Randomization, Constrained”
1986. While she discusses how to construct a reference distribution for causal inference in the
2In fact the analysis is the same whichever group is called treatment group versus the control group. For analytical
purposes, “treatment” or “control” labels are arbitrary.
3My analysis considers the treatment effect for the treated.
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Figure 4.1: Plots of land (a) to receive random assignment of treatment A or B, (b) acceptable
randomization , and (c) a randomization that would be rejected by the researcher
experimental setting, her logic translates to observational studies.
Bailey notes that some configurations of treatments under complete randomization are unlikely
to be implemented by researchers. Considering two different treatment assignments in an agri-
cultural study, an acceptable randomization would be 4.1.a whereas 4.1.b would be unlikely to
be implemented by researchers. There is a 1 in 10 chance that the configuration of AAABBB or
BBBAAA comes up at random, but these are unlikely to be implemented, because they might not
appear random — i.e. there may be concern about unmeasured spatial homogeneity. Bailey recom-
mends that at the outset, the researcher think about which are the treatment assignments that he
or she would never implement. Since some realizations of the random treatment assignment do not
truly have the potential for being implemented, they should also not be included in the reference
distribution as a comparison with the realize effect size estimate. Configurations that have zero
probability of being implemented at the outset have little place in the reference set of potential
outcomes.
This logic, I argue, also has an application in observational studies. In observational studies, we
should also be aware of treatment assignments which might never be realized — not because they
would never be implemented by the experimenter, but rather because they are very implausibly
realized. In observational studies, the treatment assignments that are very implausible, because of
institutional characteristics or other causes, should analogously be omitted from the comparison
set.4
4The conclusions about what to exclude may be reversed for the randomization experiment versus observational
study case. Rejected comparisons will look less random for the random experiment, and rejected comparisons may
actually be more random looking in the observational study. What might be accepted as plausible treatment assign-
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4.1.2 Implementation
In my research of the Security Council, allowable comparison of treatment and control groups that
might have been realized should reflect the data generating process for the treatment assignment
and the underlying probabilities of treatment. I propose constructing a reference distribution in
two ways. First, I will look at the responses of realized Security Councils to the resolution in
question. The treatment is being on the Council when a resolution is issued, but we could imagine
that other Security Council compositions could have been seated when issues arose that give rise
to a given resolution. The best comparison for the behavior of the true treatment group is with
other observed Security Council compositions because these compositions could have plausibly been
seated, but happened not to be, when the resolution in question was passed. We can compare these
sets of countries’ behaviors with the behaviors of the Security Council members that were actually
treated. We can construct a meaningful reference distribution of a difference in means between of
possible treatment units and possible control units from these comparisons to compare to the true
treatment configuration.
A second, and perhaps even more compelling reference distribution is created by amplifying
these comparisons, by creating other plausible treatment groups. These are synthetic Security
Council compositions. They are generated respecting some important features of the real data
generating process for treatment assignment. I mimic Security Council formation by drawing ten
countries from the 188 UN member countries that are not permanent members of the Security
Council. Specifically, the allowed compositions are only ones that meet the real regional require-
ments for council membership and ones where the probability of appearance on the Council comes
from the observed frequency of non-permanent members on the Council.
The simulation generates compositions which respect the geographic distribution and frequency
of representation on the real Security Council. I will argue that this identification strategy (i.e.
“the manner in which a researcher uses observational data (not generated by a randomized trial) to
approximate a real experiment”) is a dramatic improvement from the traditional approach, given
the frequent failures of models to conform to modeling assumptions in the regression frameworks.
ments may be more similar to the realized distribution of treatment and controls for observational studies; similar
units may fall into either the treatment or control group. For some observational studies less random looking as-
signments will be the allowed comparisons for reference, and more random looking assignments should probably not
enter into the reference group of allowable comparisons.
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My approach employs a potential outcomes framework, asserting that relevant comparisons are the
collective state behaviors of other Security Council membership compositions.
The remainder of the chapter evaluates if my expectations about reputation and international
law play out empirically, using fulfillment of reporting requirements as a measure of compliance. My
primary case is that of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) as it has the most detailed data associated with
it. I will later look at compliance in terms of fulfillment of reporting requirements for Resolutions
1373 as well as Resolution 1624, which sought to make terrorist activity illegal in UN members’
domestic legal frameworks and to deny safe haven to persons having committed terrorist acts.
Specifically, I compare the behavior of countries that are on the Security Council when “legislative”
resolutions are passed to countries that receive the same resolution as a mandate.
First, I will describe Resolution 1540 in greater detail and implement my preferred method
which uses the natural point of comparison of the compliance behavior of different UN Security
Councils compositions throughout time. I compare the compliance behavior of those countries that
are on the Security Council when the resolution in question was issued to countries that are on
the Security Council at other times. To extend the comparisons further I then use a computer
simulation is used to construct synthetic Security Councils compositions. Then, I will evaluate if
results from reporting requirements for UNSC Resolution1373 (2001), and UNSC Resolution1624
(2005) are consistent with the 1540 result. Finally, I will perform a “traditional” analysis - modeling
compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions with regression models as a robustness check to
my findings.
4.2 Background on UNSC Resolution 1540
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 made the concerns surrounding security of sensitive
materials acute. Security Council Resolution 1373, passed within weeks of September 11th, primar-
ily focused on denying financial resources to terrorist organizations, but also contained language
asserting that safeguarding sensitive materials is a component of good governance for all states
(Operative Paragraph 3(a)). Desiring to solidify these obligations, the United States pushed for a
UNSC resolution which would mandated universal implementation of national safeguards against
transfers of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and related materials. The result — UNSC
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Resolution 1540 — was passed in 2004. A committee was established to monitor compliance with
the 1540 resolution.
The Committee for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 summarizes
the Resolution as:
[. . . obliging] States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-state
actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transfer-
ring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. Res-
olution 1540 imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their
means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related mate-
rials. It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts, in ac-
cord with and promoting universal adherence to existing international nonproliferation
treaties.http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ (N.d.)
UNSC Resolution 1540 requires national legislation which would restrain the state itself and its
citizens from assisting non-state actors in procurement of WMDs. It also requires that policies be
implemented for the safeguarding in practice of materials that could be used in WMD programs.
4.2.1 Compliance Measurement
States were required to submit reports about the status of existing national programs or intentions
to create programs to control sensitive materials within six months of the Resolutions’ passing.
States could be simply reporting on systems which were already in place, or could report devel-
opments and planned improvements in their safeguards program due to the mandate. The 1540
Committee is charged with assessing progress of each country and UN countries as a whole toward
fulfilling the Resolution’s mandate. Country’s reports and matrices are publicly available on the
committee website.5
In this chapter, for the 1540 Resolution, the compliance variable is how many days elapsed from
the Resolution’s due date (October 28th 2004) before countries turned in reports in compliance with
the 1540 Resolution. Since states were directed to submit their initial reports six months after the
5Collection was performed on Oct 7, 2013
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passage of Resolution 1540, any state filing a report later than that date was in (at least partial)
non-compliance in the interim. It is clear that non-submission of the national report was seen
as unacceptable and non-compliant. In each of Resolutions 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008), and 1977
(2011), which extend the work of the 1540 Committee, countries have been urged to make their
first report to the Committee if they have not yet done so. Submission of documentation on national
controls is the minimum level of acceptable compliance with Resolution 1540 — and it is a clear
and measurable mark of the responsiveness of states to the UNSC Resolution 1540 mandate. The
reporting itself does not represent “incidental” compliance because reporting to the UN Security
Council by UN members would not have been observed were it not for the 1540 Resolution.
4.3 Plausible Comparisons: Realized Security Council Compositions
I first ask the question — does participating on the Security Council have an effect on compliance
— from the potential outcomes standpoint. The potential outcomes framework requires that the
researcher make the case that other treatments were possible and plausible, and allow for com-
parison. The estimated effect is considered in relation to potential treatments and what effects
would have been estimated for those treatments. The researcher then determines how extraordi-
nary the observed relationship between treatment and outcome is compared to the relationship
between plausible (but not factual) treatments and real outcome — the distribution for the null
hypothesis.6
In this case, the Security Council lends itself to answering this question. With its rotating
membership, the Security Council composition keeps changing while different events in the world
system arise to confront the Council, irrespective I have argued, of which particular group of
countries are on the Security Council at any time. For the particular Security Council that voted
on Resolution 1540, did the 2004 Council members actually perform better in terms of reporting
compliance than the other compositions of Security Councils that have been observed throughout
time — compositions which we could as easily imagine being seated in 2004?
The results are striking. For all observed compositions from the 1966 expansion of the Security
6Also consider that compared to the previous approaches too, we might still be asking the question, “But is there
something special about Security Council participants in general that causes them to be better compliers”. Without
this subsequent analysis, that question still looms in the mind of skeptics.
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Figure 4.2: Mean number of days lagging in report submission for UNSCR1540 for realized Security
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Figure 4.3: The Distribution of Means for Realized Security Council Compositions from 1966-2015
Council to the present, the 2004 composition exhibits the most compliant behavior. Figure 4.2
shows the mean days late for the submission of national reports for the 1540 mandate by the
different compositions of non-permanent Security Council members throughout time.7 The mean
for the 2004 council is marked with a dashed vertical line, and the mean is the lowest among all
Councils. Figure 4.3, using this same data, shows the distribution of these means from 1966-2015
as a histogram which I use as a reference distribution. The black dashed vertical line, which is at
the most outlying in the distribution shows the mean for the 2004 Council.
Note that for completeness Figure 4.2 contains the means for all Security Councils, back to
7The mean is only for the non-permanent members, as the contribution to the mean of the lateness for the
permanent members is constant.
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the founding of the UN. However, the relevant comparisons are after the 1966 expansion of the
Security Council — where the Council compositions are regionally comparable. The number of
non-permanent members of the Security Council increased from 6 to 10 in 1966 and regional groups
changed at that time. For compositions that take place early on in the existence of the United
Nations, there appears to be phenomenally good reporting compliance, even when compared to
the 2004 composition, but these are not comparable groups, because the electoral process is not
comparable. The year 1965 is marked with a gray dashed vertical line in Figure 4.2 for reference.
One might argue that the very best comparisons are more recent Security Councils because of
new UN membership. Further back, the pool of potential Security Council members was smaller
than in 2004, given UN membership growth. Decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union
resultant in increased numbers of UN members. Figure 4.4 shows that UN membership increases
in the early 1990’s which, in turn, changed the pool of potential Security Council members. The
new wave of UN memberships by post-Soviet states is marked by the second highlighted section of
Figure 4.4.
The reader should also note in Figures 4.2 and 4.5 that each aggregation (each point) is not
independent, as there is overlap in representation from year to year. Countries serve two terms on
the Security Council; there are five new members each year, with an additional five members having
served the previous year. Therefore, we might observe a downward bias in the average ‘lateness’
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in 2003 and 2005, because treated countries that are on the Council in 2004 were also on the 2003
or 2005 councils. Indeed, the mean days to fulfill the reporting requirement for the 2005 Security
Council is quite low – close to the 2004 average.
Figure 4.5 displays the unaggregated data. The graph connects speed of the fastest com-
plier with a line, second fastest complier with a line, etc.8 We can see that the variation in the
means results from slower deciles of the compliers for each group of nonpermanent Security Council
members. On the faster end of different Security Council compositions, there is simply on-time
compliance. Being on the Security Council when the resolution was issued seems to have more
impact on countries that are expected to exhibit worse compliance. The y-axis is log transformed.
8Before 1964, I graph as if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth complier are not observed.
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Figure 4.5: Disaggregated history of non permanent members displayed by compliance behavior
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Figure 4.6: UN Regional Groups and number of non-permanent representatives from each on SC:
(a) Africa Group, (b) Asia Group, (c) Eastern Europe Group, (d) Latin American and Carribian
Group (GRULAC), (e) Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG)
4.4 Analysis Using Simulated Compositions
One shortcoming of comparing the behaviors of actual Security Councils throughout time is that
the number of comparisons is relatively small. Given this concerns, another way I test that there
really was an effect on compliance of being on the council when the resolution was passed is by
using Monte Carlo simulations to construct many plausible comparisons.
Such a simulation needs to respect features of the data generating process. To start, ten
countries could be drawn from the 193 countries that are members of the United Nations but
not permanent members, this would yield 1.128 × 1016 (approximately ten quintillion) potential
Security Council compositions. However, more features of the data generating process should
be incorporated. Many of these 1.128 × 1016 compositions would never be realized. One reason
that some of these compositions would not be plausible is due to the selection process for the
UN Security Council non-permanent members, since a certain number of seats are awarded to
each regional block, with countries up for the seat needing support from their respective regional
blocks, which are shown in Figure 4.6. This component of the data generating process must be
acknowledged and incorporated into any simulation that produces plausible compositions. Also,
certain countries are more successful at repeatedly being seated on the Security Council, consider
that Japan and Brazil have been on the Security Council 20 years each, while other countries have
never been seated at all. The differences are shown in Figure 4.7. These frequencies also affect
what we would consider a plausible composition. Also, among plausible compositions, expectations
should be met about observing states more or less frequently.
For the simulation, I allow only correct regional representation: i.e. three African states, two
Latin American States, etc, according to the norms for selecting Security Council members. These
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Figure 4.7: Intensity of color corresponds to years as non-permanent members on the Security
Council
regional requirements limit the outcomes to 1.125×1014, or 100 trillion possible compositions. This
is a huge number of compositions but 100 times smaller than the unconstrained draw. I select only
from countries that have ever been included on the Security Council, and also weight the probability
of being selected according to the number of times countries have been selected and served on the
Security Council since its inception. When countries that have never been on the Security Council
are excluded, 1.544 × 1012 (1.5 trillion) different compositions are possible and the observation of
the ‘drawing’ of particular states versus others is reflected in a set of simulated Security Council
compositions.
An additional tradition that is followed in the selection of Security Council non-permanent
members is that a member of the League of Arab States (those states highlighted in Figure 4.8)
be always included, half of the time from the African regional group and the other half from the
Asian regional group. This is a feature of the data generating process that is also accounted for in
the simulation. The code for the Monte Carlo simulation, written in the programming language R,
is included in the Appendices.
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Figure 4.8: League of Arab States
Simulation Design Overview
1. Meets Regional Requirements of Compositions.
2. Weighted by the number of times that a country has been on the Security Council.
3. Guarantees an Arab Nation a seat, half the time from the African Group and half the time
from the Asian Group.
4. Allows for examination of a characteristic of a group (such as fulfillment of a reporting
requirement).
A histogram of the average lateness (with an imputed value of 3650 days late for countries who
have yet to comply) for these different compositions is shown in Figure 4.10.
By inspection of the country data, we can determine the furthest possible outlying compositions.
The lowest possible value that can be found by the Monte Carlo simulation is zero, with all countries
complying on time or early. The absolute quickest configuration is that of Namibia (-2 day), Angola
(-1 days), Nigeria (0 days) from Africa; Syria (-14 day) and Singapore (-7 day) from Asia; Belarus
(-8 days) (from Eastern Europe), Costa Rica (-85 days) and Argentina (-2 days) (from South
America), and Malta (-8 days) and Greece (-6 days) (from Western Europe and Others).
The highest possible value that could be found using the Monte Carlo simulation the mean
of 1343 days late, which is found using the using the imputed value of 3650. There are several
configurations that yield the slowest averages, given the large number of African countries that
have yet turned in their reports. An example is the composition Somalia (3650 days late), Gabon
(3650), Madagascar (3650 days late) (from Africa); Bangladesh (456 days late) and Nepal (505 days
late) from Asia; Croatia (32 days late) from Eastern Europe; Honduras (600 late) and Nicaragua
(820 late) from Latin America; and Turkey (4 days late) and Canada (64 days late).
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Figure 4.9: Examples of Security Council Compositions
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Figure 4.10: Mean days late resulting from potential Security Council compositions
4.4.1 Result
In this distribution, the test statistic - the mean value for days late in reporting - is extremely
outlying for the countries on the Security Council in 2004. It is very unlikely that this relationship
is a product of chance. Rejecting the null hypothesis, I conclude that participating on the Council
effects procedural compliance.
Since I find that response is better for those countries that voted in favor of the Resolution,
being on the Security Council at that time, I argue that the sense of obligation is greater for these
countries having taken the obligation themselves, whereas the obligation is felt more weakly by
the states to which the obligation was mandated. This is an observation that has not been made
as clearly in the compliance literature before, and it has strong theoretical implications, as it is
linked to the question of legitimacy of the obligations. The sense of duty might be different for
an obligation that countries are involved in creating versus an obligation forced upon them. This
is an important observation in an era where state sovereignty is increasingly challenged by the
international system.
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Figure 4.11: Rank Sum for Days Late resulting from potential Security Council Compositions
4.5 Covariates
Up until this point, I have not explicitly looked at the relationship between covariates and (1) being
on the Council and (2) compliance outcomes. I have argued that the data generating process is an
as-if random treating assignment, which lends itself to make covariates free analysis allowable.
However, the reader may be justifiably curious about the above relationships. In the next
sections, I consider covariates in two ways. First I use regression modeling to test if my result
holds in various model specifications. Then, I examine the quality of the as-if random “draw”. By
chance, the 2004 Council, that was treated with participating in the creation of Resolution 1540,
could be a set of countries with extraordinary characteristics.
In both the regression section and section on the quality 2004 Council, I focus on three variables:
per capita GDP in 2004, infant mortality in 2004, and population size in 2004. While variables
theoretically should have no relationship with the timing of Security Council membership, we do
expect them to have a relationship with the outcomes of compliance. These variables often proxy
for capacity, which is theorized to predict compliance (Chayes & Chayes 1993). Figures 4.12, 4.13,
and 4.14 provides mappings of these variables for reference. Infant mortality and per capita GDP
are thought to proxy country development, and by extension the state’s capacity. Population has a
relationship to capacity insofar as larger states have more manpower and resources at their disposal.
Readers may also be concerned about post treatment effects, like if foreign aid allocation is
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Figure 4.12: Intensity of color corresponds to greater per capita GDP in 2004
Figure 4.13: Intensity of color corresponds to higher rates of infant mortality in 2004
Figure 4.14: Intensity of color corresponds to greater population size in 2004
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Figure 4.15: Intensity of color corresponds to the sum of examined foreign aid sources in 2004
increase to Security Council non-permanent members (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm
and Vreeland, 2009a,b; Lim and Vreeland, 2013; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). As I have mentioned
in the previous chapter, several studies provide evidence that foreign aid flows to non-permanent
membership of the Security Council with the aim of influencing votes. A temporary increase in
aid flow might also be aimed at influencing compliance behavior, especially from states like the
US and UK which were the primary drafters of Resolution 1540. Therefore, I evaluate if there are
statistically significant increases in aid flows to countries that were on the Security Council when
the WMDs Resolution 1540 passed. I focus on the aid sources considered by Vreeland and Dreher
(2014).
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4.5.1 Robustness of the UNSC Resolution 1540 Result: A Regression Modeling Approach
In this section, I evaluate my central result with parametric modeling approaches. The outcome
can be operationalized in different ways, and we will evaluate whether my result is robust to these
different operationalizations. First, I model reporting compliance as binary outcomes; second, I
model days late using OLS; finally, I employ survival models.
Modeling Binary Outcomes
The binary outcomes I model are 1) complying with the reporting requirement at all or not and 2)
complying on time or not. Table 4.1 shows the number of states submit their country reports to
the 1540 Committee 1) on time, 2) late, or 3) never.
Number of Countries
Late 112
Never Submit 20
On Time 59
Table 4.1: Compliance with 1540 reporting requirement
The full models of the binary outcomes to be fitted are shown in equations 4.1 and 4.2 and I also
present nested models in Table 4.2. Explanatory variables are related to relationship to Security
Council and to state capacity. In addition to the covariates already discussed (per capita GDP,
infant mortality, and population), I also include the year a country joins the UN to proxy state age,
which is likely to have a relationship with institutional knowledge and practice and in turn state
capacity, and a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa, to capture compliance idiosyncrasies of that
region. Some variables are logged (where indicated) to reduce skewness and because, theoretically,
fixed increases in these variables should have marginally smaller effects on state capacity.
ln( P (EverSubmit)1−P (EverSubmit)) =β0 + β1PermSC + β2NonPermSC + β3LogPerCapGDP+
β4LogPop+ β5Y earJoiningUN + β6LogInfantMort+
β7PermSC + β8SubSaharanAfrica+ 
(4.1)
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ln( P (ReportOnTime)1−P (ReportOnTime)) =β0 + β1PermSC + β2NonPermSC + β3LogPerCapGDP+
β4LogPop+ β5Y earJoiningUN + β6LogInfantMort+
β7PermSC + β8SubSaharanAfrica+ 
(4.2)
Table 4.2: Logit Models of Compliance
Dependent variable:
Ever Report Report On Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rotating SC Member 2004 16.000 17.000 1.900∗∗∗ 1.800∗∗
(1, 251.000) (2, 584.000) (0.710) (0.930)
Perm. SC Member 16.000 9.700 18.000 15.000
(1, 769.000) (4, 437.000) (1, 073.000) (1, 024.000)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.590 0.280 0.450 0.210
(0.870) (0.920) (0.650) (0.670)
Log Population 1.400∗∗ 1.300∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.600) (0.320) (0.330)
Year Joining UN −0.015 −0.022 0.011 0.010
(0.031) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Inf. Mortality −5.200∗∗ −5.900∗∗ −2.700∗∗∗ −3.100∗∗∗
(2.200) (2.400) (1.100) (1.100)
Subsaharan Africa −1.800∗ −1.800∗ −0.130 −0.048
(1.000) (1.000) (0.770) (0.780)
Constant 2.100∗∗∗ 30.000 47.000 −1.000∗∗∗ −29.000 −25.000
(0.240) (63.000) (64.000) (0.170) (29.000) (29.000)
Observations 191 182 182 191 182 182
Akaike Inf. Crit. 131.000 77.000 79.000 222.000 163.000 161.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The central result holds in these logistic models. The coefficient estimate for the rotating
Security Council member variable is found to be statistically significant in models 4 and 6. A
greater likelihood of reporting on time is predicted if a country is part of the rotating membership
when Resolution 1540 was passed. Models 1 and 3 don’t indicate statistically significant estimates,
but this is because all members of the Security Council in 2004, both non-permanent and permanent,
have fulfilled the reporting requirement. Thus estimate and standard errors are very large and not
meaningful for the model of “Ever Report”. Likewise, all of the P5-countries reported on time, so
in models 4 and 5 those coefficient estimates and standard errors are large and not meaningful.
The logistic regression modeling results also suggests strong relationships between more com-
pliant behavior and proxies for state capacity. Specifically, the population, infant mortality, and
sub-Saharan Africa variables are statistically significant predictors of the outcome. Columns 2 and
5 suggest that the much can be explained, even when not taking Security Council participation
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Figure 4.16: Intensity of color corresponds lateness completing reporting requirement
into account. Even in this non-consent based law case, the evidence is consistent with the theory
that state capacity will play an important role in compliance Chayes and Chayes (1993)).
Linear Model
The linear model specifications use the same set of explanatory variables. After performing mod-
eling diagnostics on both as shown in Figures 4.17 and 4.18, I determine that taking the log of
the dependent variable results in a model more aligned with modeling assumptions.9 Specifically,
considering the quantile-quantile plots, deviations from normality of the distribution of residuals is
much less severe in the second case where the dependent variable is logged. Given the skewness of
the dependent variable’s distribution, this is perhaps not that surprising. The model to be fitted
is shown in equation 4.3.
ln(DaysLate) =β0 + β1PermSC + β2NonPermSC + β3LogPerCapGDP+
β4LogPop+ β5Y earJoiningUN + β6LogInfantMort+
β7PermSC + β8SubSaharanAfrica+ β0 + 
(4.3)
Tables 4.3 displays the model of the logged number of days late. The dependent variable in
columns 1-3 is the logged number of days late in submitting reports dropping countries are that
have never submitted their report. Columns 3-6 use imputed data for countries that have yet to
comply is used. These countries are assigned a value of ImputedVal days late, as ten years have
passed since the deadline for reporting.
9To take the log of the variable without losing any observations, I add one to the variable and then take log, so
that observations with zero days late will not be dropped.
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Figure 4.17: Diagnostics for modeling specification not logging the dependent variable, full model
with imputed values
Table 4.3: Linear Models of Compliance using Capacity
Dependent variable:
Days Late Logged Days Late Logged with Imputed Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rotating SC Member 2004 −2.800∗∗∗ −1.600∗∗ −3.400∗∗∗ −1.800∗∗
(0.940) (0.690) (1.000) (0.680)
Perm. SC Member −3.600∗∗∗ 0.210 −4.100∗∗∗ 0.280
(1.300) (0.990) (1.400) (0.970)
Log Per Capita GDP −1.200∗∗ −1.000∗ −1.200∗∗ −1.000∗∗
(0.520) (0.520) (0.470) (0.470)
Log Population −1.800∗∗∗ −1.700∗∗∗ −1.800∗∗∗ −1.700∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.220) (0.200) (0.210)
Year Joining UN −0.028∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Log Inf. Mortality 1.900∗∗ 2.200∗∗ 2.100∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗
(0.840) (0.840) (0.770) (0.770)
Subsaharan Africa 1.400∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗ 1.600∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.500) (0.450) (0.440)
Constant 3.600∗∗∗ 71.000∗∗∗ 67.000∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗ 68.000∗∗∗ 63.000∗∗∗
(0.230) (23.000) (23.000) (0.230) (22.000) (22.000)
Observations 171 165 165 191 182 182
R2 0.087 0.540 0.560 0.094 0.610 0.630
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.530 0.540 0.084 0.600 0.610
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.18: Diagnostics for modeling specification logging the dependent variable, full model with
imputed values
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As in the logistic regressions, many of the variables related to state capacity are statistically
significantly related to the outcome. Likewise, the coefficient on being a non-permanent member of
the Security Council is negative (associated with greater compliance) and is statistically significant,
consistent with the findings shown earlier in the chapter.
Survival Model
Another way to model the data is using event history modeling, specifically using a hazard or
survival models. This approach lends itself to use of censored data, without imputation – which
is the case of my data; some countries simply have never complied with reporting requirement for
Resolution 1540.
I employ a Cox Proportional Hazard Model, in which the hazard ratio is constant, as an ad-
ditional robustness check on my finding that fulfillment of the reporting requirement is improved
for countries that are non-permanent members of the Security Council, shown in Table 4.4. The
results show that being on the Security Council appears to matter in this modeling framework, with
the non-permanent Security Council member indicator variable found to be statistically significant
at the .01 level. Figure 4.19 and 4.20 shows the result of the model in terms of the proportion of
countries submitting reports as time elapses, collectively and then according to Security Council
non-permanent membership status, respectively.
Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show the predictions for reporting overall and by membership in the
Security Council non-permanent membership or not respectively.
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Table 4.4: Survival Model of Days Until Submission
Dependent variable:
Days Late
(1) (2) (3)
Rotating SC Member 2004 1.20∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗
(0.34) (0.36)
Perm. SC Member 1.80∗∗∗ 0.29
(0.47) (0.50)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.31 0.23
(0.26) (0.27)
Log Population 0.87∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12)
Year Joining UN 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Log Inf. Mortality −1.60∗∗∗ −1.60∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.47)
Subsaharan Africa −0.88∗∗∗ −0.86∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.28)
Observations 171 165 165
R2 0.10 0.55 0.56
Max. Possible R2 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wald Test 25.00∗∗∗ (df = 2) 120.00∗∗∗ (df = 5) 128.00∗∗∗ (df = 7)
LR Test 18.00∗∗∗ (df = 2) 132.00∗∗∗ (df = 5) 136.00∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Score (Logrank) Test 31.00∗∗∗ (df = 2) 135.00∗∗∗ (df = 5) 148.00∗∗∗ (df = 7)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.19: Overall Survival Plot
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Figure 4.20: Survival Plot Comparing Hazard for Compliance for two groups
55
A Tale of One Country? Robustness Under the Jackknife
Given the small number of cases in the treatment condition, one still could be concerned about the
sensitivity of the findings. Using a Jackknife-type procedure, I explore model sensitivity. Specif-
ically, I drop observations one-by-one and re-estimate the above models,10 collecting the p-values
associated with the estimate of the coefficient for non-permanent membership.
Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show the results of this procedure for the different full models. I
display p-values and dropped country-pairs in which the resultant p-value is the greatest.
The results of this exercise shows that model result is not extremely sensitive to the removal of
any one country. The removal of Angola has the greatest effect on the p-values across model speci-
fications; sometimes the removal of this country increases the size of the p-value above traditionally
accepted values of statistical significance.
Dropped country Resultant p-value
Angola 0.18
Pakistan 0.13
Philippines 0.09
Romania 0.09
Chile 0.07
India 0.06
Table 4.5: “Report On Time” logistic – largest p-values for rotating Council membership when
dropping indicated country
Dropped country Resultant p-value
Angola 0.09
Pakistan 0.04
Philippines 0.04
Romania 0.03
Chile 0.03
Benin 0.03
Table 4.6: “Logged Days Late” linear model without imputed values – largest p-values for rotating
Council membership when dropping indicated country
10Specifically model 6 of Table 4.2, model 3 and model 6 of Table 4.3 and model 3 of Table 4.4.
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Dropped country Resultant p-value
Angola 0.07
Pakistan 0.03
Philippines 0.02
Romania 0.02
Benin 0.02
Chile 0.01
Table 4.7: “Logged Days Late” linear model with imputed values – largest p-values for rotating
Council membership when dropping indicated country
Dropped country Resultant p-value
Angola 0.07
Benin 0.07
Pakistan 0.07
Philippines 0.06
Romania 0.06
Chile 0.06
Table 4.8: Days to submit report survival model – largest p-values for rotating Council membership
when dropping indicated country
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Figure 4.21: Distribution of test statistics calculated from re-estimating linear models with placebo
non-permanent Security Councils
Estimation with synthetic Security Council compositions
As an additional robustness check on the linear model of logged days late (without imputed days), I
use the 1000 synthetic Security Council compositions as placebos in a regression model framework.
I re-estimate the model, replacing the Council that voted on the 1540 Resolution, with a different
synthetic Council 1000 times. I collect the t-statistic associated with non-permanent membership
and observe where the realized treatment (the 2004 Council) falls within this distribution. The
test statistic for the realized Council is outlying in this distribution as shown in 4.21. Interestingly,
this distribution is not quite centered around zero, and the distribution of test statistics (kernel
smoothed solid curve) do not quite follow the theoretical t-statistic distribution (dashed curve).
4.5.2 Pre Treatment Relationships
The 2004 composition of the Security Council could be extraordinary by chance. I check how
extraordinary the composition is (again I would argue – by chance) in terms of pretreatment
variables. I consider per capita GDP, infant mortality rate, and population size, to check on the
concern that I have “a bad draw” from the randomization.
Specifically, I use the simulation and rank-sum procedure to see how outlying the 2004 compo-
sition is relative to other plausible compositions on these variables. Because there is no theoretical
relationship to being on the Council at a specific moment in time on the one hand and population,
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Figure 4.22: Rank sums for Infant Mortality Rate (2004) resulting from potential Security Council
compositions
infant mortality, or per capita GDP on the other, we would expect to see p-values that do not lead
us to reject the null in these cases. The placebo test does not raise concerns about the research de-
sign, when looking at infant mortality or per capita GDP. For these placebos the resulting p-values
do not lead us to reject the null of independence. From the distributions, I estimate the two tailed
p-values to be 0.21 for infant mortality and 0.94 for per capita GDP. By contrast, the variable
population is a bit concerning, given that the p-value is 0.03. The outlyingness for population
(about 1 in twenty compositions are as outlying), however, does not reach the level of outlyingness
of the procedural compliance when performing this procedure (about 1 in 1000 compositions are
as outlying). Figures 4.22, 4.23 and 4.24 show this result.
4.5.3 Non Reputational Pathway - Influence of Foreign Aid
An additional cause for concern is the possibility of an alternate pathway for participation on
the Security Council to effect compliance outcomes. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter,
several studies provide evidence that foreign aid flows to non-permanent membership of the Security
Council to influence votes (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009a,b; Lim
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Figure 4.23: Rank sums for GDP per capita (2004) resulting from potential Security Council
compositions
800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0.
00
00
0.
00
10
0.
00
20
0.
00
30
Distribution rank sums − Population (2004)
D
en
si
ty
Rank sum 
 Population (2004)  
 for non−permanent SC 
 members passing 
 UNSCR 1540
Figure 4.24: Rank sums for Population (2004) resulting from potential Security Council composi-
tions
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and Vreeland, 2013). A temporary increase in aid flow could also influence compliance behavior.
Therefore, I evaluate if, in 2004, there are statistically significant increases in aid flows to non-
permanent member countries. I use the rank-sum constrained randomization approach, and create
the distributions shown in Figure 4.25.11 I also, do this for Aid in 2005. In general, the rank-sum
for aid to the non-permanent membership in 2004 is higher than the median rank-sum. This might
not come as a great surprise as we know that the 2004 Council has a population rank-sum which
is larger than the median ranks-sums for simulated Councils. The rank-sum for infant mortality is
also on the high side. So the ten treated countries might be more likely recipients of aid, compared
with other plausibly treated countries.
I also look at aid in the time series, plotting aid flow for the 2004 non-permanent Security
Council members in Figures 4.26 for bilateral Aid from the US and 4.27 for bilateral Aid from the
UK. A vertical dashed line is provided at 2004 for reference. Of greatest concern might be the
increased US aid that Angola received during 2003 and 2004, the tenure of its Security Council
membership.12
11Abbreviations in this section follow. IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA: Inter-
national Development Association; UN: United Nations; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme UNICEF:
United Nations Children’s Fund; UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNTA: United Nations
Regular Programme for Technical Assistance; WFP: World Food Programme.
12On close inspection it appears that this increase in aid began in 2002.
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Figure 4.25: Distributions of rank sums for simulated non-permanent Security Council membership
for aid in 2004 from various donors
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Figure 4.26: Time Series for US Aid to UN Security Council 2004 Non-Permanent Members
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Figure 4.27: Time Series for UK Aid to UN Security Council 2004 Non-Permanent Members
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p-value
Infant Mortality Rate (2004) 0.21
GDP per capita (2004) 0.94
Population (2004) 0.03
Sum of Aid Sources (2004) 0.50
Sum of Aid Sources (2005) 0.67
US Aid (2004) 0.63
Japanese Aid (2004) 0.26
German Aid (2004) 0.50
Great Britain Aid (2004) 0.98
France Aid (2004) 0.41
IBRD Aid (2004) 0.09
IBRD Aid (2004) 0.58
UN Aid (2004) 0.55
WFP Aid (2004) 0.55
UNDP Aid (2004) 0.44
UNICEF Aid (2004) 0.21
UNHCR Aid (2004) 0.55
UNTA Aid (2004) 0.99
US Aid (2005) 0.98
Japanese Aid (2005) 0.45
German Aid (2005) 0.69
Great Britain Aid (2005) 0.56
France Aid (2005) 0.62
IBRD Aid (2005) 0.07
IBRD Aid (2005) 0.73
UN Aid (2005) 0.61
WFP Aid (2005) 0.78
UNDP Aid (2005) 0.68
UNICEF Aid (2005) 0.49
UNHCR Aid (2005) 0.46
UNTA Aid (2005) 0.39
Table 4.9: P-Values of Constrained Permutation Rank Sum Analysis with Capacity and Foreign
Aid Variables
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4.6 Consistency Check: UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 1624
In this Chapter, I have focused most of my attention on compliance with Resolution 1540. However,
Resolutions 1373 and 1624 are also “legislative” resolutions and have reporting requirements similar
to Resolution 1540. Resolution 1373 required states to put financial policies in place that would
deny resources to terrorist actors, and Resolution 1624 required that states implement policies to
deny safe haven to terrorists. Like Resolution 1540, these resolutions required that states report
on their implementation. However, these reports were not made publicly available.
For Resolution 1373, the data that I use to proxy fulfillment of the reporting requirements is the
number of reports that are submitted. Six reports were required of UN member countries. To gauge
responsiveness of each country to this resolution, I code the number of reports that were actually
submitted of the six required.13 This data is censored, as reports were not publicly available if they
were submitted after 2006.
For Resolution 1624, I proxy compliance again with a variable for the timing of report sub-
mission. Countries are required to submit just one report within a year of the issuance of the
resolution, which was September 2005. In this case, this variable is much less fine grained as I
collected only the year of report submission.14
In Table 4.10 we see the compliance distribution for countries with Resolution 1373 and in
Table 4.11 the non-permanent membership of the Security Council in 2001. In Table 4.12 on page
67 we see the compliance distribution for Resolution 1624 and in Table 4.13 the non-permanent
membership of the Security Council in 2005.
Number of Countries
Submitted 1 report 17
Submitted 2 report 33
Submitted 3 report 26
Submitted 4 report 44
Submitted 5 report 58
Submitted 6 report 13
Table 4.10: Number of Reports Submitted for Resolution 1373
13The data was collected from the Counter Terrorism Committee website, url-
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373.html, accessed Oct 7, 2013
14The data is made available by the Counter Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/
1624.html, accessed Oct 7, 2013
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Table 4.11: Countries On Security Council in 2001 when UNSCR 1373 is passed
Bangladesh Colombia
Ireland Jamaica
Mali Mauritius
Norway Singapore
Tunisia Ukraine
Table 4.12: Year Submitted Report for Resolution 1624
Number of Countries
No Submission 81
Submitted in 2005 1
Submitted in 2006 76
Submitted in 2007 13
Submitted in 2008 6
Submitted in 2009 6
Submitted in 2010 6
Submitted in 2011 1
Submitted in 2012 1
Even though these measures of compliance for Resolutions 1373 and Resolution 1624 are less
fine-grained, comparison is useful. We would expect that for these Resolutions, compliance will be
greater for the 2001 and the 2005 composition in which Resolutions 1373 and Resolutions 1624 were
passed, respectively. For the 2001 Security Council non-permanent members, the average number
of reports submitted for the ten non-permanent members is 4.6. For the 2005 Security Council
nonpermanent members, the mean for the years late submitted is 2008.8. Figures 4.28 and 4.29
show the mean among realized historical Security Council compositions.
I extend the comparisons with the simulation to create synthetic Security Council compositions,
which uses a constrained randomization procedure to generate sets of countries that could have
plausibly been a Security Council composition. The one tailed p-value is 0.195 for the case of
Resolution 1373. For Resolution 1624, there one-tailed p-value generated by the simulation 0.504.
The Security Council compositions of 2001 and 2005, in their compliance with Resolutions 1373
and 1624, are not statistically significant, however they do fall on the side of the distribution that
reputational theory predicts. Figure 4.30 and 4.31 show the mean value for the realized Council
in 2001 and 2005 Councils respectively compared to 1000 plausible councils created via simulation.
Neither compliance outcomes are statistically significant.
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Figure 4.28: Mean Number of Reports for UNSCR 1373 for realized Security Council Compositions
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Figure 4.29: Mean Year Reporting Submission for UNSCR 1624 for realized Security Council
Compositions
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Figure 4.30: Means for number of reports for UNSCR 1373 for potential Security Council compo-
sitions
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Figure 4.31: Mean of years lagging in Report Submission for UNSCR 1624 for plausible Security
Council compositions.
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Table 4.13: Countries On Security Council in 2001 when UNSCR 1624 is passed
Algeria Argentina
Benin Brazil
Denmark Greece
Japan Philippines
Romania Tanzania
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter makes an important contribution to the compliance literature by using exoge-
nously arising obligations instead of endogenous ones for empirical study, and it has relevance for
the future of international obligations. In previous studies, isolating the legal obligation as a cause
of compliance in and of itself has been a challenge because international obligations usually arise
endogenously; thus the causes for complying might be the same as those which cause international
commitment. Moreover, in an increasingly globalized and integrated world, centralization of inter-
national decision making leads to mandates that states have not agreed to, but with which they are
legally bound to comply. Beginning to analyze cases where this is already happening will advance
a theoretical foundation for approaching these legal obligations that states will face more and more
on the horizon. By analyzing UNSC Resolution 1540, I have shown that states comply with inter-
national law to a greater extent when their reputation stands to lose by non-compliance. Results
from analysis of UNSCR 1373 and 1624 are not inconsistent with the results of the 1540 analysis,
but are not statistically significant.
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Chapter 5
Substantive Compliance
This chapter deals with substantive compliance. Using the Resolution 1540 matrices, which I will
discuss in greater detail below, I evaluate if being on the Security Council when Resolution 1540 is
passed affects compliance outcomes. This chapter takes much the same approach as the previous
chapter, but exploits a much larger and more careful data collection project to address the issue of
substantive compliance.
Looking at substantive compliance, rather than just at the success of reporting, is important
because scholars are interested in the ability of international law to change state behavior. While
fulfillment of the reporting requirement was certainly essential to being in compliance with Res-
olution 1540, more substantive compliance by states — having national legislation in place and
enforcing it — is of greater interest when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of this interna-
tional law.
Subsequent to passing resolution 1540, the UN Security Council created the 1540 Committee
of experts to oversee the implementation of the mandate. Initially, the Committee was tasked with
receiving country reports and liaisoning with countries about the issue of reporting and compliance
with the substance of Resolution 1540. However, the Committee recognized that Resolution 1540
was a loaded document. To systematize their assessment of country compliance, the Committee
went systematically through the content of Resolution 1540, and identified a list of specific re-
quirements. The four page document constituting Resolution 1540 actually implied hundreds of
mandates to UN member countries.
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Using this list, called the 1540 Matrix, I am better able to measure compliance with the sub-
stance of Resolution 1540. The 1540 Matrix contains 382 fields that assess whether countries’ policy
and legislation are in line with the requirements of Resolution 1540. The broad questions to be
answered by the countries in response to UN Resolutions 1540 are regarding national membership
in WMD related treaties (like the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention etc.); prohibition of activities related to WMD production and use; safeguards to account
for and secure materials related to WMD production and use; and national safeguards against the
transfer of materials (which may be dual-use) for WMD use, and control lists, with legal weight,
to control materials.
At first, I will consider the proportion of “fields” in the matrix that are filled. That is, of
all that is required of the 1540 resolution, what portion is fulfilled by states, according to their
self-reports. Then, I will use the matrices to assess if the domestic legislation cited for satisfying
each item in the matrix might have been motivated by Resolution 1540. In other words, did the
resolution plausibly change the state’s behavior? I identify the year that the domestic legislation
and policies came into effect. Only legislation and policy coming into effect in 2004 or later could
have plausibly been affected by Resolution 1540.1
The analysis is motivated by the idea that simply evaluating which country is in greater compli-
ance does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of Resolution 1540. Compliance with international
law may be incidental ; a state may not need to change its behavior to be in compliance with an
international statute. If compliance is incidental rather than a result of state action, then less
will be communicated about a state’s reputation (Tomz 2007). When compliance requires changes
to policy and legislation, then compliance can communicate more about states’ ability to follow
through with commitments it has made.
1Another study which looks at the question of substantive compliance with the 1540 resolution is Stinnett et
al. 2011, “Complying by Denying, Explaining why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls.” This study
positions itself to look at the effect of Resolution 1540 but actually looks much more at incidental compliance, and
not so much responses to the resolution itself. The outcome they are trying to explain is a score for the level
of development of the export control system (on three dimensions - legal, institutional, and implementation). Even
though the measure is constructed based on 2007 country compliance, much of this development may have come before
the 2004 issuance of Resolution 1540, so they are not looking at the resolution effectiveness, i.e. the behavioral change
due to Resolution 1540. This contrasts with my study that does make the distinction between pre-resolution-based
compliance and post-resolution-based compliance.
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5.1 Substantive Compliance with Resolution 1540
5.1.1 Compliance in General with Resolution 1540
Initially, there was optimism among statesmen about the extent of compliance with Resolution
1540 that could be achieved. In the meeting records on the 1540 vote, Inocencio Arias from Spain
commented on the establishment of the 1540 Committee:
“With regard to the follow-up mechanism, we supported the creation of a committee
entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the resolution, and we welcome the
fact that it was given sufficient time to fulfill its functions. Two years seems to be a
satisfactory length of time” (UN Security Council Meeting 6795, 2004).
However, two years greatly underestimated the amount of time that the 1540 Committee needed
to work toward global compliance with Resolution 1540. Discovering a slower than anticipated
implementation, the Security Council extended the mandate of the Committee by another two
years in 2006 (via Resolution 1673 (UNSCR 1673, 2006)) and an additional three year extension
was instituted in 2008 (via Resolution 1810). In 2011, Resolution 1977 extended the work of the
Committee through 2021 (UNSCR1977, 2011). In addition to these extensions of the work of the
Committee, Resolution 2055 was issued in June 2012 to increase the resources to the Committee
by increasing the size of the group of experts (UNSCR 1540, 2004).
Even while many resources have been made available for the fulfillment of Resolution 1540,
compliance to date with the Resolution leaves much to be desired.2 James R. Holmes, co-editor
of the “1540 Compass” (a niche periodical about Resolution 1540), assesses that countries have
only “fitfully” made progress under towards meeting requirements of the 1540 Resolution (Holmes,
2014).
Holmes writes:
...have UN member states complied with the resolution? Sort of. Ten years on, the
system remains a work in progress. In principle, governments must do X, Y, and Z. In
practice, though, they have the latitude to define how they will execute commitments
2“1540 Compass”, of which there are 6 editions, is a dedicated publication on the topic.
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X, Y, and Z. There’s ample wiggle room within the UNSC Resolution 1540 straitjacket,
as it turns out. And maybe that’s just political reality. The United Nations can put
export controls on the to-do list, but local discretion determines how to cross that item
off the list (Holmes, 2014).
5.1.2 Participants in the resolution creation versus non participants
This chapter addresses the central question of my dissertation: Does reputation via participation
in law creation have an impact on compliance outcomes? I have posited that states stand to lose
more reputationally when they do not follow through with international law that they have created
for themselves; conversely their reputation should be damaged less if a state fails to comply with
an international law that it receives as a mandate.
I have slightly different expectations about substantive versus procedural compliance given that
the former is more costly than the latter. These additional cost might outweigh the reputational
costs for compliance. Thus, I hypothesize that it is more likely that we will see no difference
with non-participatory states. The implication of the theory for this situation is that while states
that make rules for themselves (states that are on the Security Council when Resolution 1540 was
passed) will find it more important to comply to preserve their reputations than their counterparts
who received the resolution as a mandate. The costs associated with their substantively compliance
with Resolution 1540 are likely to outweigh reputational concerns.
5.2 The Matrix
The 1540 Matrix specifies precisely what the Resolution requires of states - which turns out to be
nearly 400 items. How does a four page resolution translate into these numerous requirements?
Consider Operating Paragraph 2 (OP2) — which is reprinted in the text box. Figure 5.1 displays
a page of the eighteen-page 1540 Matrix template provided by the Committee corresponding to
fulfillment of OP2. The implied set of questions are to be answered with regard to Chemical
Weapons, but there are two nearly identical OP2 pages of the matrix regarding Biological Weapons
and Nuclear Weapons.
For the page in Figure 5.1, the committee must assess the answer to the question for each
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UN member country: “Does national legislation exist which prohibits persons or entities to en-
gage in one of the following activities? Can violators be penalized?” The orienting question for
the page, is broken into more specific questions: “manufacture/produce”; “acquire”; “possess”;
“stockpile/store”, “develop”; “transport”, “transfer”, “use”, “participate as an accomplice in afore-
mentioned activities”; “assist in aforementioned activities”; “finance aforementioned activities”;
“aforementioned activities related to means of delivery”; “involvement of non-State actors in afore-
mentioned activities”, and “other”. For the other operating paragraphs of Resolution 1540, this
type of breakdown has also been performed. Looking at this page as an example one understands
how Resolution 1540 resulted in nearly 400 items. I have organized a complete overview of the
1540 Matrix items in table 5.1.
Operating Paragraph 2, corresponds to Column 2 of the Overview of Matrix Items Table.
The Security Council . . . [d]ecides also that all States, in accordance with their national proce-
dures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to
engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance
them;
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Figure 5.1: Page from the matrix template
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Table 5.1: Overview of Matrix Items
Part of Res. 1540 → OP 1 and related matters from OP 5,
OP 6, OP 8 (a), (b), (c) and OP 10
OP2 OP 3 (a) and (b) - Account
for/Secure/Physically protect
BW/CW/NW including Related
Materials
OP 3 (c) and (d) and related matters
from OP 6 and OP 10 - Controls of
BW/CW/NW including Related Ma-
terials
OP 6, 7 and 8 (d) - Control lists, As-
sistance, Information
Did you make one of the following
statements or is your country a State
Party to or Member State of one of the
following Conventions, Treaties and
Arrangements?†
Does national legisla-
tion exist which pro-
hibits persons or enti-
ties to engage in one
of the following activi-
ties ? Can violators be
penalized?‡
Are any of the following measures,
procedures or legislation in place to
account for, secure or otherwise pro-
tect BW/CW/NW and Related Mate-
rials? Can violators be penalized?†
Which of the following legislation,
procedures, measures, agencies ex-
ist to control border crossings, ex-
port/import and other transfers of
BW [or CW or NW] and Related Ma-
terials ? Can violators be penalized
?‡
Can information be provided on the
following issues ?†
1 General statement on non- possession
of WMD
manufacture/produce Measures to account for production Border control Control lists - items (goods/ equip-
ment/ materials/ technologies)
2 General statement on commitment to
disarmament and non-proliferation
acquire Measures to account for use Technical support of border control
measures
Control lists - other
3 General statement on non-provision of
WMD and related materials to non-
State actors
possess Measures to account for storage Control of brokering, trading in, nego-
tiating, otherwise assisting in sale of
goods and technology
Assistance offered
4 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC)
stockpile/store Measures to account for transport Enforcement agencies/authorities Assistance requested
5 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)
develop Other measures for accounting Export control legislation in place Assistance in place (bilat-
eral/plurilateral/multilateral)
6 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT)
transport Measures to secure production Licensing provisions Information for industry
7 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
transfer Measures to secure use Individual licensing Information for the public
8 Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
use Measures to secure storage General licensing
9 Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) participate as an ac-
complice in a.m. activi-
ties
Measures to secure transport Exceptions from licensing
10 Geneva Protocol of 1925 assist in a.m. activities Other measures for securing Licensing of deemed export/visa
11 International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
finance a.m. activities Regulations for physical protection of
facilities/materials/ transports
National licensing authority
12 Nuclear Weapons Free Zone/ Proto-
col(s)
a.m. activities related
to means of delivery
Licensing/registration of facili-
ties/persons handling biological
materials
Interagency review for licenses
13 Other Conventions/Treaties involvement of non-
State actors in a.m.
activities
Licensing of chemical installa-
tions/entities/use of materials
Control lists
14 Other Arrangements Other Licensing of nuclear installa-
tions/entities/use of materials
Updating of lists
15 Other Reliability check of personnel Inclusion of technologies
16 Measures to account for/secure/ phys-
ically protect means of delivery
Inclusion of means of delivery
17 Regulations for genetic engineering
work
End-user controls
18 National CWC authority Catch all clause
19 National regulatory authority Intangible transfers
20 Reporting Schedule I, II and III chem-
icals to OPCW
Transit control
21 Account for, secure or physically pro-
tect old chemical weapons
Trans-shipment control
22 IAEA Safeguards Agreements Re-export control
23 IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources
Control of providing funds
24 IAEA Database on Illicit Trafficking
of Nuclear Materials and other Ra-
dioactive Sources
Control of providing transport ser-
vices
25 Other Agreements related to IAEA Control of importation
26 Additional national legisla-
tion/regulations related to nuclear
materials including CPPNM
Extraterritorial applicability
27 Other legislation/ regulations related
to safety and security of biological ma-
terials
Other
28 Other
† Countries provide one answer for each item under this question. ‡ Where appropriate, countries provide six answers for each item under this
question. Namely they comment on the national legal framework separately for biological weapons, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons and
then enforcement (civil/criminal penalties, and measures of implementation, etc) separately for biological weapons, chemical weapons and nuclear
weapons.
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5.2.1 Analytical Procedure
Coding
Based on the Matrices from each UN member state, I created three datasets with 382 variables
each. One dataset contains the references text contained in the matrices which usually referred
to the domestic laws which fulfill the specific obligation. The second dataset is made up of 382
categorical variables based on whether the committee deemed the country to have satisfied the
requirement of the matrix field. If no information was reported, then the committee would leave
their cell blank. If satisfied, then the committee marked an “X”. If the committee was uncertain
that the information reported was relevant or satisfied compliance with the issue area, then the
committee’s cell was marked with a question mark. I recoded this information as “Yes” for the
“X”, “No” for the cell left blank, and “Maybe” for cells marked as a question mark in my data set.
Additionally, I created a dataset of indicator variables based on the creation of legal statutes
created in 2004 or later; if the referenced legal statutes were issued in 2004 or later then I coded
the variable one (1) and otherwise zero (0). If the legal statute was created in 2004 or later, then
Resolution 1540 could have motivated the legal creation. These laws would be evidence of the
effectiveness of the international law. By contrast, domestic statutes that were already in place
before 2004 could not have been motivated by the existence of Resolution 1540.
Aggregating Compliance
The analytical procedure used in this chapter is the same as that used in the previous chapter, but
the outcome of interest has changed to focus on the question of substantive compliance. Substantive
compliance is first operationalized as a proportion of fields where the compliance requirement has
been met for a country. I simply sum compliance across all of the compliance fields, then divide by
the total number of fields.
Rank-Sum Analysis
Based on this proportion, countries are ranked, and I calculate the rank sum for the realized Council
— the UNSC in 2004. Then, I use the 1000 generated plausible Security Council compositions3
3The simulated compositions will actually be identical to those used in the previous chapter.
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Figure 5.2: All Compliance
and calculate the rank sum for the proportion compliance with the matrix items for each of these
hypothetical Councils. Situating the rank sum the 2004 Council within the reference distribution
constructed from hypothetical Councils, we determine how unusual the 2004 Council is under the
null of no relationship between being on the Council and substantive compliance. If the average
for the true 2004 Council is outlying in this reference distribution, then we could reject the null of
no relationship.
Figure 5.2.b shows the result of this analysis given all components of the matrix. As an addi-
tional point of reference, 5.2.a shows the distribution of proportions. The geographic distribution
is visualized in 5.3. For the 382 compliance fields the Security Council in 2004 compliance record
figures squarely in the middle of the reference distribution. Therefore we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis of no relationship between being on the Security Council in 2004 and compliance
with resolution 1540. The p-value is 0.714.
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Figure 5.3: Intensity of color corresponds to proportion of matrix items “checked off”
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Figure 5.4: Biological Compliance
Subsetting on WMD type
We might think about compliance in different issue areas of the resolution as well. One might
worry, for example that the nuclear issue area especially might be significantly different than other
compliance items given the unique relationship that states have with the NPT and nuclear weapons
technologies. Pakistan for example, which was on the Security Council in 2005, is not a member
of the NPT, a very unusual characteristic of a non-permanent member. Therefore it might not
be as easily able to “check the boxes” on nuclear nonproliferation issues as other UNSC potential
non-permanent member countries. In figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, show the result for the identical
procedure using the reference distribution from plausible draws where items are included only if
they pertain to a certain category: biological, chemical or nuclear. The p-values for Biological,
Chemical, and Nuclear compliance are 0.758, 0.612, and 0.822 respectively. The conclusions drawn
are thus the same as for overall compliance. We cannot reject the null of no relationship between
the treatment of interest – being on the Security Council to participate in the creation of resolution
1540 in 2004 – and the outcome of interest – compliance with Resolution 1540.
Subset on Legal Framework or Enforcement
One might also believe that there might be differences in participators in the creation of Resolution
1540, versus non-participants just in terms of legal framework, or just in terms of enforcement.
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Figure 5.5: Chemical Compliance
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Figure 5.6: Nuclear Compliance
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Figure 5.7: Enforcement Compliance
Participatants might think, for example that enforcement is a better way to communicate their
commitment to Resolution 1540, thereby preserving their reputation. However with Security Coun-
cil membership, there is neither a statistically significant relationship with enforcement items nor
with non-enforcement items. The p-value calculated from this procedure for legal and enforcement
answers are 0.936 and 0.462.
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Figure 5.8: Non-Enforcement Compliance
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Figure 5.9: Intensity of color corresponds to proportion of matrix items “checked off” which specif-
ically refer to actions passed in 2004 or thereafter
5.2.2 Effectiveness
The above analysis focuses on compliance broadly understood. In this section, I narrow my focus
to effectiveness with international law. Does state behavior change due to Resolution 1540? And
does being on the Council when resolution 1540 was passed lead to greater change in behavior?
The way that I approach this question is to evaluate if the legal structures that are cited in the
matrices are “incidental” or if the resolution might have motivated state actors. If the legal statute
cited was from 2004 or later, then I consider the item as evidence for effectiveness of Resolution
1540. I code the item one (1) if this is the case and zero (0) otherwise. The geographic distribution
of the variable is visualized in Figure 5.9. This new variable is fairly highly correlated with the
simple compliance variable.
With this new conception of compliance I apply the same procedure as above. I calculate the
proportion of items that each state responds to with new legislation. Then, with 1000 plausible
Security Councils, I calculate the an average proportion for non-permanent members. Then I
compare the average of the actual 2004 Security Council, with the reference distribution constructed
from the averages from the 1000 plausible Security Council resolutions.
Again, I consider the results for all items and then subsets of items, based on weapons type,
and based on if the item is legal or enforcement related.
Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 show the results of the focus on post 2004 legal changes,
in general, and in the biological, chemical, nuclear, legal and enforcement realms respectively. The
p-value calculated based on this procedure for all compliance items is 0.408. The p-value for
Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear compliance are 0.488, 0.362, and 0.938 respectively. The p-value
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Figure 5.10: All Compliance Post 2004
calculated from this procedure for legal and enforcement answers are 0.51 and .
Table 5.2 summarizes the result for all the data subsets both derived from the incidental com-
pliance case and the 2004-and-thereafter measures of compliance.
Scope p-value
All Compliance 0.71
Biological Compliance 0.76
Chemical Compliance 0.61
Nuclear Compliance 0.82
Non-Enforcement Compliance 0.94
Enforcement Compliance 0.46
All Compliance Post 2004 0.41
Biological Compliance Post 2004 0.49
Chemical Compliance Post 2004 0.36
Nuclear Compliance Post 2004 0.94
Non-Enforcement Compliance Post 2004 0.51
Enforcement Compliance Post 2004 0.69
Table 5.2: P-values associated with different dimensions
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Figure 5.11: Biological Compliance Post 2004
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Figure 5.12: Chemical Compliance Post 2004
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Figure 5.13: Nuclear Compliance Post 2004
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Figure 5.14: Enforcement Compliance Post 2004
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5.3 Regression Approach
In the previous section we have observed that membership in the Security Council does not seem
to increase substantive compliance with Resolution 1540. Still, we might wish to characterize what
the factors are that predict high compliance levels; what are the factors that predict substantive
compliance with Resolution 1540. I use ordinary least squares to model compliance as a function
of variables related to capacity — the same variables used in the previous section. Tables 5.3 and
5.4 contain the linear models (OLS) of the proportion items that countries complied with, and
proportion of items that countries have complied with via statutes issued in 2004 or thereafter.
Table 5.3: Linear of proportion matrix compliance
Dependent variable:
All Items Bio Chem Nuc Legal Enforcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rotating SC Member 2004 0.021 0.032 0.004 0.028 0.033 0.007
(0.069) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
Perm. SC Member 0.007 0.070 0.014 −0.041 0.007 0.007
(0.099) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.065 0.051 0.044 0.096∗ 0.061 0.070
(0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Log Population 0.098∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Year Joining UN 0.0002 0.0004 −0.0001 0.001 −0.0004 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Inf. Mortality −0.300∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.082) (0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.079)
Subsaharan Africa −0.009 −0.011 −0.018 0.004 −0.018 0.001
(0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant −0.510 −0.880 0.190 −1.700 0.650 −1.800
(2.200) (2.300) (2.400) (2.300) (2.300) (2.300)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.490 0.500 0.450 0.490 0.470 0.490
Adjusted R2 0.470 0.480 0.430 0.470 0.450 0.470
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The model results are similar across the two major divisions (incidental versus substantive com-
pliance), and across the materials and legal/enforcement breakdown. The standard errors are much
larger than the estimates across models for coefficients for Security Council membership, both per-
manent and non-permanent. Variables that have conditionally statistically significant relationships
with the dependent variables are log population and log infant mortality rate; these relationships
are positive and negative associations with the dependent variables respectively, consistent with
how these variables proxy state capacity. The coefficients for per capita GDP are positive for all
models, but only statistically significant for the nuclear dependent variable in the simple compliance
91
Table 5.4: Linear models of proportion substantive compliance (post 2004)
Dependent variable:
Overall Bio. Chem. Nuc. Legal Enforcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rotating SC Member 2004 −0.001 0.016 −0.008 −0.005 −0.003 0.002
(0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037)
Perm. SC Member −0.015 −0.008 −0.067 0.019 −0.007 −0.024
(0.052) (0.058) (0.062) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053)
Log Per Capita GDP 0.035 0.031 0.029 0.043 0.031 0.040
(0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
Log Population 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Year Joining UN 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.001∗ 0.001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Inf. Mortality −0.085∗∗ −0.120∗∗ −0.091∗ −0.080∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.055
(0.041) (0.046) (0.049) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042)
Subsaharan Africa 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.013
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Constant −1.300 −1.100 −0.690 −2.200∗ −1.500 −1.100
(1.200) (1.300) (1.400) (1.200) (1.300) (1.200)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182
R2 0.250 0.280 0.180 0.260 0.280 0.180
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.250 0.150 0.230 0.250 0.140
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
measure. Other variables, year of Security Council membership and sub-Saharan Africa indicator
have, in general, large standard errors compared with their coefficient estimates.
Much of the variation in simple substantive compliance can be explained by variables that proxy
state capacity (such as population (state size) and infant mortality (state development)). Models of
simple compliance using these variables have R-Squared values close to 0.5. However, the r-squared
values are about half that size when modeling my measure of the international law’s effectiveness.
5.4 Conclusion
In the previous chapter, I found evidence that being on the Security Council lead to better compli-
ance with procedural obligations. This chapter has looked at a substantive measure of compliance
— the rates of fulfillment of obligations as measured by the 1540 matrices. The results in this
chapter contrast with the previous one. The chapter provides no evidence for behavioral change
due to being on the Council. It may be that reputation, which was theorized to motivate behav-
ioral change in procedural compliance, is not enough to motivate enhanced levels of compliance by
non-permanent members of the council when it is substantive compliance — when it is much more
costly.
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Chapter 6
A Survey of Brazilian Deputies
This chapter examines the responses of Brazilian legislators to a survey about international law and
reputation, conducted in summers 2011 and 2012. Reputation is central to academic explanations as
to why countries comply with international law (Simmons, 2000; Guzman, 2005; Tomz, 2007; Allee
and Peinhardt, 2011). To summarize, the reputionational theory proposes that signing international
agreements “ups the reputational ante” because states have put their reputations on the line. States
will face the consequence of a tarnished reputation if they do not comply with the promises that
they have made. A damaged reputation diminishes a state’s desirability as a partner in future
cooperative agreements.
As in previous chapters, non-consent based international law is used to generate informative
comparisons. We would expect concern for reputation to be more acute when obligations are
consent-based versus not. Some evidence presented in previous chapters shows that countries tend
to have better compliance with resolutions adopted during their tenures on the Security Council.
Even so, there may be additional factors at work: membership on the Council likely leads to
improved understanding of the requirements and more opportunity to be convinced of the benefits
of resolutions.
This survey provides another angle to evaluate if the reputational mechanism is at work in the
controlled environment of a survey experiment. The central question asks Brazilian deputies about
willingness to cooperate in the future with countries that are not compliant with a UN Security
Council resolution. The reputational theory of compliance suggests the empirical pattern: non-
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compliance by a country that participates in a resolution’s creation should generate more concern
about future partnerships than non-compliance by a country that did not participate.
Within, I find that the survey respondents report being more likely to judge counties harshly
when they did participate in the creation of the resolution, but do not comply. I also find that when
Brazilians consider their own country’s compliance with a resolution, they anticipate reputational
costs to be greater for non-compliance if Brazil had participated on the Security Council when the
resolution was issued.
This surveys is one of the first to focused on how reputation affects country’s engagement with
international law.1 Studying Brazil also takes research in a new direction — focusing on emerging
rather than established powers. In addition to using original questions, the survey also replicates
Tomz’ 2008 study on reputation and international law.
6.1 Why Brazil?
Due to its special relationship to the UN Security Council, Brazil is uniquely suited to be the subject
of a study which leverages the non-consent based UNSC resolutions. Brazil is among the most
frequent non-permanent members of the Security Council, having been seated 10 times, matched
only by Japan.2 Like any nonpermanent member, Brazil is a frequent recipient of resolutions as
mandates, but Brazil also has the frequent experience of participating in passing resolutions. It is
a country that is in the situation of both study groups at different points in time.
Also, studying Brazil diversify our knowledge about how international law. Existing interna-
tional law compliance literature relies heavily on U.S. and Western Europe’s experiences or cross
national studies. Less research comes from middle-income and less-developed countries and what
does lacks specificity (Henkin, 1979).3 Studying Brazil, classified a middle-income country, ap-
1See Tomz 2008 for discussion on the lack of research in this area. Tomz is among the first to contribute to this
area of research.
2For example, Brazil was on the Council during 2004 and 2005, when Resolutions 1540 and 1624 were passed, the
subjects of earlier chapters. It was not on the Council for the passage of Resolution 1373, passed in 2001, however,
another Resolution for which I have analyzed compliance patterns. Also, Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council, along with other “G4” countries Japan, Germany, and India, means that the position of being
mandate creators is imaginable to the Brazilian population.
3Researchers have published much on Brazil in terms of its international relations and foreign policyBernal-Meza
(2002); ?); da Fontoura (1999); de Almeida (1999); Hirst and Pinheiro (1995); Lafer (2000); Vizentini (2004). However,
researchers have focused less on the issue of compliance with international law in Brazil, which is the goal of this
study. This study builds on this previous work to understand, in particular, Brazilian attitudes about international
legal compliance.
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propriately widens scope of the international law research lens, and may help to uncover how
contextual differences affects attitudes toward international law. My study, in replicating Michael
Tomz’ survey questions (2008), allows for direct comparison between the British and Brazilian
parliamentarians’ responses on international legal commitments.
What is more, Brazil is particularly relevant due to its growing position on the regional and
global stage. Brazil is a key player on many legal issue and markets. Brazil is central to addressing
global climate change given that the Amazon is the world’s largest carbon sink. In global health
policy, Brazil has been a reference point, particularly, its controversial policies regarding intellectual
property in HIV antiretroviral medications (Lazzarini, 2003). Moreover, Brazil is one of the top
suppliers of the important agricultural commodities (Ye-qiang, 2008), like soy and corn, and is an
increasingly important producer of hydrocarbons, both bio-fuels and traditional Gallagher et al.
(2006). Small arms production in Brazil and export from Brazil is notable, which means that
coordination with Brazil on international security is important Dreyfus et al. (2010). Working with
BRIC partners Russia, India, China, and South Africa increases leverage as an agenda setter at
international forums.
6.2 Why Deputies?
Characterizing “typical” Brazilian attitudes about compliance with international law is a daunting
task, given Brazil’s almost 200 million person population and expansive government institutions
and employees. Following research on Brazilian foreign policy by Amaury de Souza (2002), I limit
the sample to political elites, who are most likely to have influence on compliance outcomes.
By further focusing on deputies as participants, the sample respondents all have the same role in
government, which is a benefit in the survey experiment, in which we would like to have comparable
treatment and control groups. In terms of function in government, treatment and control groups
will be identical. Still, as the 513-member lower of the two houses of the Brazilian legislature,
the Caˆmara, is a closer reflection of the Brazilian population as opposed to the 81-member Senate
for example. The size of the Caˆmara also makes achieving a reasonably sized sample without
extraordinary response rates feasible.
From a theoretical perspective, too, focusing on the legislature is justifiable. Sanchez and Win-
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ters demonstrate how legislatures can be crucial actors when it comes to international convention
accession and compliance (Sanchez and Winters, 2009). A final benefit is that studying deputies
makes for a close parallel of the replicated study — Micheal Tomz’ survey of British parliamentar-
ians.
6.3 Research Design and Procedure
To obtain participants for the survey, I first contacted the deputies by e-mail and later knocked
door-to-door at the Caˆmara office annexes in Brasilia, Brazil. There were a total of fifty-five
surveys completed with thirty-six attained in person and nineteen filled out by the deputy and
returned to the researcher. All deputies who completed the survey orally agreed to have their
responses recorded, facilitating the collection of rationales. The written surveys also often included
rationales.
6.3.1 The Questionnaire
There are several components to the questionnaire. First, I collected background information
and asked seven original questions on deputies’ opinions about international law and compliance.4
Additionally, I ask four questions authored by Michael Tomz, from his unpublished survey of
British parliamentarians: “The Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs” (Tomz,
2008). Among these questions, there are two “survey experiments” — one an original and one a
replication question — comparing responses between groups that are asked variants of the question.
6.3.2 The Participants
Surveying at the Brazilian house of deputies meant there were a limited number of possible respon-
dents; my strategy was to survey as many of them as possible. In the end, about ten percent of
deputies answered the survey questions.
Because deputies representing the Federal District of Brasilia spent more time in their Brasilia
offices than deputies from other states, there was greater opportunity to administer the survey to
4I originally included one more question asking deputies to rank order foreign policy priorities, which was a survey
experiment. However, because this question was time consuming and there was great baseline variability in responses
I decided to drop the question after only a handful of deputies were asked it.
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these deputies. Given that self-selection was the most important factor determining my sample, one
might expect the sample to be very unrepresentative. Interestingly, the examination that follows
does not suggest that the sample is statistically different from the chamber, aside from the over
representation from the Federal District.5
The median age of the surveyed deputies was 54. The youngest deputy surveyed was 28 and
the oldest was 75. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide the age of the deputies and the number of terms or
“mandates” in the Chamber respectively. The most any participant had served was seven terms
and the modal number of terms is one. The age and number of mandates of the deputies, perhaps
unsurprisingly, correlate strongly, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.61.6
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Figure 6.1: Ages of Deputies in Sample
Women make up approximately nine percent of the Chamber of Deputies.7 Six female respon-
dents make up approximately eleven percent of my survey. The ratio of male and female respondents
and nonrespondents is shown in Figure 6.3.
There are fifteen parties represented in my sample. All of the parties not represented have three
or fewer deputies in the Chamber. Figure 6.4 shows the prevalence of parties8 among respondents
5Sometimes deputies would refuse to respond that they did not feel qualified to respond because they had little
experience with international relations. They would suggest that I seek out members of the Caˆmera’s Committee on
foreign relations. In future work, I may assess whether I have over representation from the Committee.
6For these variables, I do not have information on the entire Chamber.
7Women’s representation in the Caˆmara disproportionately small.
8There is also one party-independent Deputy.
97
05
10
15
20
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
co
u
n
t
Figure 6.2: Number of Terms for Deputies in Sample
and non-respondents. For reference I include Table 6.1 which shows Brazilian political parties and
their respective abbreviations.
Table 6.1: Brazilian Political Parties Represented in the Chamber of Deputies
Democratas DEM Partido Comunista do Brasil PCdoB
Partido Democra´tico Trabalhista PDT Partido Humanista de Solidariedade PHS
Partido do Movimento Democra´tico Brasileiro PMDB Partido da Mobilizac¸a´o Nacional PMN
Partido Progressista PP Partido Popular Socialista PPS
Partido da Repu´blica PR Partido Republicano Brasileiro PRB
Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro PRTB Partido Socialista Brasileiro PSB
Partido Social Crista˜o PSC Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira PSDB
Partido Social Liberal PSL Partido Socialismo e Liberdade PSOL
Partido dos Trabalhadores PT Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro PTB
Partido Trabalhista do Brasil PTdoB Partido Verde PV
Consistent with their greater representation in the Chamber, my sample has greater geographic
representation, from the populous southeastern states, like Sa˜o Paulo state and Rio de Janeiro state.
The bar charts in Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of deputies across the twenty-six Brazilian states
(and the Federal District) among respondents and non-respondents. Shown another way the maps
in Figure 6.6 shows the spatial distribution of the deputies in my sample (a) and in the chamber
(b). Table 6.2 lists Brazilian states and their abbreviations for reference.
Based on descriptions of profession for the Chamber, I determined whether deputies had a
legal background or not. Twenty-two percent of respondents had legal professions, while seventeen
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Figure 6.3: Gender of Deputies in Sample and Chamber
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Figure 6.4: Parties of deputies in the sample versus rest of the chamber
percent of non-respondents did. These distributions are shown in Figure 6.7.
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Table 6.2: Brazilian States Represented in the Chamber of Deputies
Acre AC Alagoas AL
Amapa´ AP Amazonas AM
Bahia BA Ceara´ CE
Distrito Federal DF Esp´ırito Santo ES
Goia´s GO Maranha˜o MA
Mato Grosso MT Mato Grosso do Sul MS
Minas Gerais MG Para´ PA
Para´ıba PB Parana´ PR
Pernambuco PE Piau´ı PI
Rio de Janeiro RJ Rio Grande do Norte RN
Rio Grande do Sul RS Rondaˆnia RO
Roraima RR Santa Catarina SC
Sa˜o Paulo SP Sergipe SE
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Figure 6.5: States of deputies in the sample versus rest of the chamber
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Figure 6.6: Geographic distribution in (a) the sample and (b) chamber
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Figure 6.7: Legal Professional Background of Deputies in Sample and Chamber
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6.3.3 Statistical tests for over or under sampling
Statistical tests can evaluate the existence of unexpected differences between the sample and the
chamber. Because expected values in cells are small (close to or less than 5), I use simulation-based
tests to calculate p-values. The sampling does not reveal statistically significant relationships
between response to the survey and gender, party, or legal professional background. There is
over-representation from the Federal District (Brasilia), as is expected due to this group’s greater
availability to be surveyed. In Table 6.3, do not reject the null of statistical independence for any
of the covariates except prevalence of Deputies from certain states.
Table 6.3: Evidence of Difference between Sample and Population?
p-value
Gender 0.62
Law Field 0.46
All States 0.05
All States (Excluding DF) 0.08
Party 0.78
6.4 Non-Experimental Original Questions
In this section, I review the survey question asked, the intention for asking the question, and the
distribution of responses for each question and discuss implications.
6.4.1 Pace of Integration
Question (1) is aimed at detecting support or hostility towards international integration, since such
dispositions might affect how deputies respond to other questions. This question is used to get at
attitudes toward international relations and global governance. If deputies opine that Brazil should
decrease its integration for example, the we might conclude that the deputy has negative attitude
about these issues.
An English translation of the question is provided in Text Box 1. Overall, there is a high level
of support for global integration with forty-one out of the fifty-five deputies responding in favor of
increased integration, twelve in favor of maintaining the pace of integration, and none in favor of
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decreasing the pace of integration.9
Some deputies asserted that Brazil is already a member of practically every IO, such that it
would not make much sense to answer that the pace of integration should be sped up. While
exceptions do exist,10 as Brazil is not a member of all the IOs and treaties for which it would be
eligible, this line of argument is justifiable. The interpretation of those deputies that were in favor
of maintenance of the pace of integration, should probably not be seen as isolationist.
Question 1
Today we find ourselves in a world increasingly integrated. International cooperation helps coun-
tries accomplish things that could not achieve alone. In this system, countries sometimes have to
conform to international rules that are not in their immediate interests. Considering all this, in
general, do you think Brazil should increase the pace of integration with international regimes,
decrease this pace, or keep the pace of integration as it is?
1. Brazil should increase its pace of integration with international regimes.
2. Brazil should decrease its pace of integration with international regimes.
3. Brazil should maintain its pace of integration with international regimes.
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Figure 6.8: Responses to question 1 - Preference on Pace of Integration
9Two deputies did not respond to this question.
10For example Brazil, is non-membership with the Australia Group, an important chemical and biological export
control institution, and has not ratified Bilateral Trade Agreements.
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6.4.2 Compliance with a SC Resolution that Brazil is opposed to
The next set of three questions (2) are designed to shed light on the issue of non-consent-based
international law that arises in the Security Council. These questions are answered in reference to
a hypothetical situation. The situation explores opinions about compliance with international law
when it conflicts with the national interest or immediate preferences of Brazil — and specifically
when Brazil is a regular part of the decision making process in the Security Council. The respon-
dents are asked to consider a scenario where Brazil is on the Security Council but opposes a Security
Council resolution, voting against it. In those circumstances, how should Brazil respond? Should
it try to comply with such a resolution? The fact that Brazil proposes permanent membership on
the Security Council allows for the hypothetical prompt in the next question.11 As things stand
Brazil is a frequent member of the Security Council, but if Brazil were a permanent member, there
would be an increased likelihood that the situation in the prompt arise. Brazil could find itself
voting against a resolution that ultimately passes.
The translation of the exact text, and the first question is provided in the text box. The first
question answered in relation to this hypothetical situation, asks if Brazil should comply with the
resolution even if it opposes it. Many scholars wonder if nations would comply with international
law in situations where it is not advantageous for them to do so — i.e. does the weight of the
law compel actors to do something they would rather not do. Few scholars have directly asked
this question of elites, however. The result is that the vast majority of elites favor following the
international law, even though they know their country had reason for opposing it.
11I should note that if Brazil were a permanent member, it would not be granted a veto according to most proposals,
unlike the current P5.
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Question 2
Below, choose the response that best represents your opinion:
As you know, one of the objectives of Brazilian foreign policy is to be a permanent member of
the Security Council. However, if Brazil were a permanent member of the Security Council, some
difficult situations could arise. For example, the Council could approve a resolution, but Brazil
could be opposed to it, and vote against it. In this situation, do you believe that Brazil should
make an effort to comply with the resolution because it is a permanent member of the Security
Council, in spite of being against it?
1. Generally, in this situation, if it were a member of the Council, Brazil should make an effort
to comply with the obligations of the resolution, in spite of being against it.
2. Generally, in this situation, if it were a member of the Council, Brazil should not make an
effort to comply with the obligations of the resolution, because it is against it.
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Figure 6.9: Responses to question 2 - How Brazil Should React to Disagreement with SC Resolution?
Vocalizing Opposition
Then I ask the deputy to give his or her opinion on what public stance Brazil should take on the
resolution. The text of the question is provided in the text box on page 106. The purpose is
to probe if the deputies believe that a compliant position can be maintained in open opposition
to the resolution - at least in this hypothetical situation. While all the deputies responded that
Brazil should comply, most also selected the first response: “Yes. In this situation, Brazil should
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make its opinion known publicly, even criticizing it.” A handful selected the second response which
advocated avoiding open criticism of the resolution. Only one deputy thought that Brazil should
stay quiet on the issue of the resolution.
Question 3 (Refers to Questions 2)
Consider the same situation. In general, should Brazil make its opinion about the resolution
known publicly, even criticizing it, or should it not?
1. Yes. In this situation, Brazil should make its opinion about the resolution known publicly,
even criticizing it.
2. Yes. In this situation, Brazil should make its opinion about the resolution known publicly,
but avoid criticizing it much.
3. No. In this situation, Brazil should not make its opinion about the resolution known publicly,
and should also avoid criticizing it.
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Figure 6.10: Responses to question 3 - How Open Brazil Should be in Position Contrary to SC
Resolution
Interestingly the deputies do not find it logically inconsistent to both feel obligated to follow
the law, and at the same time be critical of it — they are willing to voice opposition.
Will Brazil Feel Greater Pressure to Comply as a Security Council Member?
Following up on the previous questions, I ask about the possibility of varied expectations of
106
compliance for countries due to their participation in the creation of the resolution. To clarify
my question, I ask the deputies to contrast the pressure Brazil would feel to comply to the pres-
sure Argentina would feel - Argentina not being on the Security Council at the moment that the
hypothetical resolution was passed.
Figure 6.11 shows the results. Here two thirds of deputies responded that Brazil would feel
more pressure than Argentina, while one third thought that they would feel equal pressure. No
deputies thought that Brazil would feel less pressure than Argentina to comply with the resolution.
Question 4 (refers to Questions 2 and 3)
In this situation, Brazil would feel more or less pressure from other countries to comply with a
resolution, if Brazil were part of the Council? More expectations, for example, than Argentina,
which did not participate in the creation of this hypothetical resolution, as it was not a member
of the Council.
1. Brazil would feel more pressure from other countries to comply with the resolutions obliga-
tions than Argentina.
2. Brazil would feel less pressure from other countries to comply with the resolutions obligations
than Argentina.
3. Brazil would feel about the same pressure from other countries to comply with the resolutions
obligations than Argentina.
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Figure 6.11: Responses to question 4 - Greater Pressure than Argentina given Brazil’s Membership
on SC
107
National Interests Versus International Obligations?
The next group of questions also asks about Brazilian compliance with international law in a real
situation. Here the prompt discusses that actual concern that Brazil’s anti-terrorism legislation is
too weak, given the international legal requirements. On one hand, Security Council resolutions
regarding terrorism envision tougher legislation. On the other, the prompt brings up Brazil’s ex-
perience with anti-terrorism during the military dictatorship involved the torture and disappearing
its own citizens, a precedent it may not wish to repeat. The deputies were asked to consider, if
national legislation were to be strengthened, what consideration would have greater importance,
international law or national interests.
Figure 6.12 shows the response rates. Most deputies responded with the middle position, that
national interest has the same importance as international law. About the same number of deputies
fall on either side. The mix of responses reveal the tension that remains on the question of the
national position versus international law when the issue is more concrete.12
12Perhaps I should have had a follow-up asking just how it is that this tension should be resolved - especially for
those deputies that favor the national interest as having greater priority over international law.
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Question 5
Below, choose the response that best represents your opinion:
The impression exists that Brazil is not doing enough to create policies and laws that can punish
terrorists from the legal perspective. One reason that is used to explain the resistance to creating
stronger measures is the experience with the military dictatorship. In that time, the government,
in the name of anti-terrorism, tortured and disappeared many citizens. However, this means that
Brazil is a minority among important countries in the world for not having strong and tough
legislation in the combat against activities that contribute to terrorism. Do you believe that the
existence of these resolutions is reason enough to strengthen national law about terrorism?
1. The existence of Security Council resolutions is the most important reason to strengthen
Brazilian laws to combat terrorism.
2. The existence of Security Council resolutions is a very important reason to strengthen Brazil-
ian laws to combat terrorism, even above national considerations.
3. The existence of Security Council resolutions is a reason to consider the strengthening of
Brazilian laws to combat terrorism, but national interests have the same importance.
4. The existence of Security Council resolutions is a reason to consider the strengthening of
Brazilian laws to combat terrorism, but national interests are more important.
5. The existence of the Security Council resolutions should not be considered in the decision
to strengthen or not strengthen Brazilian laws on combating terrorism.
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Figure 6.12: Responses to question 4 – Priorities of National Interest versus International Law
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Power or Law Motivates Compliance?
The next question asks if it is more important for Brazil to consider the opinions of the most powerful
countries or international law. A question driven by realist school in International Relations, simply
to see how power and international law rank in terms of domestic decision making.
Figure 6.13 shows the result. Deputies, on the whole, are much more supportive of the idea
that international law ought to matter more than power in determining legislation, by more than
a two to one margin. No deputies believe that power should be more determinative to outcomes
than international law, but a substantial number do give power some standing, with about two
fifths responding that they should be given equal weight.
Question 6 (Refers to Question 5)
In this area of national anti-terrorism legislation, do you believe that it is more important for
Brazil to consider international law or the opinions of powerful countries?
1. International law is much more important than the opinions of the most influential countries.
2. International law is a little more important than the opinions of the most influential coun-
tries.
3. International law and the opinions of the most influential countries have about the same
importance.
4. International law is a little less important than the opinions of the most influential countries.
5. International law is much less important than the opinions of the most influential countries.
6.4.3 Correlations between question responses
To wrap up the commentary on this set of questions, I provide the correlation coefficients (Kendall
coefficients) between these ordered categorical variables that result from my questions. Many of
the questions would seem to be related, given their subject matter of respect and compliance for
international law. Especially consider that “Comply” question, the “Pressure to comply question”,
the “IL versus National” interests question, and the “IL versus Power” question. However, the
correlation is not strong in most cases, though it is positive for most of these pairs. Nevertheless, I
do construct a new variable to be used in prediction for the survey experiment from these questions
- an additive scale of the four questions. This will be used in the next section, as a potential
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Figure 6.13: Perspective on power versus law as rational for compliance
moderating variable for outcome of interest in the experimental section.
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Figure 6.14: Kendall Tau ordinal associations between Survey Introductory questions: Integra-
tion: Preference for Pace of Integration Comply: How public should Brazil be about a disagree-
ment with a Security Council Resolution? Vocal: What should Brazil’s public stance be on a SC
resolution that it opposes? IL v. National: Compared with national interests, how important
are SC resolutions in strengthening national terrorism law? IL v. Power: How much should in-
ternational law matter compared with the opinions of powerful countries to Brazilian international
politics?
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Figure 6.15: Distribution of constructed variable, capturing concern for compliance, based on initial
survey questions
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6.4.4 Regression Modeling
The first column in Table 6.4 reports an ordered logistic regression model of attitudes towards
integration. There are no statistically significant relationships between demographic variables and
answers given. Also, there is no statistical difference between the answers of those deputies that
responded face-to-face with the enumerator, or responded to the survey on their own.
Table 6.4: Models of responses to questions: Integration: Preference for Pace of Integration Comply: How public
should Brazil be about a disagreement with a Security Council Resolution? Vocal: What should Brazil’s public
stance be on a SC resolution that it opposes? IL v. National: Compared with national interests, how important
are SC resolutions in strengthening national terrorism law? IL v. Power How much should international law matter
compared with the opinions of powerful countries to Brazilian international politics?
Dependent variable:
Integration Comply Vocal Pressure IL v. National IL v. Power:
ordered logistic ordered ordered ordered ordered
logistic logistic logistic logistic logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 0.021 −0.004 0.044 0.013 −0.040 −0.043
(0.043) (0.052) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038)
Female −1.304 −1.079 0.971 −0.274 1.892∗∗ −1.076
(1.077) (1.376) (1.212) (1.034) (0.930) (0.941)
Number of mandates −0.325 0.363 −0.469∗ 0.260 0.347 0.275
(0.313) (0.472) (0.257) (0.282) (0.278) (0.279)
Legal background 0.255 −1.502 0.088 −1.607∗ 0.034 −1.182
(0.992) (1.209) (0.750) (0.821) (0.893) (0.866)
Survey conducted in person 0.610 1.297 1.151∗∗ −0.286 0.088 0.027
(0.665) (0.977) (0.554) (0.561) (0.541) (0.558)
Constant 1.335
(2.474)
Observations 52 50 52 48 49 50
Log Likelihood −16.047
Akaike Inf. Crit. 44.094
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Looking at the regression in column 2, which models responses to Question 2 of Table 6.4 we
again do not observe statistically significant relationships between demographics and the response
on whether to comply or not with the resolution. We might expect a positive relationship between
support for compliance and having legal professional background, however, the relationship is not
statistically significant and the estimate is actually negative.
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In column three of Table 6.4 on page 113 we see that there are statistically significant relation-
ships between respondent’s positions on this question and the number of mandates that they have
served (at 90% confidence), and whether the respondent answered the survey in person with the
enumerator (at 95% confidence). If the negative relationship between mandates and being vocal
about opposition is not due to chance, we might think that have learned to be diplomatic from
their experience — they may have learned to “tow the party line” and support official policies. The
positive relationship between the survey being conducted in person and being more vocal about
opposition to a resolution that is passed might be attributed to strengthened desire, when inter-
acting with a foreign enumerator, to demonstrate strength and to not back down on values held
dear. Respondent may have wished to communicate resolve in the face of a American enumerator,
whereas this aspect of the survey collection would be less prevalent with the paper version of the
survey.
In column four of Table 6.4, the only statistically significant relationship is negative with the
legal background variable, with 90% confidence. If this relationship is not due to chance, it coun-
ters conventional wisdom that those in the legal profession are more aware of the reputational
ramifications of not abiding by the law.13
In column five of Table 6.4, there are no statistically significant relationships between responses
to this question except with gender. Female respondents are more likely to respond in favor com-
pliance with international law over national considerations at higher levels than male respondents,
with 95% confidence. This finding, if not due to chance, bucks conventional wisdom that female
law makers will privilege what is local. At the same time it is consistent with the old fashioned
notion of women being more virtuous and law abiding. However, the reader should keep in mind
that this relationship is estimate based on just six female respondents.
In the final column of Table 6.4, it can be observed that there are no deputy characteristics that
are statistically significant predictors of the responses to this question. Again, we might expect
legal background to have a positive statistically significant relationship, but this is not observed.
13It seems as likely that it is due to chance. For other variables where we could have told the same story, the
relationship is not observed.
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6.5 Original Experimental Question
Question 7 is designed to specifically test the reputational theory of compliance. Reputational
theories contend that if states sign onto agreements, they are putting their reputations on the line,
and they are more likely to comply. The implication is that if they do not comply, after having
signed, they will be suffer by being excluded from future agreements.
The question asks deputies to consider a countries which does not comply with a UN Security
Council resolution. The treatment is information that the country was on the Security Council
when the resolution passed or was not. The deputies are asked to say how willing Brazil should be
to make future agreements with the country. Then deputy is then asked about the same situation,
but with the opposite treatment. The order the deputies received the two participation treatments
is random. The reputational theory would predict that there will be greater willingness to form
new agreements in the case where the country is non-compliant, but did not participate on the
Security Council, versus forming a new agreement with a country that is non-compliant and did
participate on the Security Council.
An additional random treatment is a comment in the addition to the vignette that some legal
scholars are opposed to supranational law, of which legislative Security Council resolutions are a
case. This treatment is either administered or not randomly. It might be expected that such at
treatment would have a dampening effect on the main treatment of interest, because deputies might
deem the SC legislative process inappropriate, and discount information about reputation that
compliance with resolutions provides. The treatment highlights that the Security Council legislative
obligations are extraordinary cases of international law, and compliance with SC resolutions might
have less to bear on how states will act when it comes to “ordinary” international law.
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Question 7
Background Prompt:
As you already know, the Security Council of the United Nations considers problems of global peace and security. Recently,
the Security Council passed several resolutions in line with the global anti-terrorism agenda. This means that fifteen countries
on the Council create new international law for all 192 country members of the United Nations.
[Some legal scholars argue against this new practice, because nations become responsible for law which they do not take part
in creating. (treatment 2)]
Question A: (half of respondents will be asked Question A first, then B, and half Question B first, and then A)
Some countries have not complied with the legal obligations of the Security Council. Consider one such country that was
participating on the Council when the resolution was passed. On the following scale, what is your opinion about how Brazil
should respond to such a country?
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Brazil should never
make any future
legal agreements
with this country
Brazil should be
very willing to
make future legal
agreements with
this country.
Question B:
Now consider another country that has not complied with the legal obligations of the Security Council. This time, consider
one such country that was not participating on the Council when the resolution was passed. On the following scale, what is
your opinion about how Brazil should respond to such a country?
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Brazil should never
make any future
legal agreements
with this country
Brazil should be
very willing to
make future legal
agreements with
this country.
Figure 6.16 shows the distribution of responses for the question where the country had partici-
pated on the Security Council, versus where it had not participated. We see that, on average, there
is greater mistrust for the country that was on the Security Council compared with the country
that was not on the Council. Performing a standard t-test on these data, the difference between
treatment groups it 0.699 units — which is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.01.
We can also consider the within-subject difference — taking the difference between a deputy’s
response under one condition versus another. Taking the responses as numeric, I subtract the
response given the country’s participation in the Security Council from the response given the non-
participation of the country. The mean difference for the deputies is 0.65; on average deputies are
less enthusiastic about cooperating with a country that has participated on the Security Council
and does not comply. While the difference is not dramatic, as this is less than a full scale position
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Figure 6.16: Willingness to make Future Agreements with Country that Fails to Comply with
UNSCR
shift, it is statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.001. The distribution of within subject
differences is in Figure 6.17.
Many deputies responded with the same scale value for both scenarios — in fact this is the
modal response. One rationale for responding in this was that future agreements may be made in
different issue areas. About half responded favoring the non-complier that had not participated
in the resolution legalization process for future agreements. These responses give credence to the
reputational theory of compliance. Four respondents favored the country that was on the Security
Council as a future cooperative partner over the country that was not on the Security Council.
Figure 6.18 shows the distribution of within subject differences for those that get the legal-
scholars-opinion treatment versus those that do not. The mean difference for the treatment group
was 0.57, and the mean in the group not treated was 0.76. The difference between these means
is not statistically significant, so while the direction of the difference is as theory anticipated (a
dampening effect for those treated with the critical law opinion), we cannot reject the null of no
difference in means for these groups.
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Figure 6.17: Difference between willingness to make future agreements with country not on Security
Council versus country on the Security Council (within subjects)
6.5.1 Regresion Analysis
To evaluate if covariates are related to attitudes toward cooperation with the non-compliant country,
I use regression modeling, first using an ordered logistic model and then ordinary least squares.
Ordered Logit
Table 6.5 shows the results from estimating ordered logistic models.14 The outcome for the first
column is the within subject difference in favorability between a country that did not participate on
the Security Council versus one that did — so it is a measure of relative favorability. In the second
column, the between subject outcome is the response only for first SC participation treatment that
the deputies respond to. The third and fourth columns analyze the situations of the non-complier
having been a member of the Council and a non-member of the Council as separate outcomes.
The only covarietes that are observed to have statistically significant relationships with the
outcomes are demographic ones — gender, the number of mandates of the deputy, and the legal
background of the deputy. Curiously, the gender variable is only significant at the 90% level in
predicting less support by female deputies for Security Council members that were non-members.
14Also, note that I treat the ordinal explanatory variable, “Deputy’s concern for compliance” as interval variables
in the models.
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Table 6.5: Ordered Logit Models of favorability towards future cooperation with the country that is the
subject of the survey question
Dependent variable:
Within subject Between subject SC member SC non-member
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.037 0.085∗ −0.001 0.039
(0.034) (0.044) (0.036) (0.040)
Female −0.990 −1.104 −0.564 −2.159∗∗
(1.001) (0.963) (0.855) (1.003)
Number of mandates −0.073 −1.102∗∗∗ −0.337 −0.596∗∗
(0.246) (0.316) (0.247) (0.279)
Legal background −0.207 2.127∗∗ 1.231 1.047
(0.733) (0.904) (0.787) (0.840)
Survey conducted in person 0.381 0.349 0.487 0.526
(0.551) (0.597) (0.579) (0.572)
Deputy’s Concern for Compliance −0.067 −0.051 0.015 −0.108
(0.124) (0.125) (0.120) (0.130)
SC non-member treatment 0.796
(0.651)
Legal scholar treatment −0.247 0.117 0.160 −0.031
(0.574) (0.639) (0.575) (0.615)
Observations 46 46 47 46
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 6.18: Response v. legal scholars negative opinion of supranational law treatment
The number of mandates of a deputy correlates negatively with favorability toward cooperation
with a non complying country in some of the models. Perhaps this is due to political experience.
Politicians who have been in congress the longest may have been disappointed by political deals
where others failed to follow through. They may, overall, have greater concerns about what non-
compliance signals — poor ability to follow through with commitments. However, the estimate
is statistically significant for Security Council non-members, which are hypothesized to relay less
information about reputation than their Security Council member counterparts. So the result is
a bit surprising. Finally, legal background is positively associated with a favorable view towards
cooperation with the non-compliant state. Theoretically, from a realist point of view, perhaps such
deputies are more realist — being aware of widespread non-compliance in law keeping, they may
not see non-compliance as a valid reason to not go about business as usual.
Ordinary Least Squares
As a robustness check of these findings, I also estimate the models using ordinary least squares
in 6.6, by assuming that the outcomes can be treated as intervals. The one difference in terms of
relationships that could be considered as statistically significant at conventional levels is the vari-
able “Age” and its positive relationship to favorability towards cooperation with a non-complying
country in the between subject analysis.
120
The within subject statistically significant result for the SC members/non-members treatment,
uncovered using the paired t-test above, is not found using the regression framework with the
between subjects regression. The relationship is positive, however, consistent with the within
subject test.
Table 6.6: OLS models of favorability towards future cooperation with the country that is the subject of the survey question
Dependent variable:
Within subject Between subject SC member SC non-member
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.018 0.043∗ 0.001 0.025
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
Female −0.627 −0.486 −0.391 −1.015∗
(0.583) (0.550) (0.679) (0.553)
Number of mandates −0.032 −0.555∗∗∗ −0.266 −0.309∗∗
(0.148) (0.140) (0.173) (0.141)
Legal background −0.134 0.903∗∗ 0.793 0.574
(0.468) (0.442) (0.544) (0.445)
Survey conducted in person 0.156 0.088 0.279 0.298
(0.330) (0.313) (0.376) (0.314)
Deputy’s Concern for Compliance −0.033 −0.030 −0.00004 −0.046
(0.073) (0.069) (0.085) (0.070)
SC non-member treatment 0.314
(0.339)
Legal scholar treatment −0.154 0.058 0.108 0.008
(0.356) (0.338) (0.414) (0.338)
Constant 0.340 2.576∗ 3.354∗ 3.665∗∗
(1.541) (1.471) (1.798) (1.464)
Observations 46 46 47 46
R2 0.087 0.348 0.099 0.202
Adjusted R2 −0.081 0.207 −0.063 0.055
Residual Std. Error 1.100 (df = 38) 1.034 (df = 37) 1.283 (df = 39) 1.045 (df = 38)
F Statistic 0.517 (df = 7; 38) 2.468∗∗ (df = 8; 37) 0.612 (df = 7; 39) 1.373 (df = 7; 38)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
6.6 U.K. Survey Replication
This section attempts to exactly replicate Michael Tomz’ survey of British legislators on issues of
international law and security (Tomz, 2008). His questions seek to assess theories about reputation
being linked to the type of international commitment made — commitment via treaty or declaration
for example. Additionally, he explores the questions of audience costs that result from not following
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through with oral commitments in the international sphere. My question going into the study was,
will Brazilian legislators respond in the same way? For most questions, the legislators respond in a
similar fashion. For Tomz’ first question, question (8), which explores the mechanism of audience
costs, the Brazilian deputies respond similarly to the British parliamentarians.
6.6.1 Signing the NPT
The first question of Michael Tomz’ survey is a embedded experiment. Deputies were asked
about the likelihood that a hypothetical country pursues nuclear weapons. Two versions of the
survey provided identical characteristics of the country, except for its relationship to the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One version of the survey described a country that had signed the
NPT and one described a country that had not signed. This design aimed at estimating changed
expectations for signing the NPT.
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Question 8
Background:
There’s much concern these days about the spread of nuclear weapons. I’m going to describe a
country that may or may not be pursuing nuclear weapons. For scientific validity, the description
involves a general type of country, rather than a specific country in the news today. Some parts
of the description may strike you as very important; other parts may seem much less impor-
tant. When I have finished the description, I will ask–in your best judgment given the limited
information available–how likely or unlikely you think it is that the country is pursuing nuclear
weapons.
Each Deputy will then receive background information. The treatment group will be presented
the following:
• The country borders on an unfriendly nation that has nuclear weapons and has threatened
to use them in a future war.
• The country has repeatedly said that it does not want nuclear weapons.
• The country has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby pledging not to re-
ceive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. [Versus control: The country
has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
• Recent satellite images show that the country has started enriching uranium, which could
be used for either civilian or military purposes.
• The country has a stagnant economy.
The control group received the same facts except regarding the NPT.
1 2 3 4 5
Very probable Probable 50-50 chance Improbable Very improba-
ble
What was your rationale for your answer?
The responses track closely with those given by British parliamentarians’. We can infer that
the treatment, the information that the country did sign the NPT, shifted the responses toward
greater confidence that the country was not pursuing nuclear weapons. Figure 6.19 shows this result.
Treating ordinal response variable as interval data, a t-test results in rejecting the null hypothesis
in no difference between the treatment groups, of signing and not signing the NPT, with a p-value
of .001. The difference in means for these groups is more than a full ordered response category.15
15Some deputies made guesses about what country might actually be in the mind of the researchers (Iran and
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Figure 6.19: Assessed likelihood that country is pursuing nuclear weapons
Tomz’s results are similar, with 61% of parliamentarian respondents believing the country
likely to be pursuing nuclear weapons with the treatment “Did not sign the NPT”. Just 35%
of respondents believed the country to be pursuing nuclear weapons with the treatment “Signed
the NPT”.
6.6.2 Bluffing Privately or Publicly
The next question that Tomz posed was about the nature of military threats made in the
international sphere. The question asked whether a threat made privately or publicly is less likely
to represent bluffing. After translation, this question was posed to the Brazilian deputies.
North Korea came up), which is a perhaps a shortcoming of the Tomz approach which aims to have the respondents
think about a generic country.
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Question 9
Suppose two countries make similar military threats. One country delivers its threat in a private
meeting with the foreign president. The other country delivers the threat in a public speech at the
United Nations. If the threats are alike in other ways, which country is less likely to be bluffing
and thus more likely to follow through, or are they about equally likely to follow through?
• The country that makes its threat in a private meeting is less likely to be bluffing, and
therefore, more likely to follow through with the threats.
• The country that makes its threat in a public meeting is less likely to be bluffing, and
therefore, more likely to follow through with the threats.
• Both are equally likely to be bluffing.
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Figure 6.20: Percentage Responding to Audience Cost Logic in Brazil versus UK
The Brazilian deputies, overall, prefer the “middle” response — that the private threat and
public threat would be equally credible. Among those that do not have this most popular response,
there is a fairly even split between deputies believing the public threat to be more credible, versus
those that believe a private threat to be more credible. Tomz found that 57% parliamentarians
believed that publicizing a commitment increased the credibility of a threat. Whereas 16% of them
thought that private commitment would increase the credibility. The remaining 27% thought that
private or public threats were equally credible.
This question is where the starkest difference between responses of the Brazilian sample and
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the British sample is observed. One explanation is that culture may condition the audience cost
to be paid for bluffing. How acceptable a British person finds it to make claims and then not
follow-through may be different from how acceptable a Brazilian finds it. Perhaps, the audience
cost to be paid in the Brazilian context may be lower. If countries face lower audience costs for not
following through with their bluff, then they might engage in this behavior more frequently. These
cultural norms may also affect the judgment of how much another country will pay in audience
costs by bluffing, using one’s own cultural perspective as a reference point.
6.6.3 Promising to Defending Allies Orally or Via Treaty
Then I posed another question of Micheal Tomz to the deputies, comparing oral versus written
agreements in the context of defensive alliance.
Question 10
At an international summit, two countries publicly promised to defend their allies. One announced
its intention orally, the other signed a treaty. Which country would be more likely to defend its
ally, or would they be equally likely to do so?
• The country that orally announces its intention is more likely to defend its ally.
• The country that signs a treaty is more likely to defend its ally.
• Both are equally likely to defend their ally.
For this question, the distribution of responses of the Brazilian deputies and the British parlia-
mentarians is almost the same. The majority of British and Brazilian legislators believe that the
country that signs a treaty is more likely to defend its ally. Only about a fifth believe that the two
countries are equally likely to defend their ally. Only a few respondents believe that the country
that makes an oral commitment is more likely to defend its ally.
6.6.4 Reputational Damage for Non-Compliance with Oral Promise Vs. Treaty
The last question asks in what circumstances reputation will suffer more, when an oral or written
promise is broken in the international sphere. Here again he is asking if there is more potential
reputational damage in the case of formal legal promises versus verbal promises, when the promises
are not met.
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Figure 6.21: Confidence of Follow-Through for Oral versus Written Promises
Question 11
Some people say that, if a country breaks an international commitment, its reputation might suffer.
Foreign leaders might become more skeptical of the country’s willingness to keep commitments
in the future. Which statement comes closest to your view about how the two types of actions—
breaking a written treaty versus breaking an oral promise—would affect a country’s international
reputation?
• Violating a written treaty would cause more reputational damage than violating an oral
commitment.
• Violating an oral commitment would cause more reputational damage than violating a
written treaty.
• Violating an oral commitment and violating a written treaty would damage a country’s
reputation to an equal degree.
This question, too, results in a similar distribution of responses for British parliamentarians
and Brazilian deputies. About two thirds of both nationalities of legislators respond that violating
the written treaty would cause more damage than violating an oral commitment. Most of the
remaining respondents choose the third answer that violating an oral commitment and violating a
written treaty would damage a country’s reputation to an equal degree. More precisely, only 3%
of Tomz’ respondents thought that the public announcement was more credible than the treaty
commitment. A majority, 75%, of his respondents believed that a treaty commitment was more
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Figure 6.22: How damaged are reputations by non-compliance with international law?
credible. The remaining 22% thought that that follow-though was equally likely for the country
that had orally committed and made a commitment through a treaty.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the results of a study conducted in Brazil in September 2011 and July
2012. Brazilian deputies were surveyed about their preferences for compliance with international
law, as well as preference for interacting with other states based on their compliance behavior.
The survey reveals that actors may face less of a reputational cost when they do not comply with
international law that they do not consent to, but which is received as a mandate. The survey
also replicates a study conducted in the U.K. with British parliamentarians, designed by Michael
Tomz. The patterns of responses of the British and Brazilian parliamentarians are similar for most
cases, and consistent with a reputational theory of compliance, which emphasizes legalization. One
notable difference is on the question focused on audience costs for threats. Overall, Brazilian
deputies consider the threat that is made in private as less likely to be a bluff, whereas the British
parliamentarians consider the threat that is made in public as less likely to be a bluff. The Brazilians
responses are inconsistent with the audience cost theory that Tomz uses to explain the British
parliamentarian’s assessment.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Does reputation play a role in compliance with international law? This dissertation has shed light on
the reputational theory of international law, an oft invoked explanation as to how state behavior
changes as a result of international law. The theory states that countries will want to preserve
their reputation for fulfillment of their commitments, because they do not want to be barred from
cooperative opportunities that rely on commitments in the future. In introducing this question, I
discussed how existing studies of international law have been troubled due to endogeneity resulting
from the fact that international law is by-and-large consent based. Specifically, self-selection into
international law has meant scholars have less confidence that it is international law itself causing
behavioral change rather than an additional unobserved state characteristic which both determines
the choice to be bound by international law and explains differences in state behavior.
My solution has been to provide a new vantage point for examining this question: using non-
consent based international law. The comparison is not that of traditional studies which look at
state behavior for countries that have signed onto an agreement versus countries that have not
signed on. Instead, for some countries, non-consent based international law will still be based on
consent, while for others it will be like a mandate. The reputational theory of international law
has different implications for these two study groups, both of which face international law as an
obligation.
Specifically, I proposed and implemented a study of an international legal obligation that was
produced by of the Security Council — one of the most powerful, and at the same time exclusive,
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international law making bodies in the global system.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, scholars have noted that some of the Council’s
resolutions have become more far reaching — terming the new flavor of resolutions “legislative”
and the Security Council as “World Legislature.” Such law has the advantage of yielding clear
groups for comparison — law makers versus law receivers — in members of the Security Council
versus non-members.
I have presented my empirical work and findings in three chapters. In the first empirical
chapter, Chapter 3, I find that participation in the creation of this binding international law depends
participation on the Security Council. This is consistent with the predictions of the reputational
theory — countries’ compliance should be better for countries that participated as their reputation
for following through with commitments they have made is on the line, whereas it might matter
less for countries that did not participate. For the Resolution that is the focus of my study — a
resolution on WMDs — the result is robust to several analytical approaches.
Then in Chapter 4, I evaluating if being on the Council effects substantive compliance, I find that
while states that have a participatory role in creating a resolution are more likely to comply with
procedural aspects of the resolution they do not differ in substantive compliance compared to their
non-participatory counterparts. Compliance is observed among countries that receive obligations as
a mandate at similar rates as countries that consent to the obligation, participating in its creation.
In Chapter 5, I summarize the results of a survey of Brazilian Deputies. The deputies, when
questioned about a hypothetical country in non-compliance with a Security Council resolution are
more likely to respond with concern about future cooperative activity with that country, if it had
participated on the Security Council, versus if it had not. This result is more consistent with the
finding of chapter Chapter 3 on procedural compliance.
This dissertation project should leave the reader with a more nuanced view of reputation and
how it affects state behavior with international law. While reputation may motivate compliance, it
is likely to only do so at the margin. More than reputation alone must motive states for international
law to effect substantive change.
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7.1 Policy Implications
The implications of my findings go beyond reputational theory — providing insight for a debate
about how to best create global legal obligations on pressing issues such as climate change, disease
control, and terrorism briefly noted in the dissertation. Supranational — non-consent based inter-
national law — has been proposed to deal with these challenges, but the solution is not without
critics. Thus there is a debates with regard to “top down” and “bottom up” strategies — two
competing models for addressing such problems. Advocates for a “top down” approach argue that
institutions should be able to impose rules on all countries — without relying on consensus and
consent. These scholars worry that building consensus is too cumbersome to be effective and timely
(Guzman, 2012). By contrast other scholars advocate for a “bottom up” approach, noting that the
principle of consent has been a tenet of international law (which ensures there is not a democratic
deficit), and that without buy-in we may see high rates of noncompliance (which indicates a compli-
ance deficit) (Johnstone, 2008). Given the findings that there is no observed substantive behavioral
difference between countries that participated in the Security Council Resolution creation verses
countries that did not, my study does not support for the “bottom up” argument.
7.2 Advancing study of International Law in the Global South
As noted in the dissertation, it is rare for studies of international law — especially survey exper-
iments of international law — to focus on countries in the global south. In this way, my study
breaks new ground. Moreover, studying Brazil’s perspective on international law is particularly
important. Another topic that my work informs is how rising powers assert themselves in the
international system.
Brazil’s relationship with the Security Council is special. It, along with Germany, India, and
Japan constitute the G4 — a group aspiring to permanent membership on the Security Council.
However, other countries may see such aspirations as a threat. The group, Uniting for Consensus,
actively opposes the scheme to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council to
include these four countries. Brazil’s permanent membership is opposed especially by other regional
powers like Argentina and Mexico. Consider Brazil’s policy on anti-retroviral drug for treatment
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of the AIDS epidemic, challenged existing international law on intellectual property on ethical and
practical grounds, arguably making it a model for other countries in tackling the AIDS epidemic and
the international legal issues surround it. It also plays a critical role in global areas of concern like
energy sector development and climate change. It is vital to know the perspective on International
Law of this rising power as it forges pathways on global governance.
7.3 Contribution as a model for IR research
In Chapters 3 and 4 I employ a novel analytically strategy to come to the conclusions. The Security
Council has the additional advantage of rotation of membership which results in quasi-experiment.
We can easily imagine different sets of countries being on the Security Council when a specific
resolution is passed. I have argued that which countries are on the Security Council at any moment
in time is haphazard and unrelated to the specific issues that arise on the global agenda during
Security Council tenures. This is due to the electoral system, which is dominated by slate rather
than competitive elections. The quantitative strategy is a constrained resampling technique in
which I create plausible simulated Councils as comparisons to the realized Council. Comparing
the compliance behavior of countries that might have participated with the countries that actually
participated mimics analysis of a randomized experiment.
In this way, this dissertation has contributed to the literature as it provides a model for finding
and using instruments in observational data in the IR setting. International Relations struggles to
find observational research that are causally identified. Ironically, it is the state of Anarchy — while
on the one hand makes international law effectiveness seem unlikely at first glance — which also may
make causal identification in IR studies rare. In domestic settings, national and local governments
are implementing policies and laws that allow for research designs to be strongly identified. In
the domestic setting, governments can, intentionally or unintentionally, provide instruments via
implementation of their policies at arbitrary cut offs, lotteries and the like. In the international
system, just as there is no higher power to police international law, and there is no higher power
to be a regular provider of exogenous shocks. This dissertation has contributed to the growing
number of identified observational studies in International Relations.
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7.4 Future Research
In the short term, I plan to consider regression using a regression discontinuity type analysis of the
existing data. The temporal plot of non-permanent Security Council composition behaviors shows
not only the story that I put forth in the dissertation, but also one that might be titled “waiting
to take a seat”. The behavior of non-permanent members after resolutions appears to be better
Security Council members from before. This may be because countries have bids for non-permanent
membership are likely to be more concerned with their compliance record on Resolutions than they
would be if the non-permanent membership were not in front of them.
In the longer term, extensions could look at new resolutions of the “legislative” nature, par-
ticularly Resolution 1278, which arose out of the crisis of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s
(ISIL) international recruitment of new members. The resolution required UN member countries
to prevent transit or travel of individuals believed to be traveling for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism (i.e. joining a terrorist organization). How did states respond to this resolution? Is
there, again, a relationship between being on the Council and procedural compliance? With sub-
stantive compliance? Also engaging with the broader body of resolutions — not just those deemed
“legislative” — might prove interesting. Specifically, I would be interested to add to the work
on national implementation of UN Security Council sanctions resolutions Mack and Khan (2000);
Rosand (2004).
In general, this study represents an embarkation for further study of countries’ responses to
supranational law. The findings point to heterogeneous effects of supranational law and my future
work will seek to investigate this heterogeneity of responses to non-consent based international
law in other settings, using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Moreover, I hope to
work in a more focused way on the question of supranational law: under what circumstances is
seeking global or universal international law is likely to be deemed legitimate and what are the best
pathways to make it effective.
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Appendix A Monte Carlo Simulation
Code
function(NumSimulated, Weights){
SimModernCouncils=matrix(data=NA, nrow=nrow(UN1540Data),
ncol=NumSimulated)
rownames(SimModernCouncils)=UN1540Data$StandardName
colnames(SimModernCouncils)=paste0("UNSC.Sim", 1:NumSimulated)
Even=rep(c(0,1), ceiling(NumSimulated/2))
for (i in 1:NumSimulated){
EasternEuropeGroupSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName, 1, replace=FALSE,
prob= Weights*(
Modern.Region==
"Eastern European Group")))
LatinAmericaGroupSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName, 2, replace=FALSE,
prob= Weights*(Modern.Region==
"GRULAC")))
WesternEuropeGroupSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName, 2, replace=FALSE,
prob= Weights*(Modern.Region==
"WEOG")))
AfricaNonArabSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName, 3, replace=FALSE,
prob= (LeagueOfArabStates-1)*-1*Weights*
(Modern.Region=="African Group")) )
AfricaArabSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName, 1, replace=FALSE,
prob=LeagueOfArabStates*Weights*
(Modern.Region=="African Group")))
AsiaNonArabGroupSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName,2,replace=FALSE,
prob=(LeagueOfArabStates-1)*-1*Weights*
(Modern.Region=="Asia-Pacific Group")))
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AsiaArabGroupSample=with(UN1540Data,
sample(StandardName,1,replace=FALSE,
prob= LeagueOfArabStates*Weights*
(Modern.Region=="Asia-Pacific Group")))
if(Even[i]==0){
OneSimComposition=c(EasternEuropeGroupSample,
LatinAmericaGroupSample,
WesternEuropeGroupSample,
AfricaNonArabSample,
AsiaNonArabGroupSample[1],
AsiaArabGroupSample
)
}else{
OneSimComposition=c(EasternEuropeGroupSample,
LatinAmericaGroupSample,
WesternEuropeGroupSample,
AfricaNonArabSample[1:2],
AfricaArabSample,
AsiaNonArabGroupSample
)
}
SimModernCouncils[,i]=
as.numeric(as.numeric(UN1540Data$StandardName) %in%
OneSimComposition)
}
return(SimModernCouncils)
}
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Appendix B Detailed Compliance In-
formation on Resolution 1373, 1540, and
1624
n mean sd median min max
Year Joining UN 191.00 1964.58 17.57 1960.00 1945.00 2002.00
Days Late Submitting 1540 Report 171.00 423.39 732.05 27.00 0.00 3597.00
Number of Years on the Security Council 191.00 3.15 3.83 2.00 0.00 20.00
GDP Per Capita in 2004 (Adjusted to 2005 $US) 183.00 10960.61 18536.19 2865.34 147.43 125965.83
Population in 2004 188.00 33870351.66 128955293.07 6781176.00 9646.00 1296075000.00
Infant Mortality per 1000 Births 187.00 34.12 30.62 21.90 2.30 130.10
Number of Reports Submitted for UNSCR 1373 191.00 3.69 1.46 4.00 1.00 6.00
Year Submitting UNSC 1624 110.00 2006.70 1.34 2006.00 2005.00 2012.00
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics - Chapter 3
Table B.2: UN member countries that have never been on the Security Council
Afghanistan Albania
Andorra Antigua and Barbuda
Armenia Bahamas
Barbados Belize
Bhutan Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia Central African Republic
Comoros Cyprus
Dominica Dominican Republic
El Salvador Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea Estonia
Fiji Georgia
Grenada Haiti
Iceland Israel
Kazakhstan Kiribati
Kyrgyzstan Laos
Latvia Lesotho
Liechtenstein Macedonia, TFYR of
Malawi Maldives
Marshall Islands Micronesia
Moldova Monaco
Mongolia Mozambique
Myanmar Nauru
North Korea Palau
Papua New Guinea Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and The Grenadines
Samoa San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia
Serbia Seychelles
Solomon Islands Suriname
Swaziland Switzerland
Tajikistan Timor-Leste
Tonga Turkmenistan
Tuvalu Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
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Table B.3: Number of Reports for UNSCR 1373 (* indicates non-permanent Council Member)
Afghanistan 2 Albania 2 Algeria 5
Andorra 5 Angola 3 Antigua and Barbuda 2
Argentina 6 Armenia 5 Australia 6
Austria 5 Azerbaijan 5 Bahamas 5
Bahrain 4 Bangladesh* 3 Barbados 4
Belarus 6 Belgium 4 Belize 3
Benin 3 Bhutan 2 Bolivia 4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 Botswana 2 Brazil 6
Brunei Darussalam 4 Bulgaria 6 Burkina Faso 2
Burundi 2 Cambodia 3 Cameroon 4
Canada 5 Cape Verde 2 Central African Republic 1
Chad 1 Chile 5 China 5
Colombia* 5 Comoros 2 Congo 4
Costa Rica 4 Croatia 4 Cuba 5
Cyprus 6 Czech Republic 6 Denmark 5
Djibouti 5 Dominica 1 Dominican Republic 3
DRC 5 Ecuador 4 Egypt 6
El Salvador 6 Equatorial Guinea 1 Eritrea 2
Estonia 6 Ethiopia 3 Fiji 2
Finland 5 France 4 Gabon 3
Gambia 1 Georgia 2 Germany 4
Ghana 2 Greece 5 Grenada 2
Guatemala 5 Guinea 2 Guinea-Bissau 1
Guyana 2 Haiti 2 Honduras 2
Hungary 5 Iceland 4 India 5
Indonesia 5 Iran 5 Iraq 3
Ireland* 4 Israel 5 Italy 4
Ivory Coast 2 Jamaica* 6 Japan 5
Jordan 5 Kazakhstan 5 Kenya 3
Kiribati 1 Kuwait 5 Kyrgyzstan 4
Laos 2 Latvia 6 Lebanon 5
Lesotho 2 Liberia 1 Libya 5
Liechtenstein 5 Lithuania 5 Luxembourg 5
Macedonia, TFYR of 4 Madagascar 2 Malawi 2
Malaysia 5 Maldives 2 Mali* 3
Malta 4 Marshall Islands 3 Mauritania 2
Mauritius* 6 Mexico 5 Micronesia 1
Moldova 4 Monaco 5 Mongolia 3
Morocco 4 Mozambique 3 Myanmar 5
Namibia 5 Nauru 3 Nepal 4
Netherlands 4 New Zealand 5 Nicaragua 3
Niger 4 Nigeria 3 North Korea 3
Norway* 5 Oman 3 Pakistan 5
Palau 3 Panama 5 Papua New Guinea 2
Paraguay 5 Peru 4 Philippines 4
Poland 5 Portugal 4 Qatar 4
Romania 5 Russian Federation 4 Rwanda 4
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 Saint Lucia 1 Saint Vincent and The Grenadines 2
Samoa 3 San Marino 4 Sao Tome and Principe 2
Saudi Arabia 4 Senegal 3 Serbia 4
Seychelles 4 Sierra Leone 1 Singapore* 5
Slovakia 5 Slovenia 4 Solomon Islands 1
Somalia 1 South Africa 5 South Korea 5
Spain 4 Sri Lanka 4 Sudan 5
Suriname 2 Swaziland 1 Sweden 4
Switzerland 4 Syria 5 Tajikistan 4
Tanzania 3 Thailand 4 Timor-Leste 2
Togo 1 Tonga 3 Trinidad and Tobago 3
Tunisia* 4 Turkey 5 Turkmenistan 5
Tuvalu 2 Uganda 3 Ukraine* 5
United Arab Emirates 4 United Kingdom 5 United States 4
Uruguay 4 Uzbekistan 5 Vanuatu 2
Venezuela 5 Vietnam 5 Yemen 5
Zambia 1 Zimbabwe 2
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Table B.4: Dates Submitting UNSCR 1540 (* indicates non-permanent Council Member)
Afghanistan 2008-08-28 Albania 2004-10-28
Algeria* 2004-11-10 Andorra 2004-10-27
Angola* 2004-10-27 Antigua and Barbuda 2006-11-06
Argentina 2004-10-26 Armenia 2004-11-09
Australia 2004-10-28 Austria 2004-10-28
Azerbaijan 2004-10-28 Bahamas 2004-10-28
Bahrain 2004-12-22 Bangladesh 2006-06-27
Barbados 2008-03-28 Belarus 2004-10-20
Belgium 2004-10-26 Belize 2004-10-20
Benin* 2005-03-03 Bhutan 2009-08-19
Bolivia 2005-03-08 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004-11-22
Botswana 2008-04-18 Brazil* 2004-10-29
Brunei Darussalam 2004-12-30 Bulgaria 2004-11-18
Burkina Faso 2005-01-04 Burundi 2008-04-04
Cambodia 2005-03-21 Cameroon 2008-09-08
Canada 2004-12-31 Chile* 2004-10-27
China 2004-10-04 Colombia 2005-02-10
Congo 2012-09-17 Costa Rica 2004-08-04
Croatia 2004-11-29 Cuba 2004-10-28
Cyprus 2004-11-24 Czech Republic 2004-10-27
Denmark 2004-10-27 Djibouti 2005-03-17
Dominica 2008-04-17 Dominican Republic 2009-12-07
DRC 2008-04-28 Ecuador 2005-04-07
Egypt 2004-10-28 El Salvador 2005-09-28
Eritrea 2006-06-22 Estonia 2004-10-29
Ethiopia 2011-03-07 Fiji 2008-02-04
Finland 2004-10-28 France 2004-10-28
Gabon 2011-01-24 Georgia 2004-10-28
Germany* 2004-10-26 Ghana 2004-11-05
Greece 2004-10-22 Grenada 2005-09-26
Guatemala 2004-10-27 Guyana 2004-11-11
Honduras 2006-06-20 Hungary 2004-10-27
Iceland 2004-10-28 India 2004-11-01
Indonesia 2004-10-28 Iran 2005-02-28
Iraq 2005-04-13 Ireland 2004-10-28
Israel 2004-11-22 Italy 2004-10-27
Ivory Coast 2010-03-12 Jamaica 2005-04-05
Japan 2004-10-28 Jordan 2005-02-09
Kazakhstan 2004-11-03 Kenya 2005-07-20
Kiribati 2006-05-01 Kuwait 2005-03-31
Kyrgyzstan 2004-12-14 Laos 2005-05-03
Latvia 2004-10-28 Lebanon 2004-10-20
Lesotho 2014-01-15 Liberia 2013-07-15
Libya 2005-04-12 Liechtenstein 2004-10-29
Lithuania 2004-10-27 Luxembourg 2004-10-29
Macedonia, TFYR of 2004-11-22 Madagascar 2008-02-27
Malawi 2014-09-03 Malaysia 2004-10-26
Maldives 2008-11-04 Malta 2004-10-20
Marshall Islands 2004-11-23 Mauritius 2007-04-30
Mexico 2004-12-07 Micronesia 2008-06-27
Moldova 2004-12-17 Monaco 2004-10-29
Mongolia 2005-05-31 Morocco 2004-10-28
Myanmar 2005-04-06 Namibia 2004-10-26
Nauru 2008-04-04 Nepal 2006-03-17
Netherlands 2004-10-28 New Zealand 2004-10-28
Nicaragua 2007-01-26 Niger 2008-10-23
Nigeria 2004-10-28 Norway 2004-10-28
Oman 2004-12-17 Pakistan* 2004-10-27
Palau 2008-04-10 Panama 2005-07-12
Papua New Guinea 2008-04-24 Paraguay 2004-11-03
Peru 2004-11-01 Philippines* 2004-10-28
Poland 2004-10-27 Portugal 2004-10-28
Qatar 2004-11-05 Romania* 2004-10-27
Russian Federation 2004-10-26 Rwanda 2011-04-01
Saint Kitts and Nevis 2008-06-30 Saint Lucia 2009-12-03
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines 2008-09-17 Samoa 2006-04-13
San Marino 2007-12-13 Saudi Arabia 2004-11-01
Senegal 2005-03-31 Serbia 2005-01-05
Seychelles 2008-04-07 Sierra Leone 2007-12-17
Singapore 2004-10-21 Slovakia 2004-11-02
Slovenia 2004-10-28 South Africa 2005-01-31
South Korea 2004-10-27 Spain* 2004-10-26
Sri Lanka 2005-05-11 Sudan 2009-03-20
Suriname 2008-01-23 Sweden 2004-10-28
Switzerland 2004-10-22 Syria 2004-10-14
Tajikistan 2005-01-11 Tanzania 2005-08-29
Thailand 2004-11-05 Togo 2010-07-30
Tonga 2006-04-05 Trinidad and Tobago 2006-04-07
Tunisia 2004-11-10 Turkey 2004-11-01
Turkmenistan 2004-09-10 Tuvalu 2007-03-13
Uganda 2005-09-14 Ukraine 2004-10-25
United Arab Emirates 2004-12-09 United Kingdom 2004-09-29
United States 2004-10-12 Uruguay 2004-12-22
Uzbekistan 2004-11-15 Vanuatu 2007-02-22
Venezuela 2004-11-16 Vietnam 2004-10-26
Yemen 2004-12-29
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Table B.5: Countries Never Submitting a Report for UNSCR 1540
Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros
Equatorial Guinea Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau
Haiti Mali Mauritania Mozambique
North Korea Sao Tome and Principe Solomon Islands Somalia
Swaziland Timor-Leste Zambia Zimbabwe
Table B.6: Year Submitting First UNSCR 1624 Report (* indicates non-permanent Council Member)
Algeria* 2007 Andorra 2006 Antigua and Barbuda 2009
Argentina* 2006 Armenia 2006 Australia 2005
Austria 2006 Azerbaijan 2006 Bahamas 2009
Bahrain 2007 Belarus 2006 Belgium 2006
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 Brazil* 2006 Brunei Darussalam 2007
Bulgaria 2006 Burkina Faso 2006 Canada 2006
Chile 2006 China 2006 Colombia 2006
Costa Rica 2008 Cuba 2006 Cyprus 2006
Czech Republic 2006 Denmark* 2006 Djibouti 2006
DRC 2008 Ecuador 2008 Egypt 2006
El Salvador 2006 Estonia 2006 Finland 2006
France 2006 Germany 2006 Greece* 2006
Hungary 2006 India 2007 Indonesia 2006
Iran 2007 Iraq 2007 Ireland 2006
Israel 2006 Italy 2006 Jamaica 2008
Japan* 2006 Jordan 2006 Kazakhstan 2008
Kuwait 2006 Kyrgyzstan 2010 Laos 2007
Latvia 2006 Lebanon 2006 Lesotho 2009
Libya 2006 Liechtenstein 2006 Lithuania 2006
Luxembourg 2006 Madagascar 2009 Mauritius 2006
Mexico 2006 Micronesia 2010 Moldova 2006
Monaco 2006 Morocco 2006 Myanmar 2006
Namibia 2006 Netherlands 2006 New Zealand 2006
Nigeria 2008 North Korea 2010 Norway 2006
Oman 2010 Pakistan 2007 Palau 2010
Panama 2010 Paraguay 2006 Poland 2006
Portugal 2006 Qatar 2006 Romania* 2006
Russian Federation 2006 Saint Vincent and The Grenadines 2009 Saudi Arabia 2007
Serbia 2006 Seychelles 2006 Singapore 2006
Slovakia 2006 Slovenia 2006 South Africa 2006
South Korea 2006 Spain 2007 Sudan 2011
Suriname 2007 Sweden 2006 Switzerland 2006
Syria 2006 Tajikistan 2006 Thailand 2006
Tunisia 2006 Turkey 2006 Turkmenistan 2009
Ukraine 2006 United Kingdom 2006 United States 2006
Uruguay 2007 Uzbekistan 2006 Vietnam 2007
Yemen 2006 Zambia 2012
Table B.7: Countries Never Submitting a Report for UNSCR 1624
Afghanistan Albania Angola Bangladesh
Barbados Belize Benin Bhutan
Bolivia Botswana Burundi Cambodia
Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad
Comoros Congo Croatia Dominica
Dominican Republic Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia
Fiji Gabon Gambia Georgia
Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guinea
Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras
Iceland Ivory Coast Kenya Kiribati
Liberia Macedonia, TFYR of Malawi Malaysia
Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands
Mauritania Mongolia Mozambique Nauru
Nepal Nicaragua Niger Papua New Guinea
Peru Philippines Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Somalia
Sri Lanka Swaziland Tanzania Timor-Leste
Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tuvalu
Uganda United Arab Emirates Vanuatu Venezuela
Zimbabwe
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Appendix C Portuguese Version of
Survey
Background Questions:
Qual e´ o seu Partido Atual?
Qual e´ o seu Estado?
Qual foi a legenda pela qual voceˆ foi eleito ao Congreso?
Este e´ o primeiro mandato de voceˆ na Camara?
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Survey Part 1.1         Control #_____ 
 
Embaixo, escolha das respostas a que mais representa a sua opinião: 
 
Hoje em dia nos encontramos num mundo cada vez mais integrado.  A cooperação internacional ajuda os 
países a conseguir coisas que não poderiam alcançar sozinhos.  Neste sistema, os países às vezes têm que 
conformar com regras internacionais que não satisfazem a seus interesses imediatos.  Considerando tudo 
isto, em geral, você acha que o Brasil deve aumentar o ritmo de integração com regimes internacionais, 
diminuir este ritmo, ou manter o atual ritmo de integração.   
 
 
1. O Brasil deve aumentar o ritmo de integração com regimes internacionais 
 
 ou 
 
2. O Brasil deve diminuir este ritmo de integração com regimes internacionais 
  
 ou 
 
3. O Brasil deve manter o atual  ritmo de integração com regimes internacionais . 
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Survey 1.2         Control #_____ 
 
Embaixo, escolha das respostas a que mais representa a sua opinião: 
 
Como você sabe, um dos objetivos da política externa do Brasil é ser membro permanente no Conselho de 
Seguraça.  Contudo, se o Brasil fosse membro permanente do Conselho de Segurança, algumas situações 
difíceis poderiam surgir.  Por exemplo, o Conselho aprova uma resolução, mas o Brasil se opõe e vota  
contra.  Nesta situação, você acha que o Brasil deve fazer um esforço para cumprir a resolução por ser 
membro permanente do Conselho de Segurança, apesar de ser contra. 
 
1. Geralmente nesta situação, se fosse membro do Conselho, o Brasil deve fazer um esforco para 
cumprir com obrigações da resolução, apesar de ser contra. 
 
2. Geralmente nesta situação, se fosse membro do Conselho, Brasil não deve fazer um esforco para 
cumprir com obrigações da resolução, por ser contra. 
 
Considere a mesma situação.  Em geral, o Brasil deve tornar pública a sua opinião  sobre a resolução e 
até criticá-la, ou não? 
 
1. Sim. Nesta situação, o Brasil deve tornar pública a sua opinião sobre a resolução e até critica-la. 
 
2. Sim. Nesta situação, o Brasil deve  tornar pública a sua opinião sobre a resolução, mas deve 
evitar criticar muito dela. 
 
3. Não. Geralmente nesta situação, o Brasil não deve deixar saber publicamente o seu opinião 
verdadeira sobre a resolução, e tambem deve evitar muita crítica. 
 
      
Nesta situação, o Brasil sentiria mais ou menos pressão de fora de outros países, para cumprir com a 
resolução, se fosse parte do Conselho?  Mais expectativas, por exemplo, do que a Argentina, que não 
participou da criação da hipotética resolução como não é membro do Conselho?    
 
1. O Brasil sentiria mais pressão de fora para cumprir obrigações da resolução do que a Argentina. 
 
2. O Brasil sentiria menos pressão de fora para cumprir obrigações da resolução do que a 
Argentina. 
 
3. A pressão de fora para o cumprimento da resolução seria mais ou menos igual para o Brasil e a 
Argentina. 
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 Survey part 1.3         Control #  _____ 
 
Embaixo, escolha das respostas a que mais representa a sua opinião: 
Existe a impressão de que o Brasil não está fazendo o suficiente para criar um sistema de políticas e leis 
que possam punir terroristas do ponto de vista jurídico.  Uma das razões usadas para explicar a 
resistência em elaborar medidas mais duras é a experiência da ditadura militar. Naquele tempo, o 
governo, em nome do anti-terrorismo,  torturou e fez muitos cidadãos desaparecer. Contudo, isto significa 
que o Brasil é uma minoria entre os países importantes do mundo, por não possuir uma legislação forte e 
dura no combate a atividades que contribuem com o terrorismo.   Nos anos recentes, o Conselho de 
Segurança criou resoluções que obrigam todos os países integrantes da ONU a fortalecer a legislação 
nacional em respeito ao terrorismo.  Você acha que a existência destas resoluções é razão suficiente para 
fortalecer a lei nacional sobre o terrorismo?  
1. A existência de resoluçõesdo Conselho de Segurança é a razão mais importante para fortalecer 
as leis do Brasil de combate ao terrorismo. 
 
2. A existência de resoluçõesdo Conselho de Segurança é uma razão muito  importante para 
considerar o fortalecimento das leis do Brasil de combate ao terrorismo, estando acima das 
considerações nacionais. 
 
3. A existência de resoluções do Conselho de Segurança é uma razão para considerar o 
fortalecimento das leis do Brasil de combate ao terrorismo, mas interesses nacionais possuem a 
mesma importância. 
 
4. A existência de resoluções do Conselho de Segurança é uma razão para considerar o 
fortalecimento das leis do Brasil de combate ao terrorismo, mas interesses nacionais são mais 
importantes. 
 
5. A existência de resoluçõesdo Conselho de Segurança não deve ser  considerada na decisão de  
fortalecer ou não as leis do Brasil de combate ao terrorismo. 
 
Nesta área de legislação nacional anti-terrorismo, você acha que é mais importante para Brasil considerar 
as leis internacionais ou as opiniões dos países poderosos. 
 
 
1. A lei internacional é muito mais importante do que as opiniões dos países mais influentes. 
 
2. A lei internacional é um pouco mais importante do que as opiniões dos países mais influentes. 
 
3. A lei internacional e as opiniões dos países mais influentes possuem mais o menos a mesma 
importância.  
 
4. A lei internacional é um pouco menos importante do que as opiniões dos países mais influentes. 
 
5. A lei internacional é muito menos importante do que as opiniões dos países mais influentes. 
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Survey Part 1:          Control #A_____ 
 
Como você já sabe, o Conselho de Segurança da Organizacão das Nações Unidas considera problemas de 
paz e segurança global.  Recentamente, o Conselho de Segurança passou vários resoluções para avançar a 
agenda global de anti-terrorismo.  Isto significa que quinze países do Conselho criaram novas leis 
internacionais para todos os cento noventa tres países da ONU. 
Alguns professores de direito argumentam contra esta nova prática, porque as nações tornam-se 
responsáveis por uma lei que não ajudaram a criar.  
 
Alguns países não tem cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de Seguranca.  Considere tal país 
que não estava participando no Conselho quando foi aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a 
sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal país.     
 
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agora, considere de novo um país que não tenha cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de 
Seguranca.  Desta vez, contudo, considere tal país que estava participando no Conselho quando foi 
aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal 
país.     
  
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey Part 1:          Control #B_____ 
 
Como você já sabe, o Conselho de Segurança da Organizacão das Nações Unidas considera problemas de 
paz e segurança global.  Recentamente, o Conselho de Segurança passaram vários resoluções para 
avançar a agenda global de anti-terrorismo.  Isto significa que quinze países do Conselho criaram novas 
leis internacionais para todos os cento noventa tres países da ONU. 
Alguns professores de direito argumentam contra esta nova prática, porque as nações tornam-se 
responsáveis por uma lei que não ajudaram a criar.  
 
Alguns países não tem cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de Seguranca.  Considere tal país 
que estava participando no Conselho quando foi aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua 
opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal país.     
 
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agora, considere de novo um país que não tenha cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de 
Seguranca.  Desta vez, contudo, considere tal país que não estava participando no Conselho quando foi 
aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal 
país.     
  
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey Part 1:          Control #C_____ 
 
Como você já sabe, o Conselho de Segurança da Organizacão das Nações Unidas considera problemas de 
paz e segurança global.  Recentamente, o Conselho de Segurança passaram vários resoluções para 
avançar a agenda global de anti-terrorismo.  Isto significa que quinze países do Conselho criaram novas 
leis internacionais para todos os cento noventa tres países da ONU. 
 
 
Alguns países não tem cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de Seguranca.  Considere tal país 
que não estava participando no Conselho quando foi aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a 
sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal país.     
 
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agora, considere de novo um país que não tenha cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de 
Seguranca.  Desta vez, contudo, considere tal país que estava participando no Conselho quando foi 
aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal 
país.     
  
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
Qual foi a sua lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey Part 1:          Control #D_____ 
 
Como você já sabe, o Conselho de Segurança da Organizacão das Nações Unidas considera problemas de 
paz e segurança global.  Recentamente, o Conselho de Segurança passaram vários resoluções para 
avançar a agenda global de anti-terrorismo.  Isto significa que quinze países do Conselho criaram novas 
leis internacionais para todos os cento noventa tres países da ONU. 
 
 
Alguns países não tem cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de Seguranca.  Considere tal país 
que estava participando no Conselho quando foi aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua 
opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal país.     
 
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agora, considere de novo um país que não tenha cumprido com as obrigações legais do Conselho de 
Seguranca.  Desta vez, contudo, considere tal país que não estava participando no Conselho quando foi 
aprovado a resolução.  Na seguinte escala, qual é a sua opinão sobre como Brasil deve responder a tal 
país.     
  
 
 
                 1                  2                  3                        4                   5                6                     7 
 
O Brasil jamais 
deverá fazer novos 
acordos legais com 
este país.  
                       
                                                 
 
                                                                        
O Brasil dever ter 
muito vontade de 
fazer mais acordos 
legais no futuro 
com este país. 
Qual foi a sua lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey part 2:           Control #A_____ 
 
Na sua opinião, dê uma nota de acordo com a prioridade da área em que o Brasil deve focar.  (Um é o 
mais importante e cinco o menos importante). 
 
1.  ___ 
 
2.  ___ 
 
3.  ___ 
 
4.  ___ 
 
5.  ___ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Melhoria das práticas aérea para 
previnir  sequestros de aviões. 
 
B. Aumento de recursos para 
a inteligência Brasileira na área de 
contra-terrorismo. 
 
C. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança da 
Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas, para 
acabar com o financiamento do 
terrorismo e melhoria da cooperação 
internacional na area de anti-
terrorismo.  
 
D. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança sobre o 
controle de materiais que podem ser 
usados em armas de destrução maciça.  
 
E. Melhor cumprimento com a Convenção 
da Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas para 
o fim de atentados terroristas. 
 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey part 2:           Control #B_____ 
 
Na sua opinião, dê uma nota de acordo com a prioridade da área em que o Brasil deve focar.  (Um é o 
mais importante e cinco o menos importante). 
 
1.  ___ 
 
2.  ___ 
 
3.  ___ 
 
4.  ___ 
 
5.  ___ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Melhoria das práticas aérea para 
previnir  sequestros de aviões. 
 
B. Aumento de recursos para 
a inteligência Brasileira na área de 
contra-terrorismo. 
 
C. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança da 
Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas para 
acabar com o financiamento do 
terrorismo e melhoria da cooperação 
internacional na area de anti-
terrorismo.  
 
D. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança sobre o 
controle de materiais utilizáveis em 
armas de destrução maciça, que 
oBrasil aprovou quando foi membro do 
Conselho de Segurança. 
 
E. Melhor cumprimento com a Convenção 
da Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas para 
o fim de atentados terroristas. 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey part 2:           Control #C_____ 
 
Na sua opinião, dê uma nota de acordo com a prioridade da área em que o Brasil deve focar.  (Um é o 
mais importante e cinco o menos importante). 
 
1.  ___ 
 
2.  ___ 
 
3.  ___ 
 
4.  ___ 
 
5.  ___ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Melhoria das práticas aérea para 
previnir  sequestros de aviões. 
 
B. Aumento de recursos para 
a inteligência Brasileira na área de 
contra-terrorismo. 
 
C. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança da 
Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas para 
acabar com o financiamento do 
terrorismo e melhoria da cooperação 
internacional na area de anti-
terrorismo.  
 
D. Melhor cumprimento da Resolução do 
Conselho de Segurança sobre o 
controle de materiais utilizáveis em 
armas de destrução maciça. 
 
E. Melhor cumprimento com a Convenção 
da Organizaçao de Naçois Unidas para 
o fim de atentados terroristas. 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em cada resposta? 
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Survey part 3-A:          Control#A_____ 
 
Há muita preocupacão nestes dias sobre a difusão de armas nucleares.  Vou descrever um país que pode estar 
persiguindo armas nucleares ou não.  Por validade científica, a decripcão involve um tipo geral de países, em vez 
de um país específico nas notícias de hoje.  Algunas partes da descrição podem parecer muito importantes; outras 
partes podem parecer menos importantes.  Quando eu termino a descrição, vou lhe perguntar  – em seu melhor 
julgamento, dado que sua informacão é limitada ao disponivel – quão probavel ou não é que aquele país está 
tentando conseguir armas nucleares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O país hipotético 
é descrito ao lado 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Este país tem fronteiras com uma nação inimiga que possui 
armas nucleares e  ameaçou usá-las numa guerra futura. 
 
Este país tem dito várias vezes que não quer armas nucleares. 
 
Este país assinou o Tratado de Não-Proliferação Nuclear, 
prometendo assim “não receber, manufaturar ou adquirir 
armas nucleares de outra forma.” 
 
Imagens recentes de satélite demostram que o país começou a 
enriquecer urânio, que pode ser usado na área civil ou miltar.  
 
O país tem uma economia estagnada. 
 
 
Quão provável você diria que é que este país está tentando conseguir armas nucleares:  
 
 
            1                  2   3        4   5 
   muito provável            provável           mais o menos provável   improvável           muito improvável 
 
 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em sua resposta? 
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Survey part 3-A:          Control#B_____ 
 
Há muita preocupacão nestes dias sobre a difusão de armas nucleares.  Vou descrever um país que pode estar 
persiguindo armas nucleares ou não.  Por validade científica, a decripcão involve um tipo geral de países, em vez 
de um país específico nas notícias de hoje.  Algunas partes da descrição podem parecer muito importantes; outras 
partes podem parecer menos importantes.  Quando eu termino a descrição, vou lhe perguntar  – em seu melhor 
julgamento, dado que sua informacão é limitada ao disponivel – quão probavel ou não é que aquele país está 
tentando conseguir armas nucleares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O país hipotético 
é descrito ao lado 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Este país tem fronteiras com uma nação inimiga que possui 
armas nucleares e  ameaçou usá-las numa guerra futura. 
 
Este país tem dito várias vezes que não quer armas nucleares. 
 
O país ainda não assinou o Tratado de Não-Proliferação 
Nuclear. 
 
Imagens recentes de satélite demostram que o país começou a 
enriquecer urânio, que pode ser usado na área civil ou miltar.  
 
O país tem uma economia estagnada. 
 
 
Quão provável você diria que é que este país está tentando conseguir armas nucleares:  
 
 
            1                  2   3        4   5 
   muito provável            provável           mais o menos provável   improvável           muito improvável 
 
 
Qual foi a sua  lógica em sua resposta? 
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Survey Part 3-B:         Control#A_____ 
 
Considere dois países que fazem ameaças militares semelhantes. Um país faz sua ameaça em uma reunião privada 
com o presidente estrangeiro. O outro país faz a ameaça em um discurso público na Organização das Nações 
Unidas. Se no demais as ameaças são iguais,  que país é menos provável de estar blefando e, portanto, mais 
propenso de  cumprir com as ameaças, ou eles possuem as mesmas probabilidades cumpri-las?  
 
    Escohla a resposta que mais representa a sua opinião 
 
1. O país faz sua ameaça em uma reunião privada e menos provável de estar blefando e, portanto, mais 
propenso de  cumprir com as ameaças. 
 
2. O país faz sua ameaça em um  discurso publico menos provável de estar blefando e, portanto, mais 
propenso de  cumprir com as ameaças. 
 
3. As mesmas probabilidades. 
 
 
 
Survey Part 3-C  
 
Numa cúpula internacional, dois países prometeram publicamente defender seus aliados. Um anunciou a sua 
intenção oralmente, o outro assinou um tratado. Que país seria mais provável de defender seu aliado, ou eles 
teriam as mesmas probabilidades?  
 
    Escohla a resposta que mais representa a sua opinião 
 
1. O país que anunciou oralmente seria mais provável de defender seu aliado. 
 
2. O país que assinou um tratado seria  mais provável de defender seu aliado. 
 
3. As mesmas probabilidades. 
 
 
 
Survey Part 3-D:  
 
Compare as conseqüências de se quebrar dois tipos de compromissos internacionais: tratados escritos e assinados 
pelo líder versus as promessas orais feitas pelo líder.  Algumas pessoas dizem que se um país quebra um 
compromisso internacional a sua reputação pode ficar comprometida. Líderes estrangeiros podem se tornar mais 
descrentes em relação à disposição do país honrar compromissos no futuro. Qual das siguintes declarações  mais 
se aproxima da sua visão sobre como os dois tipos de ações --  quebra de um tratado escrito versus quebra de uma 
promessa oral -- afetariam a reputação internacional de um país?  
 
    Escohla a resposta que mais representa a sua opinião 
 
1. Violar um tratado escrito causaria mais danos à reputação do que violar um compromisso oral. 
 
2. Violar um compromisso oral causaria mais dano à reputação do que violar um tratado escrito. 
 
3. Os dois provávelmente causariam danos iguais ã reputação.  
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